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Chapter 1
Introduction
General Introduction
General equilibrium theory and cooperative game theory are different models
in economic theory describing perfectly competitive or cooperative behavior in
economic environments. This dissertation analyzes several aspects of the relation
between these different approaches.
General equilibrium theory describes the behavior of agents on perfectly com-
petitive markets. One considers some basic physical realities as the primitives of
the model. These can be preferences of the agents, consumption sets, production
sets and endowment vectors, but can also include several other aspects like time,
uncertainty, financial assets and much more. In a next step one analyzes the
equilibrium values of all variables of interest within a closed and interdependent
system. Hereby, it is in particular interesting to consider equilibrium prices. The
most prominent solution concept for Arrow-Debreu-Economies is the Walrasian
or competitive equilibrium. It reflects the idea that given the prices agents act as
price takers and maximize their utility subject to their budget constraints. Fur-
thermore, firms also act as price takers and choose profit maximizing production
plans. A tuple of price vectors, consumption plans of consumers and production
plans of producers is called a competitive equilibrium if the prices are such that all
markets clear, given the utility maximization of the agents and profit maximiza-
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tion of the firms. One typically considers questions like existence, uniqueness,
stability of equilibria but also the analysis of efficiency or social desirability of
competitive equilibria is of particular interest.
On the other hand, there is the theory on cooperative or coalitional games.
This theory can be used to describe many different kinds of interactive decision
situations where agents can form coalitions and make binding agreements about
their cooperation. The aim here is to study what groups can reach rather than
what individuals do. Hereby, one considers details of the behavior of the agents as
a black box and just analyzes which outcomes are achievable for which coalition.
Often, one even suppresses physical outcomes and considers only the allocations
of utility that are feasible for the coalitions. The set of players together with the
coalitional function is called a cooperative or coalitional game. The coalitional
function describes for each coalition the utility allocations that are achievable for
the coalition. Hereby, one often assumes that these outcomes are independent of
the behavior of the agents outside the coalition. A solution concept for cooperative
games assigns to each cooperative game a set of outcomes in terms of utility
vectors. Such solution concepts can be single valued but may also be set valued.
There exist several solution concepts for cooperative games like the core, inner
core, Nash bargaining solution, Shapley value, kernel, nucleolus and many others.
These solution concepts capture ideas like efficiency, stability, fairness, justice,
equity or others and try to predict or suggest possible agreements. One of the
most prominent solution concepts is the core where for elements of the core two
conditions have to hold. First, they have to be contained in the set of utility
allocations achievable for the grand coalition and, second, it must be impossible
for any coalition to make each member of this coalition better off than in the core
utility allocation.1
There exist mainly two approaches to study the relation between general
equilibrium theory and cooperative game theory. The first approach is to analyze
1There exists a slightly different definition of the core. This alternative definition re-
quires that core utility allocations have to be achievable for the grand coalition and,
furthermore, that there is no coalition that can assign to each member of the coalition
a utility that is at least as high as in the core utility allocation and to one member of
the coalition a utility that is higher than in the core utility allocation.
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an economy via concepts borrowed from game theory. Starting with a market
Shapley (1955) considers markets as cooperative games with two kinds of players,
seller and buyer. He introduces in this context the general notion of an ‘abstract
market game’. This is a cooperative game with certain conditions on the charac-
teristic function. Shubik (1959) extends the ideas of Edgeworth (from 1881) and
studies ‘Edgeworth market games’. In particular he shows that if the number
of players of both sides in an Edgeworth market game is the same, then the set
of imputations coincides with the contract curve of Edgeworth. Furthermore, he
considers non-emptiness conditions for the core of this class of games. Debreu
and Scarf (1963) show that under certain assumptions a competitive allocation
is in the core. Aumann (1964) investigates, based among others on the oceanic
games from Milnor and Shapley (1978)2, economies with a continuum of traders
and obtains that in this case the core equals the set of equilibrium allocations.
De Clippel and Minelli (2005) even show that competitive equilibrium allocations
are under mild conditions not only in the core, but even in the inner core, a re-
finement of the core. The core convergence theorem by Debreu and Scarf (1963)
shows that the core shrinks to the set of competitive equilibrium allocations if an
economy becomes very large in a specific way.
The second approach is to consider cooperative games themselves as economies
or markets and goes back to Shapley and Shubik (1969). They look at TU market
games. These are cooperative games with transferable utility (TU) that are in
a certain sense linked to economies or markets. More precisely, a market is said
to represent a game if the set of utility allocations a coalition can reach in the
market coincides with the set of utility allocations a coalition obtains according
to the coalitional function of the game. If there exists a market that represents a
game, then this game is called a market game. Shapley and Shubik (1969) prove
the identity of the class of totally balanced TU games with the class of TU market
games. In Shapley and Shubik (1975) they show that starting with a TU market
game every payoff vector in the core of that game is competitive in a certain
market, called direct market, and that for any given point in the core there exists
2The reference Milnor and Shapley (1978) is based on the Rand research memoranda
from the early 1960’s.
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at least one market that has this payoff vector as its unique competitive payoff
vector.
Cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) can be considered as
a generalization of TU games, where the transfer of the utility within a coalition
does not take place at a fixed rate. After Shapley and Shubik (1969), Billera
and Bixby (1974) investigated the NTU case and obtained similar results for
compactly convexly generated NTU games. Analogously to the result of Shapley
and Shubik (1969) they show that every totally balanced NTU game, that is
compactly convexly generated, is a market game. The inner core is a refinement
of the core for NTU games. A point is in the inner core if there exists a transfer
rate vector, such that - given this transfer rate vector - no coalition can improve
even if utility can be transferred within a coalition according to the transfer rates
given by this vector. So, an inner core point is in the core of an associated
hyperplane game where the utility can be transferred according to the transfer
rate vector. The notion of the inner core was first described by Shapley and
Shubik (1975) and formalized by Shapley (1984). Sufficient conditions for the
non-emptiness of the inner core are studied in Qin (1994), Inoue (2010a) and
in Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2007). Furthermore, de Clippel and Minelli (2005)
give indirectly conditions for the non-emptiness of the inner core via economies.
A recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2011) discusses necessary and
sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the inner core. Hereby, they make
use of the notion of payoff depend balancedness developed in Bonnisseau and Iehle´
(2007). Qin (1994) analyzes the relation of the inner core with strictly inhibitive
sets and de Clippel (2002) gives an axiomatization of the inner core.
It turns out that the inner core is a suitable concept in the context of NTU
market games. Qin (1993) shows, verifying a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik
(1975), that the inner core of a market game coincides with the set of competitive
payoff vectors of the induced market of that game. Moreover, he shows that for
every NTU market game and for any given point in its inner core there exists a
market that represents the game and further has this given inner core point as its
unique competitive payoff vector. These results indicate the loss of information
when going from markets to market games, since different markets can represent
4
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the same market game.
There exist other approaches to market games where different kinds of pro-
duction are considered. In their work about TU-games Sun et al. (2008) consider
economies with coalitional production. Motivated by Sun et al. (2008) and the
approach of Billera and Bixby (1974), Inoue (2010b) considers the NTU-case.
He proves that every compactly generated NTU game can be represented by a
coalition production economy. Moreover, he proves that there exists a coalition
production economy such that its set of competitive payoff vectors coincide with
the inner core of the balanced cover of the original NTU game. Bejan and Gomez
(2010) consider not necessarily balanced TU games. They show that the aspira-
tion core of a TU game coincides with the set of competitive wages of two different
types of direct production economies including coalitional production. Garratt
and Qin (2000a) and Bejan and Gomez (2011) consider market games with time
constraints or even time and location constraints. Bejan and Gomez (2011) show
that in economies with time and location constraints and without free disposal
every TU game is a TU market game in the sense that the game can be generated
by an economy of this special type.
Trockel (1996, 2000) introduces an alternative approach and interprets in an
NTU-context bargaining games directly as Arrow-Debreu or as coalition pro-
duction economies. He shows that the unique equilibrium of such an economy
coincides with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of the underlying game
where the weights of the bargaining solution correspond to the shares in produc-
tion. One difference to other literature is that he uses a stylized models with
outputs in the production without requiring inputs.
Another contribution discussing the relation of bargaining solutions with com-
petitive equilibria is an article by Sertel and Yildiz (2003). They consider pure ex-
change economies and study bargaining games that are induced by these economies.
They prove ”that there are distinct exchange economies whose Walrasian equi-
librium welfare payoffs disagree but which define the same bargaining problem
and should have hence determined the same bargaining solution and its payoffs.”
So, they show that in general there cannot be a bargaining solution that always
yields the same payoffs as competitive equilibria.
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But the results of Sertel and Yildiz (2003) just show the impossibility of a Wal-
rasian bargaining solution in a very general setup. Under more restrictive condi-
tions it is possible to give a bargaining solution that yields the same payoffs as
Walrasian equilibria. John (2005) considers economies with linear utility functions
and proportionally divided endowments. In this situation a certain asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution yields exactly the competitive equilibrium allocations.
Moulin (2003) mentions only in passing that there should exist a version of the
results of John (2005) in the context of homogeneous utility functions.
Ervig and Haake (2005) also compare economies and bargaining games. They
show that in their model the payoffs of competitive equilibria coincide with payoffs
resulting from asymmetric versions of the Perles-Maschler bargaining solution.
The main reason for their different result is that they restrict consumer demand
by the total endowments of the economy.
Chipman and Moore (1979) discuss the relation of individual demand, ag-
gregate demand and social welfare functions. They consider in particular the
question whether the market demand function can be seen as the demand func-
tion of some representative consumer.
Contents of this dissertation
This dissertation studies several aspects of the relation of economies and coop-
erative games. Hereby, the focus is on the relation of solution concepts of the
different fields. More precisely, we discuss the relation of competitive equilibria
with solution concepts for cooperative games like core, inner core or asymmetric
Nash bargaining solutions. We consider games and study which solutions appear
as equilibria in economies representing these games. On the other hand we ana-
lyze when competitive equilibria of economies and cooperative solutions applied
to induced games yield the same allocations.
The dissertation consists of four chapters. Hereby, the first three chapters are
in joint work with Sonja Brangewitz (EBIM, Bielefeld University). We worked
together on these chapters with equal overall contributions of both of us. These
chapters are also a part of her dissertation.
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Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market
Games
In the second chapter we investigate the relationship between certain subsets of
the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors of certain markets
linked to that game. Given a TU market we consider a certain market depending
on a given compact, convex subset of the core. We prove that this market repre-
sents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of competitive
equilibria. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases
of Shapley and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be ex-
tended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they omit the details of the
proof which we present here. This more general case is in particular interesting,
as the two theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases.
Furthermore, it is interesting to see this result in contrast to the NTU version
presented in the third chapter. While in chapter 2 convex, closed subsets of the
core are considered it turns out that in the context of NTU market games the
appropriate approach is to study compact subsets of the inner core. Also the
techniques used in those chapters differ substantially.
More precisely, we denote with N = {1, 2..., n} the set of players. The set
of all non-empty coalitions is given by N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}. Thus, a coalition
is a non-empty subset of players. A cooperative game with transferable utility
(TU) is given by the pair (N, v) where N is the player set and v : N → R is the
characteristic or coalitional function.3 One well known solution concept for TU
games is the core. The core C(v) of a TU game (N, v) is the set of payoff vectors
where the value v(N), the grand coalition N can achieve, is distributed and no
coalition can improve upon,
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn|x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ N}.
We consider the relation of games to a certain class of pure exchange-economies
3Shapley and Shubik (1969) define the characteristic function as well for the empty set
with v(∅) = 0. Others, for example Billera and Bixby (1974), exclude the empty set
from this definition.
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called markets.
Definition 1 (market). Let N = {1, 2..., n} be the set of agents. A market is
given by E = (Xi, ωi, ui)i∈N where for every individual i ∈ N
- Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set, where
ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- ωi ∈ Xi is the initial endowment vector,
- ui : Xi → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility function.
Having introduced the notion of markets one can define when games are re-
lated to markets and analyze which games are related to markets. We follow
the notion of Shapley and Shubik (1975) and define a TU market game in the
following way:
Definition 2 (TU market game). A TU game (N, v) that is representable by a
market is a TU market game. This means that there exists a market E such that
(N, vE) = (N, v) with
vE(S) = max
xS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
ui(xi) for all S ∈ N .
We analyze which kind of equilibria markets have that represent a game.
Hereby, we use a notion of equilibrium that suppresses the explicit use of a nu-
meraire commodity. In an extended model this commodity could be used to make
transfers of utility between different agents possible.
Definition 3 (competitive solution). A competitive solution is an ordered pair
(p∗, (x∗i)i∈N ), where p
∗ is an arbitrary n-vector of prices and x∗N is a feasible
N -allocation, such that
ui(x∗i)− p∗ · x∗i = max
xi∈Rl+
[ui(xi)− p · xi] for all i ∈ N.
The following notion describes payoffs of equilibria.
8
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Definition 4 (competitive payoff vector). A vector α∗ is a competitive payoff
vector if it arises from a competitive solution (p∗, (x∗i)i∈N ) such that
α∗i = ui(x∗i)− p∗ · (x∗i − ωi).
A competitive payoff vector describes the payoffs of competitive equilibria in
the complete model incorporating a numeraire commodity. The definition goes
back to Shapley and Shubik (1975) and is more precisely discussed in chapter 2.
In so called direct markets the competitive payoff vectors appear also as the set
of equilibrium price vectors.
The main result of this chapter is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let (N, v) be a TU market game and let A be a closed, convex subset
of the core. Then there exists a market such that this market represents the game
(N, v) and such that the set of competitive payoff vectors of this market is the set
A.
Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU
Market Games
In the third chapter we consider the classical approach using NTU market games.
Hereby, it is well known that a market game can be represented by several mar-
kets. A natural question that arises in this context is which competitive equilibria
those economies have. In particular, it is not clear which utility payoffs these equi-
libria generate and how they are related to the game. We investigate the case
in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993), where on the one hand there
exists a market that has the complete inner core as set of its competitive payoff
vector and on the other hand for any given inner core point there is a market
that has this point as its unique competitive payoff vector. We extend the re-
sults of Qin (1993) to compact subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market
game we construct a market depending on a given compact subset of the inner
core. This market represents the game and further has the given set as the set
of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria. Hereby, we can not chose arbitrary
9
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compact subsets of the inner core but only subsets satisfying a condition called
strict positive separability. This condition mainly requires that any point con-
tained in the compact set can be strictly separated from the set of allocations of
utility available for the grand coalition. As this condition is relatively mild our
result shows that mainly any compact subset of the inner core of a given game
can appear as the set of payoff vectors of an economy representing that game.
The result is interesting itself as it gives new insights into the structural relation
of market games and markets, but it could also be useful in the context of market
foundations of compact valued solutions for cooperative games. The result is an
NTU version of the results presented in chapter 2.
In our work we follow the notion of Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin (1993). An
NTU (non-transferable utility) game is a pair (N,V ), that consists of a player set
N = {1, ..., n} and a coalitional function V . The coalitional function defines for
every coalition a set of utility allocations this coalition can reach, regardless of
what players outside this coalition do. Hence, the coalitional function V is defined
as a mapping from the set of coalitions, N , to the set of non-empty subsets of Rn,
such that for every coalition S ∈ N we have V (S) ⊆ RS , V (S) is non-empty and
V (S) is S-comprehensive, meaning V (S) ⊇ V (S)−RS+. Hereby, RS is defined as
RS = {x ∈ Rn|xi = 0 if i /∈ S} ⊆ Rn. The core C(V ) of an NTU game (N,V ) is
defined as the set of utility allocations that are achievable by the grand coalition
N such that no coalition S can improve upon this allocation. Thus, in the NTU
context the core is defined as
C(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)| ∀S ⊆ N ∀u′ ∈ V (S) ∃ i ∈ S such that u′i ≤ ui}.
It turns out that in the context of NTU market games a refinement of the core,
the inner core, is a suitable concept. To introduce it we need the following notion.
Definition 5 (λ-transfer game). Let (N,V ) be a compactly generated NTU game
and let λ ∈ RN+ . Define the λ-transfer game of (N,V ) by (N,Vλ) with
Vλ(S) = {u ∈ RS |λ · u ≤ vλ(S)}
where vλ(S) = max{λ · u|u ∈ V (S)}.
10
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The idea of the λ-transfer game is that we allow for transfers of utility within
a coalition according to the transfer rates given by the vector λ. Now we can use
this notion to introduce the inner core.
Definition 6 (inner core, Shubik (1984)). The inner core IC(V ) of a compactly
generated NTU game (N,V ) is
IC(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)|∃λ ∈ ∆ such that u ∈ C(Vλ)}
where C(Vλ) denotes the core of the λ-transfer game of (N,V ).
We analyze the relation of games to economies. Therefore, we consider a
particular class of economies called markets. Deviating from the definition in the
TU case we consider economies with production where each agent owns his own
firm. 4
Definition 7 (market). A market is given by E = (Xi, Y i, ωi, ui)
i∈N
where for
every individual i ∈ N
- Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set, where
ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- Y i ⊆ Rℓ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the production set, such
that Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0},
- ωi ∈ Xi − Y i, the initial endowment vector,
- and ui : Xi → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility function.
In a market we can describe which allocations are feasible for coalitions.
An S-allocation is a tuple
(
xi
)
i∈S
such that xi ∈ Xi for each i ∈ S. The set
of feasible S-allocations is given by
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ S,∑
i∈S
(xi − ωi) ∈
∑
i∈S
Y i
}
.
4This type of economies was considered in Hurwicz (1960), Rader (1964), Billera (1974),
Qin (1993), Qin and Shubik (2009), among others
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A feasible S-allocation is an allocation that is feasible for a coalition S if the
members of the coalition use their joint endowments and produce with their firms.
Having introduced this notion we can analyze which games are related to
markets. An NTU game is called an NTU market game if there exists a market
such that the set of utility allocations a coalition can reach according to the
coalitional function coincides with the set of utility allocations that are generated
by feasible S-allocations in the market or that give less utility than some feasible
S-allocation. The main result of this chapter is the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let (N,V ) be an NTU market game and let A be a compact subset
of the inner core of (N,V ). Suppose that the game together with the set A satisfy
the condition of strict positive separability. Then there exists a market such that
a) this market represents the game (N,V ) and
b) the set of competitive payoff vectors of this market is the set A.
Inner Core, asymmetric Nash and competitive payoffs
In the fourth chapter we discuss the relation of the inner core with the set of
asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for bargaining games. We show that the
set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive weights
coincides with the inner core, if all points in the underlying bargaining set are
strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every bargaining game is a mar-
ket game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude that for every possible
vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists an econ-
omy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive
payoff vector. We relate the articles of Trockel (1996, 2005) with the ideas of Qin
(1993). Our result can be seen as a market foundation of the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution in analogy to the results on non-cooperative foundations of
cooperative games.
More precisely, we introduce the following notion of a comprehensive bargain-
ing game.
12
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Definition 8 (NTU bargaining game). Define an NTU bargaining game(N,V )
with the generating set B using the player set N and the coalitional function
V : N −→ P (Rn)
defined by
V ({i}) : = {b ∈ Rn|bi ≤ 0, bj = 0, ∀j 6= i} = {0} − R{i}+ ,
V (S) : = {0} − RS+ for all S with 1 < |S| < n,
V (N) : =
{
b ∈ Rn|∃ b′ ∈ B : b ≤ b′} = B − Rn+.
We apply the well known concept of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
to this bargaining game.
Definition 9 (asymmetric Nash bargaining solution). The asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution with a vector of weights θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ ∆n++, for short
θ-asymmetric, for a n-person NTU bargaining game (N,V ) with disagreement
point 0 is defined as the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash product given by∏n
i=1 u
θi
i over the set V (N).
5
If ν =
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
the ν-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is called the
(symmetric) Nash bargaining solution. We obtain the following result about the
relation of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions with the inner core.
Proposition 1. Let (N,V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game with disagree-
ment point 0 and generating set B ⊆ Rn++.
• Suppose we have given a vector of weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆n++. Then the
θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, aθ, is in the inner core of (N,V ).
• For any given inner core point aθ we can find an appropriate vector of
weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆n++ such that aθ is the maximizer of the θ-
asymmetric Nash product
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i .
5For bargaining games with a general threat point d ∈ Rn the θ-asymmetric Nash product
is given by
∏n
i=1 (ui − di)θi .
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Combining this proposition with the results of Qin (1993) we obtain the main
result of the chapter.
Proposition 2. Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N,V ) (with disagree-
ment point 0 and generating set from Rn+) and a vector of weights θ ∈ ∆n++,
there is market that represents (N,V ) and where additionally the unique competi-
tive payoff vector of this market coincides with the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution aθ of the NTU bargaining game (N,V ).
Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and perfect com-
petition
Chapter 5 builds on an unpublished mimeo by Reinhard John. The idea of this
paper is to study the compatibility of competitive equilibria with concepts of
bargaining theory and in particular with asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
We consider a pure exchange economy and study this economy on the one hand
with means of general equilibrium theory and on the other hand with means of
cooperative bargaining theory. It turns out that sets of competitive equilibrium
allocations and of allocations resulting from an asymmetric Nash bargaining so-
lution coincide as long as one restricts attention to economies where agents have
homogeneous (of degree 1) utility functions and where the initial endowments are
proportionally distributed. We study what happens when these assumptions are
relaxed or changed. Our result also holds if the agents have utility functions that
are homogeneous of the same degree k with 0 < k ≤ 1. Moreover, we analyze
the robustness of the result. Modifying the utility functions via certain monotone
transformation of utility leads to a breakdown of the implications of the results.
Furthermore, the unusual choice of the status quo point is analyzed in detail.
More precisely, we consider economies with n consumers i = 1, ..., n and m
commodities j = 1, ..., l. An economy is a tuple
((
(Xi, ui)ni=1
)
, e
)
. Xi = Rl+
is the consumption set of consumer i. Each consumer is described by a utility
function
ui : Xi −→ R (1.1)
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which is weakly increasing, locally nonsatiated, concave, continuous and homo-
geneous of degree 1. Applying the concept of the Walrasian equilibrium in the
context of a proportional division of the endowments leads to the following defi-
nition.
Definition 10. An allocation x¯ ∈ A is called a Walras allocation with respect
to (the ownership or income distribution) α if there exists a price vector p =
(pj)
l
j=1 ∈ Rl+ \ {0} such that
For i = 1, ..., n : x¯i maximizes ui
(
xi
)
subject to
xij ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., l,
p · xi ≤ p · (αie) for all i = 1, ..., n
n∑
i=1
x¯i ≤ e and p ·
(
n∑
i=1
x¯i − e
)
= 0.
In order to analyze this situation from the viewpoint of cooperative game
theory we apply an asymmetric version of the Nash bargaining solution. That
leads to the following definition.
Definition 11. A feasible allocation x¯ ∈ A is called a Nash allocation with
respect to α if it maximizes U˜α (x) =
n∏
i=1
(
ui
(
xi
))αi on the set of all feasible
allocation, i.e. if x¯ is a solution to
max U˜α(x) subject to
xij ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., l
n∑
i=1
xij − ej ≤ 0 for all j = 1, ..., l
The following proposition is the main result of chapter 5.
Proposition 3. An allocation x¯ =
(
x¯i
)n
i=1
is a Nash allocation with respect to α
if and only if it is a Walras allocation with respect to α.
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Short Overview
The main chapters of this thesis, each of which self contained in notation, are
based on four articles. Chapters 2 and 3 consider extensions of the results of
Shapley and Shubik (1975) and Qin (1993) to subsets of the core respectively the
inner core. Chapter 2 considers the case of TU market games while in Chapter
3 the NTU case is analyzed. Chapter 4 investigates the relation of asymmetric
Nash bargaining solutions with the inner core in the context of bargaining games.
We conclude that asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions are related to certain
markets. The fifth Chapter considers the relation of asymmetric Nash bargaining
solutions and competitive equilibria but now starting with economies and looking
at induced bargaining games.
Chapters 2 and 3 stress the loss of information when going from markets to
games. They illustrate that it is impossible to reconstruct payoffs of equilibria of
economies if one just has information about the possible allocations of utility, i.e.
about the coalitional function. In contrast to this result (and also in contrast to
the results of Sertel and Yildiz (2003)) chapter 5 illustrates that the conclusion
is not correct if one restricts attention to economies with homogeneous utility
functions (see chapter 5 for the detailed conditions). But this result is not very
robust. Already small deviations from the assumptions lead to a breakdown of
the results. So, only under very restrictive conditions it is possible to consider
an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the bargaining solution describing
payoffs of competitive equilibria.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are also directly related. Chapter 4 makes direct
use of the results of Qin (1993) and the results of Chapter 3 which show that
essentially anything within the inner core can appear as the set of payoffs of
competitive equilibria of some market. Therefore, in particular the set of utility
payoffs given by an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution appear as the set of
payoffs of competitive equilibria of some market. This market can be chosen as
the market constructed by Qin (1993) or as the market given in Chapter 3.
Chapters 4 and 5 both discuss the relation of asymmetric Nash bargaining
solutions with competitive equilibria of certain economies. Nevertheless, both
16
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approaches differ substantially. In chapter 4 we start with an arbitrary NTU
bargaining game and pick a certain market representing this bargaining game.
In this suitably chosen market utility payoff vectors of competitive equilibria and
those allocations of utility, that an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution yields,
coincide. In contrast to that, in chapter 5 we start with a given economy with
certain properties. We show that the competitive equilibrium payoff vectors of
this economy coincide with the vector of utilities given by an asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution of the induced bargaining game.
To this point we have given a brief outline of the general context and devel-
opments which lead to this work. Since the questions and topics treated in the
following chapters differ, a more detailed scientific placement of this work will be
discussed in each chapter separately. This includes separate introductions and
conclusions.
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Introduction ge´ne´rale
La the´orie de l’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral et la the´orie des jeux coope´ratifs sont deux mod-
e`les diffe´rents de l’e´conomie the´orique permettant de de´crire les comportements
compe´titifs ou coope´ratifs. Cette the`se analyse diffe´rents aspects des relations
entre ces deux the´ories.
La the´orie de l’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral de´crit le comportement des agents sur des
marche´s parfaitement compe´titifs. On conside`re des donne´es physiques comme
des e´le´ments primitifs du mode`le. Cela peut eˆtre les pre´fe´rences des agents, les
ensembles de consommation, les ensembles de production et les vecteurs de dota-
tions initiales, mais aussi plusieurs autres aspects comme le temps, l’incertain,
les actifs financiers et bien d’autres. Dans une e´tape ulte´rieure, on analyse les
valeurs de toutes les variables endoge`nes a` l’e´quilibre a` l’inte´rieur d’un syste`me
complet d’e´quations interde´pendantes. En conse´quence, il est particulie`rement
inte´ressant de conside´rer les prix d’e´quilibre. Le concept de solution dominant
pour les e´conomies a` la Arrow-Debreu est l’e´quilibre de Walras ou compe´titif. Il
traduit l’ide´e qu’e´tant donne´ les prix, les agents agissent comme s’ils n’avaient
pas d’influence sur ceux-ci et maximisent leurs fonctions d’utilite´ sous leur con-
trainte budge´taire. De plus, les entreprises agissent aussi en prenant les prix
comme une donne´e et choisissent des productions qui maximisent le profit. La
donne´e d’un vecteur de prix, de consommations pour les consommateurs et de
productions pour les producteurs est appele´ un e´quilibre compe´titif si les prix sont
tels que l’offre est e´gal a` la demande sur tous les marche´s. Dans ce contexte, on
e´tudie typiquement les questions d’existence, d’unicite´, de stabilite´ des e´quilibres
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mais l’analyse de l’efficacite´ ou de l’efficience sociale est aussi particulie`rement
inte´ressante.
La the´orie des jeux coope´ratifs ou des jeux avec coalitions est une autre ap-
proche des interactions entre agents e´conomiques. Cette the´orie peut eˆtre utilise´e
pour de´crire de nombreux types d’interactions ou` les agents peuvent former des
coalitions et faire des accords contraignants sur leur coope´ration. L’objectif ici
est d’e´tudier quels groupes peuvent eˆtre atteints plutoˆt que ce que les individus
vont faire. Ainsi, les de´tails sur le comportement des agents est traite´ comme une
boite noire. On analyse seulement quelles conse´quences sont re´alisables par quelles
coalitions en prenant en compte les pre´fe´rences des agents sur ces conse´quences.
Souvent, on ne conside`re meˆme pas les conse´quences physiques mais seulement
les niveaux d’utilite´ re´alisables par les coalitions. L’ensemble des joueurs avec
les fonctions de coalition est appele´ un jeu coope´ratif. Les fonctions de coali-
tion de´crivent les niveaux d’utilite´ re´alisables pour chaque coalition. On suppose
souvent que ces niveaux d’utilite´s sont inde´pendant du comportement des agents
hors de la coalition. Un concept de solution pour les jeux coope´ratifs associe a`
chaque jeu un ensemble de conse´quences exprime´es en terme de niveau d’utilite´.
Les ensembles de solutions peuvent eˆtre des singletons ou multivoques. Il existe
plusieurs concepts de solution pour les jeux coope´ratifs comme le coeur, le coeur
interne, la solution de marchandage a` la Nash, la valeur de Shapley, le noyau,
le nucleolus et bien d’autres. Ces concepts traduisent des notions d’efficacite´, de
stabilite´, d’e´quite´, de justice ou d’autres et tentent de pre´dire ou de sugge´rer des
accords possibles. L’un des principaux concepts est le coeur pour lequel deux
conditions doivent eˆtre satisfaites. Premie`rement, les niveaux d’utilite´ dans le
coeur doivent eˆtre re´alisables par la grande coalition regroupant tous les joueurs
et, deuxie`mement, il ne doit pas eˆtre possible pour une coalition d’assurer a` tous
ses membres un niveau d’utilite´ strictement supe´rieur a` celui offert par l’e´le´ment
du coeur conside´re´.6
Il existe principalement deux approches pour e´tudier les liens entre the´orie
6Il existe une version un peu diffe´rente pour le coeur. Celle-ci requiert que les niveaux
d’utilite´ doivent eˆtre re´alisables par la grande coalition et que, de plus, aucune coalition
peut garantir a` chacun de ses membres un niveau d’utilite´ supe´rieur ou e´gal a` celui de
l’e´le´ment propose´ et strictement plus grand pour au moins un de ses membres.
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de l’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral et the´orie des jeux coope´ratifs. La premie`re approche est
d’analyser une e´conomie avec les concepts emprunte´s a` la the´orie des jeux. Shap-
ley (1955) conside`re les marche´s comme des jeux coope´ratifs avec deux types
de joueurs, les vendeurs et les acheteurs. Il introduit dans ce contexte la no-
tion ge´ne´rale d’un “jeu de marche´ abstrait”. C’est un jeu coope´ratif avec cer-
taines conditions sur les fonctions caracte´ristiques. Shubik (1959) e´tend les ide´es
d’Edgeworth (de 1881) et e´tudie les “jeux de marche´ d’Edgeworth”. En partic-
ulier, il montre que si le nombre d’agents des deux coˆte´s dans un jeu de marche´
d’Edgeworth est le meˆme, alors l’ensemble des conse´quences co¨ıncide avec les
courbes des contrats d’Edgeworth. De plus, il conside`re des conditions suffisantes
de non vacuite´ pour le coeur de cette classe de jeux. Debreu and Scarf (1963)
montre que sous certaines hypothe`ses une allocation associe´e a` un e´quilibre com-
pe´titif appartient au coeur. En partant des jeux oce´aniques introduit entre autres
par Milnor and Shapley (1978)7, Aumann (1964) examine les e´conomies avec un
continuum d’agents et obtient que le coeur co¨ıncide alors avec l’ensemble des al-
locations d’e´quilibre. De Clippel and Minelli (2005) montre meˆme que sous des
conditions assez faibles, les allocations d’e´quilibre appartiennent non seulement
au coeur mais aussi au coeur interne, qui est un raffinement du coeur. Le the´ore`me
de convergence vers le coeur de Debreu and Scarf (1963) montre que le coeur se
re´tre´cit vers l’ensemble des allocations d’e´quilibre si l’e´conomie devient de plus
en plus grande dans un sens bien pre´cis.
La deuxie`me approche, datant de Shapley and Shubik (1969), est de con-
side´rer les jeux coope´ratifs eux-meˆmes comme des e´conomies ou marche´s. Dans
Shapley and Shubik (1969), les auteurs conside`re les jeux de marche´s avec utilite´
transfe´rable (TU). Ce sont des jeux coope´ratifs TU qui sont dans un certain sens
relie´s aux e´conomies ou marche´s. Plus pre´cise´ment, un marche´ repre´sente un jeu
si l’ensemble des niveaux d’utilite´ qu’une coalition peut atteindre dans le marche´
co¨ıncide avec l’ensemble des niveaux d’utilite´ pour cette coalition donne´ par la
fonction de coalition. S’il existe un marche´ qui repre´sente le jeu, alors le jeu est
appele´ un jeu de marche´. Shapley and Shubik (1969) montre l’identite´ entre la
7La re´fe´rence Milnor and Shapley (1978) est base´e sur le Rand research memoranda de
de´but des anne´es 60.
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classe des jeux TU totalement e´quilibre´ avec la classe des jeux de marche´ TU.
Dans Shapley and Shubik (1975), il montre qu’en partant d’un jeu de marche´
TU, tous les vecteurs de paiements dans le coeur du jeu sont des niveaux d’utilite´
d’e´quilibre d’un certain marche´ appele´ marche´ direct, et que pour tout point dans
le coeur, il existe au moins un marche´ tel que ce paiement est l’unique niveau
d’utilite´ d’e´quilibre de ce marche´.
Les jeux coope´ratifs a` utilite´ non-transfe´rable (NTU) peuvent eˆtre vu comme
une ge´ne´ralisation des jeux a` utilite´ transfe´rable, ou` les transferts a` l’inte´rieur
d’une coalition ne peuvent pas eˆtre fait a` un taux d’e´change constant. Apre`s
Shapley and Shubik (1969), Billera and Bixby (1974) a e´tudie´ les jeux NTU et
a obtenu des re´sultats similaires pour les jeux NTU ge´ne´re´s par des convexes
compacts. De manie`re analogue au re´sultat de Shapley and Shubik (1969), ils
montrent que tous les jeux NTU totalement e´quilibre´s et ge´ne´re´s par des convexes
compacts sont des jeux de marche´.
Le coeur interne est un raffinement du coeur pour les jeux NTU. Un paiement
appartient au coeur interne s’il existe un vecteur de taux de transfert tel que,
e´tant donne´ ce vecteur, aucune coalition ne peut ame´liorer le paiement meˆme si
les niveaux d’utilite´s pourraient eˆtre transfe´re´s en suivant les taux donne´s par le
vecteur. Donc, un e´le´ment dans le coeur interne est un e´le´ment du coeur d’un
jeux associe´ ou les ensembles d’utilite´s re´alisables sont des demi-espaces de´finis
par le vecteur de taux de transfert. La notion de coeur interne a e´te´ de´crite pour
la premie`re fois par Shapley and Shubik (1975) et formalise´ dans Shapley (1984).
Des conditions suffisantes pour le non-vacuite´ du coeur interne ont e´te´ propose´es
dans Qin (1994), Inoue (2010a) et dans Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2007). De plus,
de Clippel and Minelli (2005) donne des conditions indirectes pour la non-vacuite´
du coeur interne pour les jeux de´rive´s d’une e´conomie. Une contribution re´cente
de Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2011) discute des conditions ne´cessaires et suffisantes
pour la non-vacuite´ du coeur interne. Qin (1994) analyse la relation entre le coeur
interne avec les ensembles strictement inhibitifs et de Clippel (2002) donne une
axiomatisation du coeur interne.
Il apparaˆıt que le coeur interne est un concept approprie´ dans le contexte des
jeux de marche´ NTU. Ve´rifiant une conjecture de Shapley and Shubik (1975), Qin
22
1.
(1993) montre que le coeur interne d’un jeu de marche´ co¨ıncide avec l’ensemble
des vecteurs de paiements compe´titifs du marche´ induit par le jeu. De plus, il
montre que pour tout jeu de marche´ NTU et pour n’importe quel e´le´ment dans
le coeur interne, il existe un marche´ qui repre´sente le jeu et qui a pour unique
paiement compe´titif l’e´le´ment choisi dans le coeur interne. Ces re´sultats montrent
la perte d’information lorsqu’on va des marche´s aux jeux de marche´, parce que
diffe´rents marche´s peuvent repre´senter le meˆme jeu.
Il existe d’autres approches des jeux de marche´ ou` diffe´rents types de pro-
duction sont introduites. Dans leur travail sur les jeux TU, Sun et al. (2008)
conside`rent des e´conomies avec des productions par coalition. Inspire´ par Sun
et al. (2008) et l’approche de Billera and Bixby (1974), Inoue (2010b) e´tudie le
cas des jeux NTU. Il montre que chaque jeu NTU ge´ne´re´ par des ensembles com-
pacts peut eˆtre repre´sente´ par une e´conomie avec production par coalition. De
plus, il prouve qu’il existe une e´conomie avec production par coalition telle que son
ensemble de paiements compe´titifs co¨ıncide avec le coeur interne de l’extension
e´quilibre´e du jeu NTU original. Bejan and Gomez (2010) conside`rent des jeux TU
non ne´cessairement e´quilibre´s. Ils montrent que le coeur espe´re´ d’un jeu TU co¨ın-
cide avec l’ensemble des revenus compe´titifs de deux diffe´rents types d’e´conomies
directes avec production dont des productions par coalition. Garratt and Qin
(2000a) et Bejan and Gomez (2011) conside`rent des jeux de marche´ avec des
contraintes de temps ou des contraintes de temps et de localisation. Bejan and
Gomez (2011) montre que dans les e´conomies avec contraintes en temps et en
localisation et sans libre disposition, chaque jeu TU est un jeu de marche´ TU
dans le sens ou` le jeu peut eˆtre ge´ne´re´ par une e´conomie de ce type particulier.
Trockel (1996, 2000) introduit une approche alternative et interpre`te un jeu
de marchandage dans un contexte NTU directement comme une e´conomie a` la
Arrow-Debreu ou comme une e´conomie avec des productions par coalition. Il
montre que l’unique e´quilibre de cette e´conomie correspond a` la solution de
marchandage de Nash asyme´trique du jeu sous-jacent ou` les poids de la solu-
tion de marchandage sont les parts dans la production. Une diffe´rence avec le
reste de la litte´rature est qu’il utilise un mode`le ou` la production a des outputs
mais pas d’inputs.
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Une autre contribution au sujet des relations entre solutions de marchandage
et e´quilibres compe´titifs est l’article de Sertel and Yildiz (2003). Ils conside`rent
des e´conomies d’e´change pures et e´tudient le jeu de marchandage induit par ces
e´conomies. Ils montrent qu’il existe des e´conomies d’e´change diffe´rentes dont les
niveaux d’utilite´ a` l’e´quilibre de Walras sont diffe´rents mais qui induisent le meˆme
jeu de marchandage et qui donc devrait avoir la meˆme solution de marchandage
et donc les meˆmes paiements. Ainsi, ils mettent en e´vidence que, en ge´ne´ral, il
n’existe pas de solution de marchandage qui donne toujours le meˆme paiement
que l’e´quilibre compe´titif.
Mais les re´sultats de Sertel and Yildiz (2003) montre juste l’impossibilite´ d’une
solution de marchandage walrasienne dans un contexte tre`s ge´ne´ral. Sous des hy-
pothe`ses plus restrictives, il est possible de donner une solution de marchandage
qui conduit aux meˆmes paiements que l’e´quilibre walrasien. John (2005) consid-
e`re des e´conomies avec des fonctions d’utilite´ line´aires et des dotations initiales
proportionnelles. Dans cette situation, une solution de marchandage de Nash
asyme´trique particulie`re conduit exactement a` l’allocation de l’e´quilibre compe´ti-
tif. Moulin (2003) mentionne seulement qu’il devrait exister une version des
re´sultats de John (2005) pour des fonctions d’utilite´ homoge`ne.
Ervig and Haake (2005) comparent aussi des e´conomies avec des jeux de
marchandage. Ils montrent que dans leur mode`le, les niveaux d’utilite´ a` l’e´quilibre
compe´titif co¨ıncident avec ceux de la solution de marchandage asyme´trique de
Perles-Maschler. La principale raison qui justifie la diffe´rence de leur re´sultat
est qu’il restreignent la demande des consommateurs par la dotation totale de
l’e´conomie.
Chipman and Moore (1979) discutent la relation entre demande individuelle,
demande agre´ge´e et fonction de bien-eˆtre sociale. Ils conside`rent en particulier
la question de savoir si la fonction de demande du marche´ peut eˆtre interpre´te´e
comme une fonction de demande d’un consommateur repre´sentatif.
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Contributions de la the`se
Cette the`se e´tudie plusieurs aspects des relations entre e´conomies et jeux coope´rat-
ifs. Dans la suite, nous nous concentrons sur les relations entre les concepts de
solution dans les diffe´rents domaines. Plus pre´cise´ment, nous discutons les re-
lations entre e´quilibre compe´titif d’une part et les concepts de solution des jeux
coope´ratifs d’autre part comme le coeur interne ou les allocations de marchandage
de Nash asyme´trique. Nous partons des jeux et nous e´tudions quelles solutions
correspondent a` des e´quilibres des e´conomies qui repre´sentent ces jeux. Nous
e´tudions e´galement quels couples de solutions conduisent aux meˆmes niveaux
d’utilite´.
La the`se est en quatre partie. Les trois premie`res sont un travail conjoint avec
Sonja Brangewitz (EBIM, Universite´ de Bielefeld).
Allocations compe´titives et le coeur des jeux de marche´s
TU
Dans le second chapitre, nous analysons les relations entre certains sous-ensembles
du coeur des jeux de marche´s TU et les vecteurs de paiements compe´titifs de
certains marche´s relie´s a` ces jeux. Etant donne´ un marche´ TU, nous construisons
un marche´ de´pendant d’un sous-ensemble donne´ convexe et compact du coeur.
Le marche´ repre´sente le jeu et de plus, l’ensemble des paiements compe´titifs est
e´gal au sous-ensemble donne´ a priori. Ce re´sultat peut eˆtre vu comme un re´sultat
interme´diaire entre les deux cas extreˆmes de Shapley and Shubik (1975). Les
auteurs avaient de´ja` remarque´s que leur re´sultat pouvait eˆtre e´tendu a` n’importe
quel ensemble ferme´ et convexe du coeur, mais ils n’avaient pas donne´ les de´tails
de la de´monstration qui est expose´ ici. Ce cas plus ge´ne´ral est en particulier
inte´ressant car les deux the´ore`mes de Shapley and Shubik (1975) sont des cas
particuliers. De plus, il est utile quand on le compare avec le re´sultat pour les
jeux NTU pre´sente´ dans le troisie`me chapitre. Alors que dans le chapitre 2,
l’ensemble de de´part doit eˆtre convexe et ferme´, il apparaˆıt que pour les jeux de
marche´s NTU, la bonne approche est d’e´tudier les ensembles compacts du coeur
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interne. Notons aussi que les techniques utilise´es dans les deux chapitres sont
substantiellement diffe´rentes.
Soit N = {1, 2..., n} l’ensemble des joueurs. L’ensemble de toutes les coali-
tions non vides est donne´ par N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}. Une coalition est donc un
sous-ensemble non vide de l’ensemble des joueurs. Un jeu coope´ratif avec utilite´
transfe´rable (TU) est la donne´e d’une paire (N, v) ou` N est l’ensemble des joueurs
et v : N → R est la fonction caracte´ristique ou de coalition.8
Un concept de solution bien connu pour les jeux TU est le coeur. Le coeur
C(v) du jeu TU (N, v) est l’ensemble des vecteurs de paiements ou la valeur
v(N) de la coalition de tous les joueurs est distribue´e et aucune coalition ne peut
ame´liorer cette distribution.
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn|x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ N}.
Nous conside´rons les relations entre les jeux avec une certaine classe d’e´conomies
d’e´change pures appele´es marche´s.
De´finition 1 (marche´). Soit N = {1, 2..., n} l’ensemble des agents. Un marche´
est donne´ par E = (Xi, ωi, ui)i∈N ou` pour chaque agent i ∈ N
- Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ est un l’ensemble de consomation qui est non vide, ferme´ et
convexei et ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N est le nombre de biens,
- ωi ∈ Xi est le vecteur de dotations initiales,
- ui : Xi → R est la fonction d’utilite´ continue et concave.
Ayant introduit la notion de marche´, nous pouvons de´finir comment les jeux
sont relie´s aux marche´s et quels jeux sont relie´s aux marche´s. Nous suivons
l’approche de Shapley and Shubik (1975) et de´finissons un jeu de marche´ TU de
la fac¸on suivante:
De´finition 2 (jeu de marche´ TU). Un jeu TU (N, v) qui est repre´sentable par
un marche´ est un jeu de marche´ TU. Cela signifie qu’il existe un marche´ E tel
8Shapley and Shubik (1969) de´finit la fonction caracte´ristique e´galement pour l’ensemble
vide par v(∅) = 0. D’autres auteurs, par exemple Billera and Bixby (1974), excluent
l’ensemble vide de l’ensemble des coalitions.
26
1.
que (N, vE) = (N, v) avec
vE(S) = max
xS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
ui(xi) pour tout S ∈ N .
Nous utilisons maintenant une de´finition d’e´quilibre sans expliciter le bien
nume´raire qui est utilise´ pour faire les transferts d’utilite´ entre les agents.
De´finition 3 (solution compe´titive). Une solution compe´titive est une paire
(p∗, (x∗i)i∈N ), ou` p
∗ est un vecteur de prix de dimension n et x∗N est une al-
location re´alisable pour la coalition de tous les agents ve´rifiant
ui(x∗i)− p∗ · x∗i = max
xi∈Rℓ+
[ui(xi)− p · xi] pour tout i ∈ N.
La de´finition suivante de´crit les paiements d’e´quilibre.
De´finition 4 (vecteur de paiements compe´titifs). Un vecteur α∗ est un vecteur de
paiements compe´titifs s’il est de´finit a` partir d’une solution compe´titive(p∗, (x∗i)i∈N )
par
α∗i = ui(x∗i)− p∗ · (x∗i − ωi).
Un vecteur de paiements compe´titifs de´crit les paiements a` l’e´quilibre com-
pe´titif en inte´grant le bien nume´raire. La de´finition est introduite dans Shapley
and Shubik (1975) et elle est plus pre´cise´ment commente´e dans le chapitre 2. Dans
le marche´ particulier appele´ marche´ direct, le vecteur de paiements est aussi le
vecteur des prix d’e´quilibre.
Le principal re´sultat du chapitre 2 est le re´sultat suivant.
The´ore`me 1. Soit (N, v) un jeu de marche´ TU et soit A un sous-ensemble
convexe ferme´ du coeur. Alors, il existe un marche´ qui repre´sente le jeu (N, v) et
tel que l’ensemble des vecteurs de paiements compe´titifs de ce marche´ est e´gal a`
l’ensemble A.
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Paiementss compe´titifs et coeur interne des jeux de
marche´ NTU
Dans le troisie`me chapitre, nous conside´rons les jeux de marche´s NTU. Il est
bien connu qu’un jeu de marche´ peut eˆtre repre´sente´ par plusieurs marche´s. Une
question naturelle dans ce contexte est d’e´tudier quels sont les e´quilibres com-
pe´titifs de ces e´conomies, en particulier, quels sont les niveaux d’utilite´ ge´ne´re´s
par ces e´quilibres et comment ils sont relie´s au jeu. Nous examinons le cas in-
terme´diaire entre les deux cas extreˆmes de Qin (1993), ou` d’un coˆte´ il existe
un marche´ dont les vecteurs de paiements compe´titifs sont tous les e´le´ments du
coeur interne et d’un autre coˆte´, pour n’importe quel e´le´ment du coeur interne, il
existe un marche´ tel que cet e´le´ment est l’unique vecteur de paiements compe´ti-
tifs. Nous e´tendons les re´sultats de Qin (1993) aux sous-ensembles compacts du
coeur interne: e´tant donne´ un jeu de marche´ NTU, nous construisons un marche´
de´pendant du sous-ensemble donne´. Ce marche´ repre´sente le jeux et, de plus,
a l’ensemble donne´ comme ensemble de vecteurs de paiements compe´titifs. A
vrai dire, nous ne pouvons pas choisir un sous-ensemble compact arbitraire du
coeur interne mais seulement ceux satisfaisant une condition appele´e se´paration
positive stricte. Cette condition exige principalement que tous les e´le´ments du
sous-ensemble compact peuvent eˆtre strictement se´pare´s de l’ensemble des allo-
cations en utilite´ re´alisable par la coalition de tous les agents. Comme cette
condition est relativement faible, notre re´sultat montre que presque tous les sous-
ensembles compacts du coeur interne d’un jeu donne´ peuvent eˆtre l’ensemble des
vecteurs de paiement compe´titifs d’une e´conomie repre´sentant le jeu.
Le re´sultat est inte´ressant en lui-meˆme car il donne de nouvelles intuitions sur
la relation structurelle des jeux de marche´ et des marche´s, mais il peut aussi eˆtre
utile dans le contexte de l’analyse des fondations des concepts de solution pour
les jeux coope´ratifs par les marche´s. Le re´sultat est une version NTU de ceux
pre´sente´s dans le chapitre 2.
Dans notre travail, nous adoptons les notations de Billera and Bixby (1974)
ou Qin (1993). Un jeu a` utilite´ non transfe´rable (NTU) est une paire (N,V )
ou` N = {1, ..., n} est l’ensemble des agents et V une fonction de coalition. La
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fonction de coalition de´finit pour chaque coalition un ensemble d’allocations en
utilite´ que la coalition peut re´aliser, sans tenir compte des agents en dehors de
la coalition. Donc, la fonction de coalition V est de´finie comme une application
de l’ensemble des coalitions, N , dans l’ensemble des sous-ensembles non vides
de RN , tel que pour toute coalition S ∈ N , V (S) ⊆ RS , V (S) est non vide et
S-comprehensif, c’est-a`-dire que V (S) ⊇ V (S)−RS+. Le coeur C(V ) du jeu NTU
(N,V ) est de´fini comme l’ensemble des allocations en utilite´ qui est re´alisable par
la coalition de tous les agent N et telles qu’aucune coalition S ne peut ame´liorer
cette allocation. Donc, dans le contexte NTU, le coeur est de´fini par:
C(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)| ∀S ⊆ N ∀u′ ∈ V (S) ∃ i ∈ S tel que u′i ≤ ui}.
Il apparaˆıt que dans le contexte des jeux de marche´, un raffinement du coeur, le
coeur interne, est un concept bien adapte´. Pour le de´finir, nous avons besoin de
la notion suivante.
De´finition 5 (jeu avec λ-transfert). Soit (N,V ) un jeu NTU ge´ne´re´ par des
compacts et soit λ ∈ RN+ . Le jeu avec λ-transfert de (N,V ) est le jeu (N,Vλ) ou`
Vλ(S) = {u ∈ RS |λ · u ≤ vλ(S)}
et vλ(S) = max{λ · u|u ∈ V (S)}.
L’ide´e du jeu avec λ-transfert est que nous permettons des transferts d’utilite´
a` l’inte´rieur des coalitions suivant les taux de transferts donne´s par le vecteur λ.
Maintenant, nous pouvons utiliser cette notion pour de´finir le coeur interne.
De´finition 6 (coeur interne, Shubik (1984)). Le coeur interne IC(V ) d’un jeu
NTU ge´ne´re´ par des compacts (N,V ) est
IC(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)|∃λ ∈ ∆ tel que u ∈ C(Vλ)}
ou` C(Vλ) est le coeur du jeu avec λ-transfert associe´ a` (N,V ).
Nous analysons les relations entre jeux et e´conomie. En conse´quence, nous
conside´rons un classe particulie`re d’e´conomies appele´e marche´s. Nous conside´rons
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des e´conomies avec production ou` les agents posse`dent leur propre entreprise9 ce
qui diffe`re du cas TU.
De´finition 7 (marche´). Un marche´ est la donne´e de E = (Xi, Y i, ωi, ui)
i∈N
ou`
pour chaque agent i ∈ N
- Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ est un ensemble de consommation non vide, ferme´ et convexe et
ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N est le nombre de biens;
- Y i ⊆ Rℓ est l’ensemble de production de l’agent i, qui est un sous-ensemble
convexe et ferme´ ve´rifiant Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0};
- ωi ∈ Xi − Y i est le vecteur de dotations initiales;
- et ui : Xi → R est la fonction d’utilite´ continue et concave.
Dans un marche´, nous pouvons de´crire les allocations re´alisables de chaque
coalition.
Une S-allocation est un e´le´ment
(
xi
)
i∈S
tel que xi ∈ Xi pour tout i ∈ S.
L’ensemble des S-allocations re´alisables est de´fini par
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣xi ∈ Xi pour tout i ∈ S,∑
i∈S
(xi − ωi) ∈
∑
i∈S
Y i
}
.
Une S-allocation re´alisable est une allocation re´alisable par la coalition S si les
membres de cette coalition utilisent conjointement leurs dotations initiales et leurs
capacite´s de production.
Ayant introduit cette notion, nous pouvons analyser quels sont les jeux relie´s
aux marche´s. Un jeu NTU est appele´ un jeu de marche´ NTU s’il existe un marche´
tel que l’ensemble V (S) des allocations en utilite´ re´alisable par une coalition
S donne´ par la fonction de coalition est e´gal a` l’enveloppe compre´hensive de
l’ensemble des allocations en utilite´ qui est ge´ne´re´ par les S-allocations re´alisables
du marche´. Le re´sultat principal de ce chapitre est le re´sultat suivant.
9Ce type d’e´conomie est conside´re´ dans Hurwicz (1960), Rader (1964), Billera (1974),
Qin (1993), Qin and Shubik (2009), parmi d’autres.
30
1.
The´ore`me 2. Soit (N,V ) un jeu de marche´ NTU et soit A un sous-ensemble
compact du coeur interne de (N,V ). Supposons que le jeu et l’ensemble A ve´rifient
la condition de stricte se´parabilite´ positive. Alors, il existe un marche´ tel que
a) ce marche´ repre´sente le jeu (N,V ) et
b) l’ensemble des vecteurs de paiements compe´titifs de ce marche´ est e´gal a`
l’ensemble A.
Coeur interne, allocation de Nash asyme´trique et paiements
compe´titifs
Dans le quatrie`me chapitre, nous e´tudions la relation du coeur interne avec
l’ensemble des solutions de marchandage de Nash asyme´triques pour les jeux
de marchandage. Nous montrons que l’ensemble des solutions de marchandage
de Nash asyme´triques pour diffe´rents poids strictement positifs est e´gal au coeur
interne si tous les e´le´ments du jeu de marchandage sous-jacent sont strictement
positifs. De plus, nous de´montrons que chaque jeu de marchandage est un jeu
de marche´. En utilisant les re´sultats de Qin (1993), nous pouvons en conclure
que pour chaque solution de marchandage de Nash asyme´trique, il existe une
e´conomie qui a pour unique vecteur de paiement compe´titif cette solution. Nous
faisons ainsi un lien entre les articles de Trockel (1996, 2005) avec les ide´es de
Qin (1993). Notre re´sultat peut eˆtre vu comme une fondation par les marche´s de
la solution de marchandage de Nash asyme´trique comparable aux re´sultats sur la
fondation non-coope´rative des jeux coope´ratifs.
Plus pre´cise´ment, nous introduisons la notion suivante d’un jeu de marchandage
compre´hensif.
De´finition 8 (jeu de marchandage NTU). Nous de´finissons un jeu de marchandage
NTU (N,V ) avec un ensemble ge´ne´rateur B, un ensemble de joueurs N et une
fonction de coalition
V : N −→ P (Rn)
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de´finie par:
V ({i}) : = {b ∈ Rn|bi ≤ 0, bj = 0, ∀j 6= i} = {0} − R{i}+ ,
V (S) : = {0} − RS+ pour tout S avec 1 < |S| < n,
V (N) : =
{
b ∈ Rn|∃ b′ ∈ B : b ≤ b′} = B − Rn+.
Nous appliquons le concept bien connu de solution de marchandage de Nash
asyme´trique a` ce jeu de marchandage.
De´finition 9 (solution de marchandage de Nash asyme´trique). La solution de
marchandage de Nash asyme´trique avec le vecteur de poids θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ ∆n++,
en bref θ-asyme´trique, pour un jeu de marchandage NTU avec n joueurs (N,V ) et
point de de´saccord 0 est de´finie comme la solution de la maximisation du produit
de Nash θ-asyme´trique donne´e par
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i sur l’ensemble V (N)
10.
Si ν =
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
la solution de marchandage de Nash ν-asyme´trique est ap-
pele´e la solution de marchandage de Nash (syme´trique). Nous obtenons le re´sultat
suivant sur les relations entre coeur interne et solutions de marchandage de Nash
asyme´triques.
Proposition 4. Soit (N,V ) un jeu de marchandage NTU avec n joueurs ayant
pour point de de´saccord 0 et engendre´ par l’ensemble B ⊆ Rn++.
• Supposons que nous avons un vecteur de poids θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆n++. Alors
la solution de marchandage de Nash θ-asyme´trique, aθ, appartient au coeur
interne de (N,V ).
• Pour n’importe quel e´le´ment a du coeur interne, nous pouvons trouver un
vecteur de poids approprie´ θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆n++ tel que a est la solution
de la maximisation du produit de Nash θ-asyme´trique
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i .
En combinant ce re´sultat avec ceux de Qin (1993), nous obtenons le re´sultat
principal de ce chapitre.
10Pour les jeux de marchandage avec un point de de´saccord ge´ne´ral d ∈ Rn le produit de
Nash θ-asyme´trique est donne´ par
∏n
i=1 (ui − di)θi .
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Proposition 5. Etant donne´ un jeu de marchandage NTU a` n joueurs (N,V )
(avec point de de´saccord 0 et engendre´ par un sous-ensemble de Rn+) et un vecteur
de poids θ ∈ ∆n++, il existe un marche´ qui repre´sente (N,V ) et, de plus, l’unique
vecteur de paiement compe´titif de ce marche´ est la solution de marchandage de
Nash θ-asyme´trique aθ du jeu de marchandage NTU (N,V ).
Quatrie`me article
Le chapitre 5 est base´ sur une note non publie´e de Reinhard John. L’ide´e du
papier est d’e´tudier la compatibilite´ des e´quilibres compe´titifs avec les concepts
de la the´orie du marchandage et en particulier, avec la solution de marchandage
de Nash asyme´trique. Nous conside´rons une e´conomie d’e´change pure et nous
l’e´tudions a` la fois d’un point de vue de la the´orie de l’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral et d’un
point de vue de la the´orie des jeux coope´ratifs. Il apparaˆıt que les ensembles des
allocations d’e´quilibre compe´titives et les allocations obtenues par la solution de
marchandage de Nash asyme´trique co¨ıncident lorsqu’on se restreint aux e´conomies
ou` les agents ont des pre´fe´rences homoge`nes de degre´ 1 et lorsque les dotations
initiales sont distribue´es proportionnellement a` la dotation initiale totale. Nous
e´tudions e´galement ce qu’il advient lorsque les hypothe`ses sont affaiblies ou modi-
fie´es. Notre re´sultat est encore vrai lorsque les agents ont des pre´fe´rences qui sont
homoge`nes pour le meˆme degre´ k avec 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. Nous analysons la robustesse
du re´sultat. La modification des fonctions d’utilite´ par des transformations mono-
tones ne permet plus d’obtenir ce re´sultat. De plus, le choix inhabituel du point
de status quo est e´tudie´ en de´tail.
Plus pre´cise´ment, nous conside´rons des e´conomies avec n consommateurs i =
1, ..., n et ℓ biens j = 1, ..., ℓ. Une e´conomie est un nuplet
((
(Xi, ui)ni=1
)
, e
)
.
Xi = Rℓ+ est l’ensemble de consommation du consommateur i. Les pre´fe´rences
de chaque consommateur sont de´crites par une fonction d’utilite´
ui : Xi −→ R (1.2)
qui est faiblement croissante, localement non sature´e, concave, continue et ho-
moge`ne de degre´ 1. Le concept d’e´quilibre de Walras dans ce contexte avec une
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re´partition proportionnelle des dotations initiales conduit a` la de´finition suivante:
De´finition 10. Une allocation x¯ ∈ A est appele´e une allocation de Walras par
rapport a` la distribution des ressources α s’il existe un vecteur de prix p =
(pj)
ℓ
j=1 ∈ Rℓ+ \ {0} tel que
Pour i = 1, ..., n : x¯i maximise ui
(
xi
)
sous les contraintes
xij ≥ 0 pour tout j = 1, ..., ℓ,
p · xi ≤ p · (αie)
n∑
i=1
x¯i ≤ e et p ·
(
n∑
i=1
x¯i − e
)
= 0.
Pour analyser la meˆme situation d’un point de vue des jeux coope´ratif, nous
utilisons la solution de marchandage asyme´trique de Nash. Ceci nous donne la
de´finition suivante:
De´finition 11. Une allocation re´alisable x¯ ∈ A est appele´e une allocation de
Nash par rapport a` α si elle maximise U˜α (x) =
n∏
i=1
(
ui
(
xi
))αi sur l’ensemble des
allocations re´alisables, c’est-a`-dire si x¯ est une solution de
max U˜α(x) sous les contraintes
xij ≥ 0 pour tout i = 1, ..., n et j = 1, ..., ℓ
n∑
i=1
xij − ej ≤ 0 pour tout j = 1, ..., ℓ
La proposition suivante constitue le re´sultat principal du chapitre 5.
Proposition 6. Une allocation x¯ =
(
x¯i
)n
i=1
est une allocation de Nash par rapport
a` α si et seulement si c’est une allocation de Walras par rapport a` α.
Une rapide synthe`se
Les principaux chapitres de cette the`se, chacun e´tant auto-suffisant pour les no-
tations, sont base´s sur quatre articles. Les chapitres 2 et 3 sont des extensions
des re´sultats Shapley and Shubik (1975) et Qin (1993) a` des sous-ensembles du
34
1.
coeur ou du coeur interne. Le chapitre 2 est consacre´ aux jeux de marche´ a`
utilite´ transfe´rable alors que le chapitre 3 analyse les jeux a` utilite´ non trans-
fe´rable. Le chapitre 4 e´tudie les relations entre la solution de marchandage de
Nash asyme´trique avec le coeur interne dans le contexte des jeux de marchandage.
Nous pouvons en conclure que les solutions de marchandage de Nash asyme´triques
sont relie´es a` certains marche´s. Le cinquie`me chapitre conside`re les relations entre
les solutions de marchandage de Nash asyme´triques et les e´quilibres compe´titifs
mais en partant maintenant des e´conomies et en regardant les jeux induits.
Les chapitres 2 et 3 mettent en e´vidence le manque d’information lorsqu’on
part des marche´s vers les jeux. Ils montrent qu’il est impossible de de´terminer les
paiements associe´s a` l’e´quilibre dans les e´conomies si on a seulement l’information
au sujet des allocations re´alisables en utilite´, c’est-a`-dire, les fonctions coalition-
nelles. Au contraire (et aussi au contraire des re´sultats de Sertel and Yildiz
(2003)), le chapitre 5 montre que la conclusion n’est pas juste si on se restreint
aux e´conomies avec des pre´fe´rences homoge`nes (voir le chapitre 5 pour les condi-
tions pre´cises). Mais ce re´sultat n’est pas tre`s robuste. De petites de´viations par
rapport aux hypothe`ses rendent invalides le re´sultat. Ainsi, seulement sous des
conditions restrictives, il est possible de conside´rer la solution de marchandage
de Nash asyme´trique comme la solution de marchandage de´crivant les paiements
des e´quilibres compe´titifs.
Les chapitres 3 et 4 sont directement relie´s. Le chapitre 4 utilise les re´sul-
tats de Qin (1993) et les re´sultats du chapitre 3, qui montrent qu’essentiellement,
n’importe quel ensemble a` l’inte´rieur du coeur interne peut eˆtre repre´sente´ comme
l’ensemble de paiements des e´quilibres compe´titifs d’un marche´. Donc, en parti-
culier l’ensemble des paiements associe´s a` une solution de marchandage de Nash
asyme´trique peut eˆtre repre´sente´ comme l’ensemble des paiements compe´titifs
d’un marche´. Ce marche´ peut eˆtre construit en suivant soit Qin (1993) soit le
chapitre 3.
Les chapitres 4 et 5 sont tous les deux consacre´s aux relations entre solu-
tions de marchandage de Nash asyme´triques et e´quilibres de certaines e´conomies.
Cependant, les deux approches sont substantiellement diffe´rentes. Dans le chapitre
4, on part d’une jeu de marchandage NTU et on choisit un marche´ qui repre´sente
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ce jeu. Pour ce marche´ soigneusement choisi, les vecteurs de paiements en utilite´
des e´quilibres compe´titifs et ceux associe´s a` une solution de marchandage de Nash
asyme´trique co¨ıncident. Au contraire, dans le chapitre 5, on part d’un e´conomie
donne´e avec certaines proprie´te´s. On montre que le vecteur de paiement des
e´quilibres compe´titifs de cette e´conomie co¨ıncide avec celui donne´ par la solution
de marchandage de Nash asyme´trique du jeu de marchandage associe´.
A ce stade, nous avons donne´ une bre`ve pre´sentation du contexte ge´ne´ral et
des de´veloppements qui conduisent a` ce travail. Comme les questions et les su-
jets traite´s dans les chapitres ci-apre`s diffe`rent, un positionnement scientifique
plus de´taille´ est donne´ dans chaque chapitre avec des introductions et des con-
clusions propres. Nous avons essaye´ d’utiliser des notations constantes dans les
quatre chapitres. Nous avons re´ussi presque partout mais a` certains moments des
variantes sont ne´cessaires.
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Chapter 2
Competitive Outcomes and the
Core of TU Market Games
2.1 Abstract
We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market
games and competitive payoff vectors of certain markets linked to that game. This
can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Shapley and
Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any
closed convex subset of the core, but they omit the details of the proof which
we present here. This more general case is in particular interesting, as the two
theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases.
2. COMPETITIVE OUTCOMES TU
2.2 Introduction
The idea to consider cooperative games as economies or markets goes back to
Shapley and Shubik (1969). They look at TU market games. These are cooper-
ative games with transferable utility (TU) that are in a certain sense linked to
economies or markets. More precisely, a market is said to represent a game if the
set of utility allocations a coalition can reach in the market coincides with the set
of utility allocations a coalition obtains according to the coalitional function of the
game. If there exists a market that represents a game, then this game is called a
market game. Shapley and Shubik (1969) prove the identity of the class of totally
balanced TU games with the class of TU market games. Furthermore, Shapley
and Shubik (1975) show that starting with a TU market game every payoff vector
in the core of that game is competitive in a certain market, called direct market,
and that for any given point in the core there exists at least one market that has
this payoff vector as its unique competitive payoff vector. Moreover, they claim
that an analogous result holds also for closed convex subsets of the core. Shapley
and Shubik (1975) give a hint how this can be shown but they omit the details
of the proof. By following this remark of Shapley and Shubik (1975) we give a
detailed proof how their two main results can be extended to any closed convex
subset of the core. This more general case is in particular interesting, as the two
theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases.
Similarly to the approach of Shapley and Shubik (1969, 1975), Inoue (2010b)
uses coalition production economies as in Sun et al. (2008) instead of markets.
Inoue (2010b) shows that every TU game can be represented by a coalition pro-
duction economy. Moreover, he proves that there exists a coalition production
economy whose set of competitive payoff vectors coincides with the core of the
balanced cover of the original TU game.
A different extension of Shapley and Shubik (1969, 1975) is Garratt and Qin
(2000b). They consider time-constrained market games, where the agents are
supposed to supply one unit of time to the market. Their main result is that a
TU game is a time-constrained market game if and only if it is superadditive.
This result of Garratt and Qin (2000b) was again extended by Bejan and Gomez
38
2.3. TU MARKET GAMES
(2011) introducing additionally location and free disposal constraints. They show
that in this sense the entire class of TU games can be considered as market games.
For NTU market games Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) extend the NTU ana-
logue to Shapley and Shubik (1975), namely Qin (1993), to closed subsets of the
inner core. Hereby, the techniques used to show the results in the TU and the
NTU case are notably different.
2.3 TU market games
In this section we state the main definitions and results on TU market games.
The following introduction for TU market games is mainly based on Shapley and
Shubik (1969) and Shapley and Shubik (1975).
Let N = {1, 2..., n} be a set of players. The set of all non-empty coalitions is
given by N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}. Thus, a coalition is a non-empty subset of players.
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is given by the pair (N, v) where
N is the player set and v : N → R is the characteristic or coalitional function.1
A subgame (T, vT ) of a TU game (N, v) is a subset of players T ∈ N and the
characteristic function vT with vT (S) = v(S) for S ⊆ T , S 6= ∅. A payoff vector
for a TU game (N, v) is a vector x ∈ Rn. The payoff of a coalition S ∈ N is
given by x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. The core C(v) of a TU game (N, v) is the set of payoff
vectors where the value v(N), the grand coalition N can achieve, is distributed
and no coalition can improve upon,
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn|x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ N}.
Given a set of players N = {1, 2..., n}, a family B ⊆ N is a balanced family if
there exist weights {γS}S∈B, with γS ≥ 0, such that for all i ∈ N we have
∑
S∈B, S∋i
γS = 1.
1Shapley and Shubik (1969) define the characteristic function as well for the empty set
with v(∅) = 0. Others, for example Billera and Bixby (1974), exclude the empty set
from this definition.
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The weights γS do not depend on the individual players but on the coalition
S ∈ N . The above condition can be as well written as
∑
S∈N
γSe
S = eN
where eS ∈ Rn is the vector with eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and eSi = 0 if i /∈ S. Let the set
of weights be denoted by Γ(eN ). The balancing weights can be interpreted as the
intensity with which player i participates in a coalition or the fraction of time he
spends to be in this coalition.
A TU game (N, v) is balanced if for every balanced family B with weights
{γS}S∈B we have ∑
S∈B
γSv(S) ≤ v(N).
A TU game (N, v) is totally balanced if all its subgames are balanced. The
totally balanced cover of a TU game (N, v) is the smallest TU game (N, v¯) that
is totally balanced and contains the game (N, v).
Shapley and Shubik (1969) recall the following result of Shapley (1965):
Theorem 3 (Shapley and Shubik (1969)). A game has a non-empty core if and
only if it is balanced.
In oder to define a TU market game we first need to introduce the notion of a
market. For the TU case it is sufficient to consider markets without production.
Definition 12 (market). Let N = {1, 2..., n} be the set of agents (or players). A
market is given by E = (Xi, ωi, ui)i∈N where for every individual i ∈ N
- Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set, where
ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- ωi ∈ Xi is the initial endowment vector,
- ui : Xi → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility function.
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Note that in the case with non-transferable utility (NTU) usually markets
with production are considered, see for example Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin
(1993).
Let S ∈ N be a coalition. The set of feasible S-allocations is given by
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣∣xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ S,
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
ωi
}
.
Elements of F (S) are often denoted for short by xS . The feasible S-allocations
are those allocations the coalition S can achieve by redistributing their initial
endowments within the coalition.
Now we define a TU market game in the following way:
Definition 13 (TU market game). A TU game (N, v) that is representable by
a market is a TU market game. This means there exists a market E such that
(N, vE) = (N, v) with
vE(S) = max
xS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
ui(xi) for all S ∈ N .
For a TU market game there exists a market such that the value a coalition
S can reach according to the coalitional function coincides with the joint utility
that is generated by feasible S-allocations in the market.
Given a TU game we can generate a market from this game in a “natural”
way. Shapley and Shubik (1969) call this market a direct market.
Definition 14 (direct market). A TU game (N, v) generates a direct market
Dv = (Xi, ωi, ui)i∈N with for each individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+,
- the initial endowment ωi = e{i} with e
{i}
i = 1 and e
{i}
j = 0 for j 6= i,
- the utility function ui(x) = max
{ ∑
S∈N
γSv(S)
∣∣∣∣γS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ N , ∑
S∈N
γSe
S = x
}
.
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The utility function ui(·) of the direct market Dv is identical for every individ-
ual i ∈ N and is homogeneous of degree 1, concave and continuous. Note that in a
direct market every consumer owns initially his own (private) good or interpreted
differently every player “is” himself a good. Using the direct market Dv, Shapley
and Shubik (1969) obtain the following characterization of TU market games.
Theorem 4 (Shapley and Shubik (1969)). A game is a market game if and only
if it is totally balanced.
This means that in order to consider TU market games it is sufficient to
consider just those TU games that are totally balanced. To obtain the above
result Shapley and Shubik (1969) start by looking at an arbitrary TU game and
its direct market. Hereafter, they consider the TU game of the direct market and
show that it is equal to the totally balanced cover of the TU game they started
with.
In a second paper Shapley and Shubik (1975) investigate the relationship
between competitive payoffs, that arise from a competitive solution in the market,
and the core of TU market games.
Definition 15 (competitive solution). A competitive solution is an ordered pair
(p∗, (x∗i)i∈N ), where p
∗ is an arbitrary n-vector of prices and x∗N is a feasible
N -allocation, such that
ui(x∗i)− p∗ · x∗i = max
xi∈Rl+
[ui(xi)− p · xi] for all i ∈ N.
We are in a setting with transferable utility. Thus, there is implicitly the
additional commodity money, that makes the transfer of utility possible. Suppose
ξi0 are the initial money holdings of agent i. Then his“true”maximization problem
is
max
xi∈Rl+
[ui(xi) + ξi0 − p ·
(
xi − ωi)].
Since the solution of the maximization problem is independent of the initial money
holdings and the initial endowment, it is equivalent to solve the in the definition
above stated maximization problem.
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Definition 16 (competitive payoff vector). A vector α∗ is a competitive payoff
vector if it arises from a competitive solution (p∗, (x∗i)i∈N ) such that
α∗i = ui(x∗i)− p∗ · (x∗i − ωi).
Shapley and Shubik (1975) show the following two relationships between the
core and competitive payoff vectors.
Theorem 5 (1, Shapley and Shubik (1975)). Every payoff vector in the core of
a TU market game is competitive in the direct market of that game.
Theorem 6 (2, Shapley and Shubik (1975)). Among the markets that generate a
given totally balanced TU game, there exists a market having any given core point
as its unique competitive payoff vector.
These two theorems represent the two extreme cases where on the one hand
the whole core equals the set of competitive payoff vectors of the direct market
and one the other hand a given core point is the unique competitive payoff vector
of a certain other market. The main ideas to prove the above two theorems
are the following: For the first result Shapley and Shubik (1975) use the direct
market to show that its competitive payoff vectors coincide with the core of the
TU market game. To prove the second theorem they introduce a second game
with a modified coalitional function for the grand coalition N . Afterwards they
look at the direct market of the original game with a modified utility function
depending on a given core point. Finally they show that this market represents
the original TU game and has a given core point as its unique competitive payoff
vector.
2.4 Results on TU market games
Shapley and Shubik (1975) already remark that for TU market games a extension
of their proof for their second theorem leads to the following result.
Theorem 7. Let (N, v) be a totally balanced TU game and let A be a closed,
convex subset of the core. Then there exists a market such that this market rep-
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resents the game (N, v) and such that the set of competitive payoff vectors of this
market is the set A.
Shapley and Shubik (1975) omit the details of the proof. We elaborate on
them here. They remark that it is enough to change the definition of the utility
function.
In the following we first define the according market and show afterwards in
two steps that this market satisfies the properties we require.
Let (N, v) be a totally balanced TU game with N = {1, ..., n} the set of
players and the coalitional function v. Let Dv be its direct market as defined
before. For d ∈ R++ define the TU game (N, vd) by
vd(S) = v(S) for all S ⊂ N
and
vd(N) = v(N) + d.
Since d > 0 the game (N, vd) is totally balanced. Analogously let Dvd be the
direct market of (N, vd). Let (u
i
d)i∈N denote the utility functions of Dvd , i.e.
uid(x) = max
{∑
S∈N
γSvd(S)
∣∣∣∣γS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ N ,∑
S∈N
γSe
S = x
}
.
As the utility functions uid in the direct market Dvd are identical for every indi-
vidual i ∈ N , we write for short ud.
Let A be a any non-empty closed convex subset of the core. For α ∈ A let
ud,α be defined as
ud,α(x) = min(ud(x), α · x).
Then define the function ud,A by
ud,A(x) = min
α∈A
ud,α(x).
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Since ud,A is continuous and concave we can define a market by
Evd =
(
Rn+, e
{i}, uid,A
)
i∈N
.
with uid,A = ud,A for all i ∈ N . It is easy to see that ud,A is homogeneous of
degree 1.
Next, we show first that the market game of this market is (N, v) and second
that the set of competitive payoff vectors of the market Evd is exactly the set A.
Proposition 7. The market Evd represents the game (N, v).
Proof. Recall that for the market Evd the set
F (S) =
{
xS ∈ Rn·S+ |
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
e{i}
}
is the set of feasible allocations for a coalition S ∈ N .
Looking at the market game generated by the market Evd we obtain
vEvd (S) = maxxS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
uid,A(x
i)
= |S| max
xS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
1
|S|ud,A(x
i)
(1)
= |S| max
xS∈F (S)
ud,A
(
eS
|S|
)
= |S|ud,A
(
eS
|S|
)
(2)
= ud,A(e
S)
= min
α∈A
ud,α(e
S)
= min
α∈A
(min(ud(e
S), α · eS))
(3)
= min
α∈A
(min(vd(S), α · eS))
= min
α∈A
(vd(S), α · eS)
(4)
= v(S)
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The detailed arguments are the following:
(1) First observe that
∑
i∈S
1
|S|ud,A(x
i) ≤ ud,A
(∑
i∈S
xi
|S|
)
= ud,A
(
eS
|S|
)
from
the concavity of ud,A and the market clearing condition. We take the max-
imum on both sides over the feasible S-allocations F (S) and we observe
that x¯i = 1|S|e
S for all i ∈ S is a feasible S-allocation. Therefore, we obtain
that setting
(
x¯i
)
i∈S
maximizes the expression on the left side and hence we
get equality.
(2) The equality follows from the homogeneity of degree 1 of ud,A.
(3) Using the totally balancedness of the game (N, vd) we obtain
ud(e
S) = max
{∑
T∈N
γT vd(T )
∣∣∣∣(γT ) ≥ 0, ∑
T∈N
γT e
T = eS
}
= vd(S).
(4) For S ⊂ N this minimum is equal to v(S), since α is in the core of the TU
game (N, v) and therefore α · eS ≥ v(S) = vd(S). For S = N the minimum
is equal to α′ · eN for some α′ ∈ A and since α′ is in the core of (N, v) we
have α′ · eN = v(N). As d > 0 we have v(N) < vd(N).
Thus vEvd = v and hence the market Evd generates the game (N, v).
Proposition 8. The set of competitive payoff vectors of the market Evd are co-
incides with the set A.
Proof. The proof is divided into five parts:
1. First, suppose
(
(x∗i)i∈N , p
∗
)
is a competitive solution in the market Evd ,
then competitive payoffs are of the form
(
p∗ · e{i})
i∈N
.
From the definition of a competitive solution it follows that (x∗i)i∈N clears
the markets,
n∑
i=1
x∗i =
n∑
i=1
e{i} = eN
and maximizes for each trader i his trading profit given by
ud,A(x
i)− p · xi.
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Moreover, we have from the existence of a maximum and the fact that the
trading profit as a function of the consumption bundle is homogeneous of
degree 1 that
ud,A
(
x∗i
)− p∗ · x∗i = 0.
Looking at the competitive payoffs of competitive solutions we observe
ud,A
(
x∗i
)− p∗ · x∗i + p∗ · e{i} = p∗ · e{i}.
2. Second, suppose
(
(x∗i)i∈N , p
∗
)
is a competitive solution in the market Evd ,
then
((
1
n
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is as well a competitive solution in the market Evd .
In addition the competitive payoffs coincide.
From the fact that the trading profit equals zero we obtain
ud,A
(
1
n
eN
)
− p∗ · 1
n
eN = ud,A
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
x∗i
)
− p∗ · 1
n
n∑
i=1
x∗i
(1)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ud,A
(
x∗i
)− p∗ · 1
n
n∑
i=1
x∗i
=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
ud,A
(
x∗i
)− p∗ · n∑
i=1
x∗i
)
=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
(
ud,A
(
x∗i
)− p∗ · x∗i)
)
= 0.
The detailed argument is the following:
(1) Using the concavity of ud,A gives us “≥” and from maximality of x∗i
we obtain the equality.
As already seen in 1., looking at the competitive payoffs of these competitive
solutions we observe
ud,A
(
x∗i
)−p∗·x∗i+p∗·e{i} = ud,A
(
1
N
eN
)
−p∗·
(
1
N
eN
)
+p∗·e{i} = p∗·e{i}.
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To summarize these results mean that looking for competitive solutions and
their competitive payoffs we can focus on possible equilibrium prices of the
allocation
(
1
N
eN
)
i∈N
. Then those competitive solutions give us all possible
competitive payoffs.
3. Third, as in the proof of Proposition 7, equality (3)
ud
(
1
N
eN
)
=
1
N
vd(N) >
1
N
v(N) = ud,A
(
1
N
eN
)
and furthermore
ud,A
(
1
N
eN
)
= α′ ·
(
1
N
eN
)
for all α′ ∈ A. Because of the continuity of ud(·) it follows for all α′ ∈ A
that ud(x) > α
′ · x for x in a small neighborhood of 1
N
eN . Thus, in a
neighborhood of 1
N
eN , ud,A(x) = minα′∈A (α
′ · x).
4. Forth, it remains to check for which prices p∗ the pair
((
1
N
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is
a competitive solution. In a first step we show that each p∗ ∈ A can be
chosen as an equilibrium price vector, in a second step we show that any
p∗ /∈ A cannot be an equilibrium price vector. For the second step it is
enough to concentrate on p∗ ∈ C(v) \ A as we have seen in 1. that the
equilibrium price vector determines the competitive payoff vector, which
are necessarily in the core.
Step 1: Suppose p∗ ∈ A. Then for all xi ∈ Rn+ we have
min
α′∈A
(
α′ · xi)− p∗ · xi ≤ p∗ · xi − p∗ · xi = 0
and furthermore
min
α′∈A
(
α′ ·
(
1
N
eN
))
− p∗ ·
(
1
N
eN
)
= 0.
Hence, xi = 1
N
eN maximizes the trading profit of agent i. Further-
more, the markets clear, as
∑
i∈N
1
N
eN = eN .
So, the pair
((
1
N
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is a competitive solution.
48
2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Step 2: Suppose p∗ ∈ C(v) \A. Recall that the set A is compact and
convex. Hence, we can apply the separating hyperplane theorem2 and
obtain that there exists x¯ ∈ Rn+ such that for all α ∈ A
α · x¯− p∗ · x¯ > 0.
Therefore we conclude that
min
α′∈A
α′ · x¯− p∗ · x¯ > 0.
Now, for sufficiently small ε > 0 we have that 1
N
eN + εx¯ is in a
neighborhood of 1
N
eN where we have ud,A(x) = minα′∈A (α
′ · x). But
min
α′∈A
(
α′ ·
(
1
N
eN + εx¯
))
−p∗·
(
1
N
eN + εx¯
)
= ε
(
min
α′∈A
α′ · x¯− p∗ · x¯
)
> 0.
This implies that 1
N
eN does not maximize agent i’s trading profit for
p∗ /∈ A.
5. To summarize the line of argument:
If
(
(x∗i)i∈N , p
∗
)
is a competitive solution in the market Evd , then by 2. we
have that
((
1
n
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is a competitive solution. By 4. we show that
p∗ ∈ A and by 1. we know that its competitive payoff vector is equal to p∗.
On the other hand if p∗ ∈ A then by 4. we have that
((
1
n
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is a
competitive solution. The competitive payoff vector is equal to p∗.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Shapley and Shubik (1975) investigate the relationship between competitive pay-
offs of markets that represent a cooperative game and their relation to solution
concepts for cooperative games. We presented the details of the proof of Shapley
and Shubik (1975), that extends their two main results to closed, convex subsets
2See for example Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Theorem M.G.2, p.948).
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of the core. This shows also the two theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975). In
a further contribution (Brangewitz and Gamp, 2011a) we establish an analogue
result for NTU market games.
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Chapter 3
Competitive Outcomes and the
Inner Core of NTU market
games
3.1 Abstract
We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with
non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to competitive equilibria of
markets that are induced by an NTU game. We investigate the relationship
between certain subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive
payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This can be considered
as the case in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993). We extend the results
of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU
market game we construct a market depending on a given closed subset of its inner
core. This market represents the game and further has the given set as the set of
payoffs of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not determined
uniquely and thus we obtain a class of markets with the desired property.
3. COMPETITIVE OUTCOMES NTU
3.2 Introduction
The idea to consider cooperative games as economies or markets goes back to
Shapley and Shubik (1969). They look at TU market games. These are cooper-
ative games with transferable utility (TU) that are in a certain sense linked to
economies or markets. More precisely, a market is said to represent a game if the
set of utility allocations a coalition can reach in the market coincides with the
set of utility allocations a coalition obtains according to the coalitional function
of the game. If there exists a market that represents a game, then this game is
called a market game. Shapley and Shubik (1969) prove the identity of the class
of totally balanced TU games with the class of TU market games. Furthermore,
Shapley and Shubik (1975) show that starting with a TU market game every
payoff vector in the core of that game is competitive in a certain market, called
direct market, and that for any given point in the core there exists at least one
market that has this payoff vector as its unique competitive payoff vector.
Cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) can be considered as
a generalization of TU games, where the transfer of the utility within a coalition
does not take place at a fixed rate. In this paper we consider NTU market games.
After Shapley and Shubik (1969), Billera and Bixby (1974) investigated the NTU
case and obtained similar results for compactly convexly generated NTU games.
Analogously to the result of Shapley and Shubik (1969) they show that every
totally balanced NTU game, that is compactly convexly generated, is a market
game. The inner core is a refinement of the core for NTU games. A point is in
the inner core if there exists a transfer rate vector, such that - given this transfer
rate vector - no coalition can improve even if utility can be transferred within
a coalition according to this vector. So, an inner core point is in the core of an
associated hyperplane game where the utility can be transferred according to the
transfer rate vector. Qin (1993) shows, verifying a conjecture of Shapley and
Shubik (1975), that the inner core of a market game coincides with the set of
competitive payoff vectors of the induced market of that game. Moreover, he
shows that for every NTU market game and for any given point in its inner core
there exists a market that represents the game and further has this given inner
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core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
Similarly to the approach of Billera and Bixby (1974), Inoue (2010b) uses
coalition production economies as in Sun et al. (2008) instead of markets. Inoue
(2010b) shows that every compactly generated NTU game can be represented by
a coalition production economy. Moreover, he proves that there exists a coalition
production economy whose set of competitive payoff vectors coincides with the
inner core of the balanced cover of the original NTU game.
Here we consider the classical approach using markets. We investigate the
case in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993), where on the one hand
there exists a market that has the complete inner core as its set of competitive
payoff vectors and on the other hand there is a market that has a given inner
core point as its unique competitive payoff vector. We extend the results of
Qin (1993) to closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we
construct a market depending on a given closed subset of the inner core. This
market represents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of
competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not determined uniquely.
Several parameters in our construction can be chosen in different ways. Thus, we
obtain a class of markets with the desired property.
Shapley and Shubik (1975) remark that in the TU case their result can be
extended to any closed and convex subset of the core. Whether a similar result
analogously to the one of Shapley and Shubik (1975) holds for NTU market
games, was up to now not clear. Our result shows, that in the NTU case it is
even possible to focus on closed, typically non-convex, subsets of the inner core.
The inner is one solution concept for NTU games. Extending the results of
Qin (1993) to closed subsets of the inner core means in particular to show such a
result for all solution concepts selecting closed subsets of the inner core.
3.3 NTU market games
Let N = {1, ..., n} with n ∈ N and n ≥ 2 be a set of players. Let N = {S ⊆
N |S 6= ∅} be the set of coalitions. Define for a coalition S ∈ N the following sets
RS = {x ∈ Rn|xi = 0 if i /∈ S} ⊆ Rn, RS+ = {x ∈ RS |xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S} ⊆ Rn+,
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RS++ = {x ∈ RS |xi > 0 for all i ∈ S} ⊆ Rn++. For a vector a ∈ Rn and a
coalition S ∈ N let aS denote the vector, where for i ∈ S we have aSi = ai and
aSj = 0 for j /∈ S. Moreover, for a ∈ Rn and b ∈ Rn denote the inner product by
a · b =∑ni=1 aibi and the Hadamard product by a ◦ b = (a1b1, ..., anbn).
An NTU (non-transferable utility) game is a pair (N,V ), that consists of a
player set N = {1, ..., n} and a coalitional function V , which defines for every
coalition the utility allocations this coalition can reach, regardless of what the
other players outside this coalition do. Hence, define the coalitional function V
from the set of coalitions, N , to the set of non-empty subsets of Rn, such that
for every coalition S ∈ N we have V (S) ⊆ RS , V (S) is non-empty and V (S) is
S-comprehensive, meaning V (S) ⊇ V (S)− RS+.
The literature on NTU market games, as for example Billera and Bixby (1974)
and Qin (1993), considers NTU games that are compactly and convexly generated.
An NTU game (N,V ) is compactly (convexly) generated if for all coalitions S ∈ N
there exists a compact (convex) set CS ⊆ RS such that the coalitional function
has the form V (S) = CS − RS+.
Given a player set N = {1, ..., n} the set of balancing weights is defined by
Γ(eN ) =
{
(γS)S⊆N |γS ≥ 0 ∀ S ⊆ N,
∑
S⊆N γSe
S = eN
}
. The balancing weights
can be interpreted in the following way: Every player i has one unit of time that
he can split over all the coalitions, he is a member of, with the constraint that a
coalition has to agree on a common weight. Thereby, each player has to spend all
his time. The weight γS can be seen as well as the intensity with which each player
participates in the coalition S ∈ N . In particular, if we have a partition of the
player set into a coalition S and its complement N \S a balancing weight can be
defined by γS = γN\S = 1 and γT = 0 for all other coalitions T except for S and
N \S. An NTU game (N,V ) is balanced if for all balancing weights γ ∈ Γ(eN ) we
have
∑
S⊆N γSV (S) ⊆ V (N). Moreover, an NTU game (N,V ) is totally balanced
if it is balanced in all subgames. This means for all coalitions T ∈ N and for all
balancing weights γ ∈ Γ(eT ) =
{
(γS)S⊆T |γS ≥ 0 ∀ S ⊆ T,
∑
S⊆T γSe
S = eT
}
we
have
∑
S⊆T γSV (S) ⊆ V (T ).
In order to define an NTUmarket game we first consider the notion of a market
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which is less general than the notion of an economy according to for example
Arrow and Debreu (1954). In a market the number of consumers coincides with
the number of producers. Each consumer has his own private production set. In
contrast to the usual notion of an economy a market is assumed to have concave
and not just quasi concave utility functions.
Definition 17 (market). A market is given by E =
{(
Xi, Y i, ωi, ui
)
i∈N
}
where
for every individual i ∈ N
- Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set, where
ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- Y i ⊆ Rℓ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the production set, such
that Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0},
- ωi ∈ Xi − Y i, the initial endowment vector,
- and ui : Xi → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility function.
As pointed out before in a market each consumer is assumed have his own
private production set. This assumption is not as restrictive as it appears to be.
A given private ownership economy can be transformed into an economy with the
same number of consumers and producers without changing the set of competitive
equilibria or possible utility allocations, see for example Qin and Shubik (2009,
section 4).
In the following, we often consider markets where Xi ⊆ Rkn+ with k, n ∈ N.
Then, consumption vectors are usually written as xi =
(
x(1)i, ..., x(k)i
) ∈ Xi
where x(m)i ∈ Rn+ for m = 1, ..., k. In a sense, we divide the kn consumption
goods in k consecutive groups of n goods. The vector x(m)i is the mth group of n
consumption goods of the consumption vector xi. We use an analogous notation
for the production goods and price vectors.
Given a market we define which allocations are considered as feasible for some
coalition S ∈ N . An S-allocation is a tuple (xi)
i∈S
such that xi ∈ Xi for each
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i ∈ S. The set of feasible S-allocations is given by
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ S,∑
i∈S
(xi − ωi) ∈
∑
i∈S
Y i
}
.
Hence, an S-allocation is feasible if there exist for all i ∈ S production plans
yi ∈ Y i such that ∑i∈S(xi − ωi) = ∑i∈S yi. We refer to a feasible S-allocation
in the following together with suitable production plans as a feasible S-allocation(
xi
)
i∈S
with
(
yi
)
i∈S
.
In the definition of feasibility it is implicitly assumed that by forming a coali-
tion the available production plans are the sum of the individually available pro-
duction plans. This approach is different from the idea to use coalition production
economies, where every coalition has already in the definition of the economy its
own production possibility set. Nevertheless, a market can be transformed into
a coalition production economy by defining the production possibility set of a
coalition as the sum of the individual production possibility sets.
Given the notion of a market and of feasible allocations for coalitions S ∈ N
we define an NTU market game in the following way:
Definition 18 (NTU market game). An NTU game (N,V ) that is representable
by a market is an NTU market game. This means there exists a market E such
that (N,VE) = (N,V ) with
VE(S) =
{
u ∈ RS | ∃ (xi)i∈S ∈ F (S), ui ≤ ui(xi), ∀ i ∈ S
}
.
For an NTU market game there exists a market such that the set of utility
allocations a coalition can reach according to the coalitional function coincides
with the set of utility allocations that are generated by feasible S-allocations in
the market or that give less utility than some feasible S-allocation.
One of the main results on NTU market games in Billera and Bixby (1974) is
the following:
Theorem 8 (2.1, Billera and Bixby (1974)). An NTU game (N,V ) is an NTU
market game if and only if it is totally balanced and compactly convexly generated.
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Hence, in order to study NTU market games, it is sufficient to look at those
NTU games that are totally balanced and compactly convexly generated.
For the succeeding analysis, it will be useful to shift a given NTU game in the
following way (compare Billera and Bixby (1973b, Proposition 2.2)): Given a vec-
tor c ∈ Rn define the coalitional function (V +c) via (V + c) (S) = V (S)+∑i∈S ci.
To represent a shifted game by a market we have to shift the utility function of
agent i by ci. Hence, the shifted game with coalitional function (V + c) is again
a market game. Furthermore, shifting the utility functions of the agents does
not change the set of competitive equilibria. Having this idea of shifting in mind
we will focus in some proofs on games where for every coalition S ∈ N we have
CS ⊆ RS++.
To prove the above result Billera and Bixby (1974) introduce the notion of an
induced market that arises from a compactly convexly generated NTU game.
Definition 19 (induced market). Let (N,V ) be a compactly convexly generated
NTU game. The induced market of the game (N,V ) is defined by
EV =
{
(Xi, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N
}
with for each individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × {0} ⊆ R2n,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S∈N
(
CS × {−eS})] ⊆ R2n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : Xi → R with ui(xi) = x(1)ii .
It can easily be seen that this is a market according to the previous definition.
Note that in an induced market we have input and output goods. Initially every
consumer owns one unit of his personal input good that can only be used for
the production process. By using his input good the consumer can get utility
just from his personal output good. The consumption and production set are the
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same for every player. Just the utility functions and the initial endowments are
dependent on the player.
The individual production sets in an induced market are convex cones and
identical for all agents. In this situation taking the sum over production sets of
some agents leads to the same production set. Setting Y =
∑
i∈N Y
i the condition
for feasibility of S-allocations reduces to
∑
i∈S(x
i − ωi) ∈ Y . Furthermore, for
convex-cone technologies the competitive equilibrium profits are equal to 0. This
means that in equilibrium we do not have to specify shares of the production as
it usually done in private ownership economies.
Thus, as long as the individual production sets are convex cones and identical
for all agents, we could alternatively consider a model for the production where
we have only one production set for all agents and possible coalitions without
specifying the shares. This model could be used instead of the production setup
in the definition of a market.
In the definition of the induced market it is assumed that every individual
has already the production possibilities, that become available if coalitions form,
included in his personal production set. This means he already knows everything
that can be produced in the different coalitions, even if he does not possess the
necessary input commodities himself. Starting with an NTU game the utility
allocations a coalition can reach in the derived induced market are not described
by defining production sets individually for every coalition but by using input
and output commodities. A utility allocation, that is reachable in the NTU game
by a coalition S, is reachable in the induced market by the same coalition if the
individuals pool their initial endowments using “one general” production possibil-
ity set. Utility allocations that require the cooperation of individuals outside the
coalition S are technologically possible but can actually not be produced as the
input commodities of these individuals are needed. In contrast to this interpre-
tation in coalition production economies every coalition has its own production
set.
The main proof of the above theorem from Billera and Bixby (1974) relies
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on Billera (1974). In a similar manner as Shapley and Shubik (1969), he starts
with an NTU game, (N,V ), and looks at the induced market of that game, EV ,
and afterwards at the NTU game that is induced by the induced market, VEV .
He shows that this game coincides with the totally balanced cover of the game
(N,V ).
The next step is to investigate the existing literature on and to study the
relationship between solution concepts in cooperative game theory, as the inner
core, and those in general equilibrium theory, as the notion of a competitive
equilibrium. Analogously to the TU case of Shapley and Shubik (1975), Qin
(1993) shows that the inner core of an NTU market game coincides with the set
of competitive payoff vectors of the induced market of that game. Moreover, he
shows that for every NTU market game and for any given point in its inner core,
there is a market that represents the game and further has the given inner core
point as its unique competitive payoff vector. Before we extend the results of Qin
(1993) we recall the basic definitions and state his main results. We start with
the definition of the inner core and the notion of competitive payoff vectors in
the context of NTU market games. Afterwards, we state the main results of Qin
(1993) and comment on the ideas he uses to prove them.
In order to define the inner core we first consider a game that is related to a
compactly generated NTU game, called the λ-transfer game. Fix a transfer rate
vector λ ∈ Rn+. Define vλ(S) = max{λ · u|u ∈ V (S)} as the maximal sum of
weighted utilities that coalition S can achieve given the transfer rate vector λ.
The λ-transfer game, denoted as (N,Vλ), of (N,V ) is defined by taking the same
player set N and the coalitional function Vλ(S) = {u ∈ RS |λ · u ≤ vλ(S)}. Qin
(1994, p.433) gives the following interpretation of the λ-transfer game: “The idea
of the λ-transfer game may be captured by thinking of each player as representing
a different country. The utilities are measured in different currencies, and the
ratios λi/λj are the exchange rates between the currencies of i and j.” As for the
λ-transfer game only proportions matter we can assume without loss of generality
that λ is normalized, i.e. λ ∈ ∆ = {λ ∈ Rn+|∑ni=1 λi = 1}. Define the positive
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unit simplex by ∆++ =
{
λ ∈ Rn++
∣∣∣∣∑ni=1 λi = 1
}
.
The inner core is a refinement of the core. The core C(V ) of an NTU game
(N,V ) is defined as the set of utility allocations that are achievable by the grand
coalition N such that no coalition S can improve upon this allocation. Thus,
C(V ) =
{
u ∈ V (N)∣∣ ∀S ⊆ N ∀u′ ∈ V (S) ∃i ∈ S such that u′i ≤ ui} .
A utility allocation is in the inner core IC(V ) of a compactly generated game
(N,V ) if it is achievable by the grand coalition N and if additionally there exists
a transfer rate vector λ ∈ ∆ such that this utility allocation is in the core of the
λ-transfer game. More precisely:
Definition 20 (inner core). The inner core of a compactly generated NTU game
(N,V ) is given by
IC(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)| ∃λ ∈ ∆ such that u ∈ C(Vλ)}.
Qin (1993, Remark 1, p. 337) remarks that if the NTU game is compactly
convexly generated the vectors of supporting weights for a utility vector in the
inner core must all be strictly positive. This can be seen by the following argu-
ment: If for one player i ∈ N λi is equal to 0, then the core of the λ-transfer
game is empty, because player i can improve upon any u ∈ Vλ(N) by forming the
singleton coalition {i}.
Qin (1994) considers sufficient conditions for the inner core to be non-empty.
In particular he shows that a compactly generated NTU game (N,V ), where V (N)
is convex, has a non-empty inner core if it is balanced with slack, meaning that
for balancing weights (γS)S⊆N with γN = 0 we have
∑
S⊂N
γSV (S) ⊂ intRn V (N)
where intRn V (N) is the interior of V (N) relative to R
n. Other contributions
related to the non-emptiness of the inner core can be found for example in Iehle´
(2004), Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2007) or Inoue (2010a).
We now define a competitive equilibrium for a market E .
Definition 21 (competitive equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for a market
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E is a tuple (
(xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ
) ∈ Rℓn+ × Rℓn+ × Rℓ+
such that
(i)
∑
i∈N xˆ
i =
∑
i∈N (yˆ
i + ωi) (market clearing),
(ii) for all i ∈ N , yˆi solves maxyi∈Y i pˆ · yi (profit maximization),
(iii) and for all i ∈ N , xˆi is maximal with respect to the utility function ui in
the budget set {xi ∈ Xi|pˆ · xi ≤ pˆ · (ωi + yˆi)} (utility maximization).
Given a competitive equilibrium its competitive payoff vector is defined as(
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
.
Qin (1993) investigates the relationship between the inner core of an NTU
market game and the set of competitive payoff vectors of a market that represents
this game. He establishes, following a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik (1975),
the two theorems below analogously to the TU-case of Shapley and Shubik (1975).
Theorem 9 (1, Qin (1993)). The inner core of an NTU market game coincides
with the set of competitive payoff vectors of the induced market by that game.
Theorem 10 (3, Qin (1993)). For every NTU market game and for any given
point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and further has
the given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
To show his first result Qin (1993) uses the notion of the induced market of a
compactly convexly generated NTU game as it was already used by Billera and
Bixby (1974). It turns out that the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors
of the induced market coincides with the inner core. For his second result Qin
(1993) fixes an inner core point, denoted by u∗ 1, and chooses one transfer rate
vector λ∗u∗ from an associated λ-transfer game. He modifies the given NTU game
by applying a suitable strictly monotonic transformation on the utility allocations
a coalition can reach. In this modified game the given inner core point u∗ can be
1Qin (1993) considers only NTU games where for all coalitions S ∈ N the generating sets
satisfy CS ⊆ RS+ and CS ∩ RS++ 6= ∅ and hence has u∗ ≫ 0.
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strictly separated from the set of utility allocations the grand coalition can reach
(excluding u∗). Denote the modified game by (N, V¯ ) and the convex compact sets
generating this game by (C¯S)S∈N . A market to prove Theorem 3 of Qin (1993)
can be defined as follows:
Define for all coalitions S ∈ N
A1S =
{(
uS ,−eS ,−eS ,−eS , 0) |uS ∈ C¯S} ⊆ R5n,
A2S =
{(
uS , 0,−eS , 0,−eS) |uS ∈ C¯S} ⊆ R5n,
A3S =
{(
uS , 0, 0,−eS ,−eS) |uS ∈ C¯S} ⊆ R5n.
Let EV¯ ,u∗ =
{(
Xi, Y i, ωi, ui
)
i∈N
}
be the market with for every individual
i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = X = Rn+ × {(0, 0, 0)} × Rn+ ⊆ R5n+ ,
- the production set Y i = Y = convexcone
[⋃
S⊆N
(
A1S ∪A2S ∪A3S
)] ⊆ R5n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}
) ∈ R5n+ ,
- the utility function ui(xi) = min
{
x
(1)i
i ,
(λ∗
u∗
◦u∗)·x(5)i
λ∗
u∗i
}
with xi = (x(1)i, 0, 0, 0, x(5)i) ∈
Xi and x
(1)i
k is the k
th entry of x(1)i.
Note that, similarly to the induced market, all individuals have the same
consumption sets and the same production sets. The individuals differ in their
initial endowment vectors and their utility functions. Qin (1993) introduces the
sets A1S , A
2
S , A
3
S in order to be able to show that the equilibrium price vector for
the 5th group of n goods, pˆ(5), is strictly positive. The ith consumer obtains utility
from the ith component of the vector of the 1st group of n goods and from all the
5th n goods. The dependence of the utility function on all components of the 5th
group of n goods is crucial to show the positiveness of pˆ(5). To prove his result
Qin (1993) shows that the market EV¯ ,u∗ represents the modified game and that
the given inner core point is the unique competitive payoff vector of this economy.
By applying the inverse strictly monotonic transformation to the utility functions
he obtains his result.
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In order to extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets
of the inner core we make use of the fact that for compactly convexly generated
NTU games competitive payoff vectors need necessarily to be in the inner core.
To see this we use a modified version of Proposition 1 from de Clippel and Minelli
(2005).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents and {1, .., ℓ} be the set of commodities.
Let Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ be a convex set containing 0, the consumption set of agent i. Each
individual has a continuous, concave, (weakly) increasing and locally non-satiated
utility function ui : Rℓ+ → R and an initial endowment vector ωi ∈ Rℓ+ \ {0}. Let
Y i ⊆ Rℓ be a non-empty and closed convex cone, the production set of agent i’s
firm.
Lemma 1. Let
((
xˆi
)
i∈N
,
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
, pˆ
)
be a competitive equilibrium such that pˆ ·
ωi > 0 for all individuals i ∈ N . Then (ui (xˆi))
i∈N
is in the inner core of the
game induced by the economy.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix 3.6.1.
3.4 An extension of the Results of Qin (1993)
In the above two theorems Qin (1993) considers on the one hand the whole inner
core and on the other hand a single point in the inner core. In this section we
extend the results of Qin (1993) by showing a similar result for closed subsets of
the inner core. In the following we consider NTU market games and closed subsets
of the inner core with certain properties. We want to ensure that for every point
in a subset of the inner core, denoted by A, of a given NTU market game (N,V )
we can find a normal vector such that this point is strictly separated from the set
V (N) without the point by the hyperplane using this normal vector. If we assume
that the individual rational part of V (N) is strictly convex, then this property
is satisfied. Moreover, we want to assume that this set of normal vectors, where
each normal vector corresponds to one point of the set A, is bounded below by a
strictly positive vector. This means that the exchange rates, represented by the
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normal vectors, within the set A cannot be too extreme. We make the following
definition:
Definition 22 (strict positive separability). A pair [(N,V ), A] consisting of a
compactly, convexly generated and totally balanced NTU game (N,V ) and a
closed subset A of its inner core satisfies strict positive separability [SPS] if the
following condition holds:
There exists an ε > 0 and a mapping λ : A → ∆++, that associates to
every point x ∈ A a normal vector λ(x) = λx, such that
– every point x ∈ A can be strictly separated from the set V (N) \ {x}
using this normal vector λx, i.e.
λx · x > λx · y for all y ∈ V (N) \ {x},
– for all x ∈ A every coordinate of the normal vector λx is strictly
greater than ε, i.e.
λxi > ε for all i ∈ N.
For a pair [(N,V ), A] satisfying strict positive separability there might exist
more than on mapping λ and more than one ε. In the following we always
consider one fixed mapping λ together with one fixed ε satisfying the conditions.
Whenever λ or ε appear we mean the ones we fixed knowing that we might have
chosen different ones.
The assumption of strict positive separability is not as restrictive as it might
appear. It is satisfied for example if the individual rational part of V (N) is strictly
convex and A is a closed subset of the interior of the inner core.
Note that from ε < λxi =
λxi
1 ≤
λxi
λxj
it follows that
ε < min
i,j∈N
λxi
λxj
for all λx, x ∈ A.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the idea of strict positive separability with some exam-
ples. Assume that we have always two players and that the coalitional function
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is given by V ({1}) = V ({2}) = {0} − R+ and V ({1, 2}) is given as indicated in
Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Examples where SPS is satisfied.
In Examples 1, 2, 3 and 4 the set V ({1, 2}) is strictly convex. Here the inner
core is given by all points on the efficient boundary without the two points on
the axes. Thus, the NTU game together with every closed subset of its inner
core satisfies SPS. This holds in particular for single points, finite sets, closed and
connected sets or finite unions of closed sets.
Example 5 illustrates the case where the set V ({1, 2}) is generated by a square
and thus the inner core consists only of the corner point. In this case all the vectors
in the strictly positive two-dimensional simplex support this inner core point. In
order to establish SPS we just take one of these supporting vectors.
In Example 6 the set V ({1, 2}) is generated by a polyhedron. The set A is a
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finite set, consisting of some corner points of the polyhedron. For each of these
corner points there exists a strictly positive normal vector that strictly separates
it from V ({1, 2}) without this corner point. The NTU game (N,V ) and this
choice of the set A satisfy SPS.
Figure 3.2 shows some examples that do not satisfy strict positive separability.
As before assume that we have always two players and that the coalitional function
is given by V ({1}) = V ({2}) = {0} − R+ and V ({1, 2}) is given as indicated in
Figure 3.2.
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u1
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b
b
0
Example 7 Example 8
Figure 3.2: Examples where SPS is not satisfied.
In contrast to Example 6, in Example 7 the set A is chosen to be the line
segment connecting two neighboring corner points of a polyhedron. Hence, all
points in the set A have a common normal vector. Thus, each of this points
cannot be strictly separated from the polyhedron without this point. Therefore,
SPS is not satisfied. In Example 8 each point in the set A can be strictly separated
from V ({1, 2}) without the point. Nevertheless SPS is not satisfied, as the set A
is not closed.
The properties, that we require at this point by considering only [(N,V ), A]
satisfying SPS, are stronger than the properties, that we really need. For example
it is sufficient if we can strictly separate each point in the boundary of A from
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A without it. Nevertheless, we choose to consider [(N,V ), A] which satisfy SPS,
because they allow for an easy interpretation. After the presentation of the main
results we discuss the question, how this can be weakened such that cases as in
Example 6 are included in our results.
Now we prove the following result:
Theorem 11. Let [(N,V ), A] satisfy strict positive separability. Then there exists
a market such that this market represents the game (N,V ) and such that the set
of competitive payoff vectors of this market is the set A.
We show this result for NTU games where for every coalition S ∈ N we have
CS ⊆ RS++. Due to the remark on page 57 this is not a restriction as we can
shift an arbitrary given NTU game such that this condition is satisfied. After
having applied our results we shift back the obtained economies such that they
represent the original game. Hence, in the following if we consider an NTU game,
we always assume for every coalition S ∈ N that we have CS ⊆ RS++.
Before beginning with the construction of a market satisfying the properties
mentioned above, we introduce an auxiliary game and some notation.
Let [(N,V ), A] satisfy SPS. Let (N, V˜ ) be the NTU-game defined by
V˜ (S) =
{
V (S) if S ⊂ N⋂
a∈A
{z ∈ Rn|λa · z ≤ λa · a} if S = N
where λa is as in the definition of SPS.
Note that to define the game (N, V˜ ) we use for every point of the set a ∈ A
just one normal vector that strictly separates this point from V (N) \ {a}. The
games (N,V ) and (N, V˜ ) are equal except for the grand coalition N . For the
coalition N we extend the set V (N) depending on the normal vectors of the set
A. For illustration purposes figure 3.3 shows as an example for two players the
sets V ({1, 2}) and V˜ ({1, 2}).
To describe the relation between (N, V˜ ) and (N,V ) we introduce the following
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b
b
b
b
V˜ ({1, 2})
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
A
0
Figure 3.3: Example: The sets V ({1, 2}) and V˜ ({1, 2}) for N = {1, 2}.
notation: Let z ∈ V˜ (N) and
t¯z = min
{
t ∈ R+|z − teN ∈ V (N)
}
.
Define
C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)∣∣∃t ∈ R+ such that z − teN ∈ CN} .
Then we also have C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)∣∣z − t¯zeN ∈ CN}.
The following remark is easy to verify:
Remark 1.
1. The game (N,V ) is contained in the game (N, V˜ ). This means we have
V (S) ⊆ V˜ (S) for all S ⊆ N .
2. The set C˜N is convex and furthermore, CN ⊆ C˜N .
3. The game (N, V˜ ) is a convexly generated and totally balanced NTU-game,
but it is not compactly generated. In particular we have V˜ (N) 6= C˜N −Rn+.
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4. SPS ensures in particular: If we take x in V (N) outside from A, then x is
in the interior of V˜ (N),
x ∈ V (N) \A ⇒ x ∈ int
(
V˜ (N)
)
.
The second point of the remark can be seen as follows: Take z1, z2 ∈ C˜N and
α ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exist tz1 and tz2 such that z1−tz1eN ∈ CN and z2−tz2eN ∈
CN . As CN is per assumption convex α
(
z1 − tz1eN
)
+ (1 − α) (z2 − tz2eN) ∈
CN . As well the set V˜ (N), as an intersection of halfspaces, is convex and hence
αz1+ (1−α)z2 ∈ V˜ (N). Thus taking tαz1+(1−α)z2 = αtz1 + (1−α)tz2 shows that
(αz1 + (1− α)z2)− tαz1+(1−α)z2eN = α
(
z1 − tz1eN
)
+(1−α) (z2 − tz2eN) ∈ CN .
Therefore, we have αz1 + (1− α)z2 ∈ C˜N . Hence, C˜N is convex.
Definition 23. Define the mapping PA : V˜ (N) −→ V (N) via
PA (x) = x− t¯xeN .
The following figure illustrates the mapping PA for the example from figure
3.3.
b
A
u1
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Figure 3.4: Illustration of the mapping PA for the example from figure 3.3.
Note, that if x ∈ V (N) then t¯x = 0 and PA (x) = x.
Remark 2.
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1. The mapping PA is continuous and its image is V (N).
2. The set C˜N can be written as
C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)∣∣PA (z) ∈ CN} = P−1A (CN) ,
thus we have PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN .
3.4.1 The basic idea
First, we present an intermediate result, which is interesting in itself. For [(N,V ), A]
satisfying SPS we construct a market such that this market represents the given
game and such that the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria with strictly
positive price vectors coincides with the given set A. In the last chapter we show,
how we deal with the case, when the equilibrium price vectors are not necessarily
strictly positive, using a more complicated market with a similar structure.
Definition 24. Let [(N,V ), A] satisfy SPS. Then the market E0V,A is defined by
E0V,A =
{(
Xi, Y i, ui, ωi
)
i∈N
}
with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × {0} × Rn+ × {0} ⊆ R4n,
- the production set
Y i = convexcone



 ⋃
S∈N\{N}, cS∈CS
(
cS ,−eS , cS ,−eS)


∪

 ⋃
c˜N∈C˜N
(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN)



 ⊆ R4n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : Xi → R with ui ((x(1), 0, x(3), 0)) = min(x(1)i , x(3)i ).
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Note that this market has the same consumption and production set for every
individual i ∈ N . The individuals differ in their initial endowment vectors and
their utility functions. There are input and output commodities. The 2nd group
and the 4th group of n commodities are the input commodities and every individ-
ual i ∈ N owns one unit of his personal input commodity in the ith component of
the 2nd and the 4th group of n goods. The 1st and the 3rd group of n goods are
the output commodities, from whose ith component player i ∈ N obtains utility.
The construction of this market is based on the idea of the induced market in
Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin (1993).
We now need to establish first that the market E0V,A is indeed a market for
the NTU market game (N,V ).
Lemma 2. The market E0V,A represents the game (N,V ).
The proof of Lemma 2 is inspired by Billera (1974).
Proof.
• As V (S) = CS − RS+ it is enough to show, that for all S ∈ N the payoff
vectors in the set CS can be achieved by coalition S in the market E0V,A.
Let z ∈ CS . We show, that there exists a feasible S-allocation (xi)
i∈S
with(
yi
)
i∈S
such that ui
(
xi
)
= zi for all i ∈ S.
Define for i ∈ S the consumption plan
xi =
(
z{i}, 0, z{i}, 0
)
and let
yi =
1
|S|
(
z,−eS , z,−eS)
be the production plan for all i ∈ S. By the definition of the consumption
sets we observe xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ S. With regard to the production sets
for S 6= N we have immediately yi ∈ Y i for all i ∈ S. For S = N note that
z ∈ V (N) ⊆ V˜ (N) and thus PA(z) = z. Hence, we have yi ∈ Y i for all
i ∈ N . Observe that ∑
i∈S
(
xi − ωi) =∑
i∈S
yi.
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Hence,
(
xi
)
i∈S
is a feasible S-allocation and
ui
(
xi
)
= zi for all i ∈ S.
• Let (x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0)
i∈S
be a feasible S-allocation with
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i
)
i∈S
in the market E0V,A.
The feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS ,
∑
i∈S
x¯(3)i,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i
)
.
Each production set is a convex cone of a union of convex sets. Hence, an
arbitrary production plan can be written in the following way: Choose one
suitable element from each of the convex sets and build a linear combination
(with non-negative coefficients) of these elements. For the 1st and the 2nd
group of n commodities we obtain, that there exist αiR ∈ R+ for all R ∈ N ,
ziR ∈ CR for all R ∈ N \ {N} and z˜iN ∈ C˜N , such that
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N\{N}
αiR
(
ziR,−eR
)
+ αiN
(
PA
(
z˜iN
)
,−eN) .
As PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN there exists ziN ∈ CN such that PA
(
z˜iN
)
= ziN and
hence we have (
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N
αiR
(
ziR,−eR
)
.
As feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
, for the 2nd group
of n coordinates we have that
eS =
∑
i∈S
∑
R∈N
αiRe
R
=
∑
R∈N
(∑
i∈S
αiR
)
eR.
Thus αiR > 0 implies R ⊆ S and if we define α (R) =
∑
i∈S
αiR, then
(α (R))R⊆S is a balanced family for the coalition S. Looking at the 1
st
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group of n coordinates we have
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i =
∑
R⊆S
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
=
∑
{R⊆S|α(R)>0}
α(R)
(
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
)
.
Since CR is convex we have
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRzR ∈ CR
and hence, using totally balancedness,
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S).
>From the definition of the utility function we obtain ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0
) ≤
x¯
(1)i
i . Since
(
x¯
(1)i
i
)
i∈S
≤ ∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S) we have by the S-comprehensiveness
of V (S) that
(
ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0
))
i∈S
∈ V (S).
We verify that the payoff vectors in the set A are indeed competitive payoff
vectors of the market E0V,A:
Proposition 9. Every point in the set A is equilibrium payoff vector of the market
E0V,A.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and λa ∈ ∆ be a normal vector such that a is in the core of the
λa-transfer game. We know that λa is strictly positive (compare the remark on
page 60). By the assumption that CN ⊆ RN++ we know that a is strictly positive.
To prove the proposition, we show that the consumption and production plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
a{i}, 0, a{i}, 0
))
i∈N
and (
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
a,−eN , a,−eN)))
i∈N
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together with the price system
pˆ = (λa, λa ◦ a, λa, λa ◦ a)
constitute a competitive equilibrium in the market E0V,A.
First note that as PA(a) = a we have yˆ
i ∈ Y i for all i ∈ N . According to the
remark above, the price system pˆ is strictly positive. As we have a convex-cone-
technology maximum profits are zero. We observe
pˆ · yˆi = 1
n
(
λa · a− (λa ◦ a) · eN + λa · a− (λa ◦ a) · eN) = 0.
Hence, the production plan yˆi is profit maximizing.
As we have a min-type or Leontief utility function, it is optimal for each
agent i to spend his budget in a way such that xˆ
(1)i
i = xˆ
(3)i
i and that he does not
consume anything of the other commodities. Furthermore, he has to spend all
his budget, because the preferences are locally non-satiated and continuous. The
budget constraint is satisfied with equality,
pˆ · xˆi = λa ·
(
a{i} + a{i}
)
= (λa ◦ a) ·
(
e{i} + e{i}
)
= pˆ · ωi
and
xˆ(1)i = a{i} = xˆ(3)i.
Hence, the consumption vector xˆi is utility maximizing on the budget set of agent
i.
Furthermore, the market clearing condition
∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
i∈N
ωi +
∑
i∈N
yˆi
is satisfied.
Thus, we have found a competitive equilibrium with equilibrium payoff vector
(
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
= a.
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Looking again at the competitive equilibrium price vectors in the proof of
Proposition 9 note: For a competitive equilibrium with payoff vector a ∈ A the
equilibrium price vector for the 1st (respectively 3rd) group of n goods, the output
goods, is the normal vector λa separating the point a from V (N). The transfer
rate vectors coincide with the equilibrium prices for the output goods of the
market. The input goods are priced by λa ◦ a. This is the transfer rate vector
weighted by the according point of the set A. Interpreted differently: The input
goods are first weighted by the point a of the set A and afterwards they are priced
by the transfer rate vector λa. The relationship of the transfer rate vectors and
the prices of competitive equilibria was observed in several publications discussing
the relation between NTU games and economies. Examples are Shubik (1985),
Shapley (1987), Trockel (1996) and Qin (1993). Shapley (1987, p. 192) states:
“There is a strong analogy though no formal equivalence that we know of between
the comparison weights that we must introduce in order to obtain a feasible
transfer value and the prices in a competitive market.” Here we obtain a formal
equivalence for the prices of the output goods and an indirect link for the prices of
the input goods. Trockel (1996) investigated this equivalence for NTU bargaining
games and Qin (1993) obtained very similar equilibrium prices as we have here.
Next, we consider the utility allocations outside the set A. Using Lemma 1 it
is sufficient to consider those vectors in the inner core.
Proposition 10. Any payoff vector of a competitive equilibrium of the market
E0V,A with a strictly positive equilibrium price vector is an element of the set A.
Proof. Lemma 1 ensures that every competitive equilibrium payoff vector is in the
inner core. Assume that there exists a competitive equilibrium ((xi)i∈N , (y
i)i∈N , p)
such that its payoff vector (ui(xi))i∈N is in the inner core but not in the set A
and such that the equilibrium price vector is strictly positive, p≫ 0.
Then, there exists an element cN in the inner core outside A such that ui(xi) =
cNi for all player i = 1, ..., n. Let x
i = (x(1)i, x(2)i, x(3)i, x(4)i). By the definition of
the consumption set we know x(2)i = x(4)i = 0 and by the definition of the utility
function we obtain x
(1)i
i ≥ cNi and x(3)ii ≥ cNi for all i = 1, ..., n.
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Claim 1: >From the utility maximization and the strict positivity of the price
vector it follows that we need to have
x
(1)i
i = c
N
i = x
(3)i
i .
The proof of Claim 1 can be found in Appendix 3.6.2.
We get by the market clearing condition: y =
∑
i∈N
(
xi − ωi) = (cN ,−eN , cN ,−eN).
But the production plan y = (cN ,−eN , cN ,−eN ) is not profit maximizing.2
To see this notice the following: As cN is in the inner core but outside the set A
there exists a c˜N with PA
(
c˜N
)
= cN and c˜N ≫ cN . Consider the production plan(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN). Looking at the profits and using the strict positivity
of the price vector we observe
p · y = p(1) · cN − p(2) · eN + p(3) · cN − p(4) · eN
< p(1) · cN − p(2) · eN + p(3) · c˜N − p(4) · eN
= p(1) · PA
(
c˜N
)− p(2) · eN + p(3) · c˜N − p(4) · eN
≤ 0.
Thus, we have found a production plan that has strictly higher profits than y.
This is a contradiction, since y needs to be profit maximizing.
It follows that with strictly positive price vectors the allocations outside the
set A but in the inner core cannot be competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
Combining the two propositions above we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 12. Let [(N,V ), A] satisfy strict positive separability. The set of payoff
vectors of competitive equilibria with a strictly positive equilibrium price vector of
the market E0V,A coincides with the set A.
2Since the individual production sets are convex cones, to check profit maximization it is
sufficient to consider the joint production plans. We have
∑n
i=1 Y
i = Y j for any j ∈ N .
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Positive equilibrium price vectors are required to obtain the above
results
Up to now we always considered competitive equilibria with only strictly positive
equilibrium price vectors. This was indeed necessary. If we also allow for price
vectors that are not strictly positive, then we can construct a competitive equi-
librium with competitive payoff vectors outside the given set A. To see this fix
a /∈ A but in the inner core. Then there exists a˜ ∈ C˜N such that PA (a˜) = a and
a˜≫ a. Consider
xˆi =
(
(PA (a˜))
{i} , 0, a˜{i}, 0
)
=
(
a{i}, 0, a˜{i}, 0
)
for all i ∈ N,
yˆi =
(
1
n
(
PA (a˜) ,−eN , a˜,−eN
))
=
(
1
n
(
a,−eN , a˜,−eN)) for all i ∈ N,
pˆ = (λa, λa ◦ a, 0, 0)
where λa is one normal vector from a λa-transfer game and (PA (a˜))
{i} is
the vector that has as its ith coordinate the ith coordinate of PA (a˜) and zero
coordinates otherwise. Analogously define a˜{i}.
We show that
(
(xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ
)
constitutes a competitive equilibrium with
the payoff vector a /∈ A.
• First note that ui(xˆi) = min {ai, a˜i} = ai, since we have a˜≫ a.
• For the profit maximization we obtain
pˆ · yˆi = 1
n
(
λa · a− (λa ◦ a) · eN) = 0.
Since the maximum profits are zero, yˆi is profit maximizing.
• For the utility maximization we obtain that the budget constraint is satis-
fied with equality,
pˆ · xˆi = λa · a{i} = (λa ◦ a) · e{i} = pˆ · ωi,
and furthermore individual i spends all his budget for the ith commodity
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in the 1st group of n goods. Since the prices are equal to zero for the 3rd
and 4th group of n goods he can consume xˆ
(3)i
i = a˜i without using any of
his budget. Thus, xˆi is utility maximizing.
• Moreover, the market clearing condition is satisfied
∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
i∈N
ωi +
∑
i∈N
yˆi.
Thus, we have found a competitive equilibrium with equilibrium payoff vector
(
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
= a /∈ A.
3.4.2 The main results
In order to deal with the general case without assuming the strict positivity of
price vectors, we modify the market from the previous section in an appropri-
ate way. This modification allows us to show, that the prices of the 3rd group
of n commodities are strictly positive, p(3) ≫ 0. For the rest of this section let
[(N,V ), A] satisfy SPS. To simplify the notation of the market, we introduce some
sets before:
For the definition of the production sets define for all coalitions S ∈ N \ {N}
A1S =
{(
cS ,−eS , cS ,−eS ,−eS) |cS ∈ CS} ,
A2S =
{(
cS , 0, cS ,−eS , 0) |cS ∈ CS} ,
A3S =
{(
cS , 0, cS , 0,−eS) |cS ∈ CS}
and for the grand coalition N define
A1N =
{(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN ,−eN) |c˜N ∈ C˜N} ,
A2N =
{(
PA
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N ,−eN , 0) |c˜N ∈ C˜N} ,
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A3N =
{(
PA
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N , 0,−eN) |c˜N ∈ C˜N} .
In order to obtain the result without the assumption of strictly positive price
vectors, we modify the utility functions, the production and consumption sets.
The utility functions do not depend anymore only on the two personal output
commodities but also on the whole second group of output commodities. For
that we add ‘a little bit’ of utility from the other players output goods. This
‘little bit’ is described by using the ε > 0 from the definition of SPS.
Definition 25 (induced A-market). Let [(N,V ), A] satisfy strict positive separa-
bility. Let ε > 0 such that ε < mini,j∈N
λai
λaj
for all a ∈ A. The induced A-market
of the game (N,V ) and the set A is defined by
EV,A,ε = {(Xi, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N}
with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × {0} × Rn+ × {0} × {0} ⊆ R5n,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S∈N
(
A1S ∪A2S ∪A3S
)] ⊆ R5n
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : Xi → R with
ui
(
x(1), 0, x(3), 0, 0
)
= min

x(1)i , x(3)i + ε∑
j 6=i
x
(3)
j

 .
Note that this market is very similar to the market we defined in the previous
section. We change the definition of the production and consumption sets slightly
by introducing a further input commodity. Moreover, the utility functions here
depend on all coordinates of the 3rd group of n goods.
Having defined the induced A-market we prove the following theorem, which
is the main result of this paper:
Theorem 13. Let [(N,V ), A] satisfy strict positive separability. Then there exists
a market such that this market represents the game (N,V ) and such that the set
of competitive payoff vectors of this market is the set A.
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To prove the above theorem we use the induced A-market EV,A,ε as defined
before. We divide the proof of this Theorem into 3 parts: First we show, that
EV,A,ε represents the game (N,V ), in the second part we prove, that every vector
in the set A is a competitive payoff vector, and in the third part we show that
competitive payoff vectors always belong to the set A.
Lemma 3. The induced A-market EV,A,ε represents the game (N,V ).
The proof of Lemma 3 is inspired by Billera (1974).
Proof.
• As V (S) = CS − RS+ it is enough to show, that the payoffs in the set CS
can be achieved by coalition S in the market EV,A,ε. Let z ∈ CS . We
show, that there exists a feasible S-allocation
(
xi
)
i∈S
with
(
yi
)
i∈S
such
that ui
(
xi
)
= zi for all i ∈ S.
Define for i ∈ S the consumption plan
xi =
(
z{i}, 0, z{i}, 0, 0
)
and let
yi =
1
|S|
(
z,−eS , z,−eS ,−eS)
be the production plan for all i ∈ S. By the definition of the consumption
sets we observe xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ S. With regard to the production sets
for S 6= N we have immediately yi ∈ Y i for all i ∈ S. For S = N note that
z ∈ V (N) ⊆ V˜ (N) and thus PA(z) = z. Hence, we have yi ∈ Y i for all
i ∈ N . Observe that ∑
i∈S
(
xi − ωi) =∑
i∈S
yi.
Hence,
(
xi
)
i∈S
is a feasible S-allocation and
ui
(
xi
)
= zi for all i ∈ S.
• Let (x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0, 0)
i∈S
be a feasible S-allocation with
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i, y¯(5)i
)
i∈S
in the market EV,A,ε.
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The feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS ,
∑
i∈S
x¯(3)i,−eS ,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i, y¯(5)i
)
.
Each production set is a convex cone of a union of convex sets. Hence, an
arbitrary production plan can be written in the following way: Choose one
suitable element from each of the convex sets and build a linear combination
(with non-negative coefficients) of these elements. For the 1st and the 2nd
group of n commodities we obtain, that there exist αiR ∈ R+ for all R ∈ N ,
ziR ∈ CR for all R ∈ N \ {N} and z˜iN ∈ C˜N , such that
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N\{N}
αiR
(
ziR,−eR
)
+ αiN
(
PA
(
z˜iN
)
,−eN) .
As PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN there exists ziN ∈ CN such that PA
(
z˜iN
)
= ziN and
hence we have (
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N
αiR
(
ziR,−eR
)
.
As feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
, for the 2nd group
of n coordinates we have that
eS =
∑
i∈S
∑
R∈N
αiRe
R
=
∑
R∈N
(∑
i∈S
αiR
)
eR.
Thus αiR > 0 implies R ⊆ S and if we define α (R) =
∑
i∈S
αiR, then
(α (R))R⊆S is a balanced family for the coalition S. Looking at the 1
st
group of n coordinates we have
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i =
∑
R⊆S
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
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=
∑
{R⊆S|α(R)>0}
α(R)
(
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
)
.
Since CR is convex we have
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRzR ∈ CR
and hence, using totally balancedness,
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S).
>From the definition of the utility function we obtain ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0, 0
) ≤
x¯
(1)i
i . Since
(
x¯
(1)i
i
)
i∈S
≤ ∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S) we have by the S-comprehensiveness
of V (S) that
(
ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0, 0
))
i∈S
∈ V (S).
Proposition 11. Every point in A is an equilibrium payoff vector of the market
EV,A,ε.
Proof. The above proposition holds by an argument similar to the one used in
the proof of Proposition 9. Let a ∈ A and λa ∈ ∆ an associated normal vector.
We know that λa is strictly positive (compare the remark on page 60). Note that
the consumption and production plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
a{i}, 0, a{i}, 0, 0
))
i∈N
and (
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
a,−eN , a,−eN ,−eN)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λa,
2
3
(λa ◦ a) , λa, 2
3
(λa ◦ a) , 2
3
(λa ◦ a)
)
constitute a competitive equilibrium in the market EV,A,ε. The equilibrium price
vector is strictly positive since a and λa are strictly positive.
As we have a convex-cone-technology maximum profits are zero. We observe
pˆ·yˆi = 1
n
(
λa · a− 2
3
(λa ◦ a) · eN + λa · a− 2
3
(λa ◦ a) · eN − 2
3
(λa ◦ a) · eN
)
= 0.
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Hence, the production plan yˆi is profit maximizing.
Next we show that the consumption vector xi is utility maximizing on the
budget set of agent i.
• First notice that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality,
pˆ · xˆi = λa ·
(
a{i} + a{i}
)
=
2
3
(λa ◦ a) ·
(
e{i} + e{i} + e{i}
)
= pˆ · ωi.
• Second the consumption vector of agent i satisfies
xˆ
(1)i
i = xˆ
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
xˆ
(3)i
j .
This means agent i consumes in a way such that he receives the “same
amount of utility” from the 1st group of n goods and the 3rd group of
n goods. For an agent with a min-type or Leontief utility function it is
a necessary condition for utility maximization to consume in such a way
(as long as we have strictly positive prices). This can be seen by similar
arguments like in the proof of Claim 1.
• Third, it remains to check that xˆi is indeed utility maximizing for agent
i on his budget set. Hereby, the crucial point to see is, that agent i only
consumes his personal output goods, and not the output goods of the other
agents. In particular, this means for the 3rd group of n commodities xˆ
(3)i
j =
0 for j 6= i.
First look at the consumption of the 3rd group of n goods when half of the
wealth, λa · a{i}, is used for these goods.
If agent i spends the wealth only for his personal output commodity, he
consumes xˆ(3)i = a{i}. Then we have pˆ(3) · xˆ(3)i = λa · a{i}. Suppose now
agent i changes his consumption plan for the 3rd group of n commodities
to a plan x˜(3)i, where he consumes as well one of the other agents output
goods, meaning x˜
(3)i
j > 0 for one j 6= i. To do this agent i needs to decrease
the consumption in his personal output good and hence xˆ
(3)i
i > x˜
(3)i
i . Set
δ = xˆ
(3)i
i − x˜(3)ii . Then this δ he consumes less gives him an available budget
of λai δ, that he can now use to spend for the other agents commodity j. If
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agent i now spends λai δ for good j, he can purchase
λai
λaj
δ units of good j
which gives him an additional level of “utility” in good j of the 3rd group
of n goods.
Look at
xˆ
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
xˆ
(3)i
j −

x˜(3)ii + ε∑
j 6=i
x˜
(3)i
j


= xˆ
(3)i
i −
(
xˆ
(3)i
i − δ + ε
λai
λaj
· δ
)
= δ − ελ
a
i
λaj
· δ
= δ
(
1− ελ
a
i
λaj
)
.
The above expression is positive since ε <
λaj
λai
for all i, j ∈ N and hence
ε
λai
λaj
<
λaj
λai
λai
λaj
= 1. Thus we have
xˆ
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
xˆ
(3)i
j > x˜
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
x˜
(3)i
j .
The potential loss of utility from consuming less of his personal output
commodity is higher than the potential gain from consuming agent j’s
output commodity given a fixed wealth.
A similar argument also holds true, when agent i changes the consumption
in a way such that he consumes output goods of several other agents.
Thus agent i cannot increase his utility by changing his consumption plan
for the 3rd group of n commodities from xˆ(3)i to x˜(3)i and consuming output
commodities of the other agents j 6= i instead of his own output commodi-
ties.
Now it is easy to see, that spending half of the total wealth for each of
the two groups of output commodities leads to the same amount of utility
in both arguments of the min-type utility function and is hence utility
maximizing.
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Furthermore, the market clearing condition
∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
i∈N
ωi +
∑
i∈N
yˆi
is satisfied.
Thus, we have found a competitive equilibrium with equilibrium payoff vector
(
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
= a.
In the above proof the competitive equilibrium price vectors are linked to the
transfer rate vectors of points in the set A similarly as in the proof of Proposition
9. The output goods are directly priced by the transfer rate vectors and the input
goods are priced by the transfer rate vectors weighted by the according point of
the set A (multiplied by 23).
It remains to show, that vectors not belonging to the set A cannot be com-
petitive payoff vectors. The crucial point is to show, that p(3) is strictly positive.
Lemma 4. Let ((xi)i∈N , (y
i)i∈N , p) be any competitive equilibrium for the induced
A-market. Then p(3) is strictly positive.
Proof. Let ((xi)i∈N , (y
i)i∈N , p) be a competitive equilibrium for the induced A-
market. By the market clearing condition we have
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi +
(
0, eN , 0, eN , eN
)
and by profit maximization p · yi = 0 for all i ∈ N . By the definition of the
production set for each i ∈ N there exist γi1S , γi2S , γi3S ≥ 0 for all S ∈ N ,
ui1S , u
i2
S , u
i3
S ∈ CS for all S ∈ N \ {N} and u˜i1N , u˜i2N , u˜i3N ∈ C˜N such that
yi =
∑
S∈N\{N}

 3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −γi1S eS ,
3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −
(
γi1S + γ
i2
S
)
eS , − (γi1S + γi3S ) eS


+

 3∑
j=1
γijNPA
(
u˜ijN
)
, −γi1NeN ,
3∑
j=1
γijN u˜
ij
N , −
(
γi1N + γ
i2
N
)
eN , − (γi1N + γi3N) eN

 .
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As PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN there exist uijN ∈ CN such that PA
(
u˜ijN
)
= uijN for j = 1, 2, 3.
Thus, we have for all i ∈ N
yi =
∑
S∈N\{N}

 3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −γi1S eS ,
3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −
(
γi1S + γ
i2
S
)
eS , − (γi1S + γi3S ) eS


+

 3∑
j=1
γijNu
ij
N , −γi1NeN ,
3∑
j=1
γijN u˜
ij
N , −
(
γi1N + γ
i2
N
)
eN , − (γi1N + γi3N) eN

 .
By the definition of the consumption set we need to have x(2)i = x(4)i = x(5)i = 0
for all i ∈ N . Hence, for all i ∈ N , we obtain, using the market clearing condition
and the definition of the production sets, for all coalitions S ∈ N
∑
T⊆N
γi1T e
T = eS ,
∑
T⊆N
(
γi1T + γ
i2
T
)
eT = eS ,
∑
T⊆N
(
γi1T + γ
i3
T
)
eT = eS .
It follows that γi2S = γ
i3
S = 0 for all i ∈ N and for all S ∈ N and that for some
i ∈ N and some S ∈ N we have γi1S > 0.
Suppose now, that p
(3)
i = 0 for at least one i ∈ N . We show, that this leads to a
contradiction.
First observe: If p
(3)
i = 0 for one i ∈ N , then p(3)k = 0 for all k ∈ N .
To see this suppose p
(3)
k > 0 for some k ∈ N . For every individual j ∈ N
the consumption bundle xj maximizes his utility function over his budget
set {xˆj ∈ Xj |p · xˆj ≤ p · ωj}. This implies, if p(3)i = 0 that agent j does
not consume any good that has a positive price. If he did so, this would
decrease his available budget whereas he can reach the same utility from
consuming good i that is for free. Precisely p
(3)
i = 0 implies x
(3)j
k = 0 for
all j ∈ N and for all k ∈ N such that k 6= i and p(3)k > 0.
However, the market clearing condition and the definition of the production
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set require ∑
j∈N
x(3)j =
∑
S∈N\{N}
γi1S u
i1
S + γ
i1
N u˜
i1
N ≫ 0,
since ui1S ∈ CS ⊆ RS++ and u˜i1N ≥ ui1N ∈ CN ⊆ RN++. Hence, we obtain a
contradiction and thus p(3) = 0.
Since uj(xˇj) > uj(x¯j) whenever xˇ
(1)j
j > x¯
(1)j
j and xˇ
(3)j > x¯(3)j , it follows from
p(3) = 0 that p
(1)
j must be positive. This holds for all j ∈ N , thus p(1) ≫ 0.
Since CS ⊆ RS++, it follows that p(1) ·ui1S > 0. Since the maximal profits are equal
to zero because of the convex-cone-technology, it must be true that
p(1) · ui1S − p(2) · eS − p(4) · eS − p(5) · eS = 0. (⋆)
For any j ∈ N choose u ∈ C{j} ∩ R{j}++ and γ > 0. Then
(
γu, 0, γu,−γe{j}, 0
)
∈ Y j
and
p ·
(
γu, 0, γu,−γe{j}, 0
)
= γ
(
p
(1)
j u− p(4)j
)
.
Since p(1) ≫ 0, p(4)j must be positive, because otherwise this would contradict the
fact, that maximal profits are 0. Thus, p(4) ≫ 0. Similarly p(5) ≫ 0. Therefore,
from the equation (⋆) above we obtain using −p(5) · eS < 0 and −p(2) · eS ≤ 0
p(1) · ui1S − p(4) · eS > 0.
Hence, we have
p · (ui1S , 0, ui1S ,−eS , 0) = p(1) · ui1S + p(3) · ui1S − p(4) · eS = p(1) · ui1S − p(4) · eS > 0.
But
(
ui1S , 0, u
i1
S ,−eS , 0
) ∈ Y i as it is of the form as points in the set A2S . This is a
contradiction to the fact, that the maximal profits are zero. Thus p(3) ≫ 0.
We use this result to show the remaining Proposition that completes the proof
of the theorem:
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Proposition 12. Any payoff vector of a competitive equilibrium of the market
EV,A,ε is an element of the set A.
Proof. Suppose there exists a competitive equilibrium
((
xi
)
i∈N
(
yi
)
i∈N
, p
)
, such
that
(
ui
(
xi
))
i∈N
= cN with cN /∈ A.
>From Lemma 1 we know that cN is in the inner core.
That Lemma 1 is applicable can be seen as follows: We know that p ·
ωi > 0. Otherwise agent i would have a budget of 0 and we needed to
have p
(2)
i = p
(4)
i = p
(5)
i = 0. This would mean that the production plan(
c{i},−e{i}, c{i},−e{i},−e{i}) with c{i} ∈ C{i} has strictly positive profits.
This would be a contradiction. Thus, for all individuals i ∈ N we have
p · ωi > 0.
By Lemma 4 we know p(3) ≫ 0. Furthermore we know
y =
∑
i∈N
yi =
(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN ,−eN)
for some c˜N ∈ C˜N satisfying PA
(
c˜N
)
= cN as any other production would con-
tradict the market clearing condition in the 1st group of n coordinates. From the
profit maximization we know that c˜N has to be chosen on the boundary of C˜(N)
and hence, since cN /∈ A, we have c˜N ≫ cN . By the market clearing condition
(for the 3rd group of n coordinates) we have
∑
i∈N
x(3)i = c˜N . (⋆⋆)
Furthermore, by utility maximization we obtain
cNi = x
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
x
(3)i
j . (⋆ ⋆ ⋆)
As cN ≪ c˜N , equation (⋆ ⋆ ⋆) implies, that we have x(3)ii < c˜Ni for all i ∈ N .
Hence, for every i ∈ N we have ∑j 6=i x(3)ji > 0. Thus, for every i ∈ N there
exists j 6= i satisfying x(3)ji > 0. Define a mapping M : N −→ N in the following
way: Every i ∈ N is mapped to one j 6= i satisfying x(3)ji > 0. Then, we can find
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k ∈ N and t ∈ N such that M t(k) = k.
We use these results to show some constraints on the equilibrium prices: As
x
(3)M(k)
k > 0, the utility maximization of agent M(k) implies, that we have p
(3)
k ≤
εp
(3)
M(k). Otherwise, agent M(k) would not consume good k, but instead more of
good M(k). In the same way, we can show similar equations for other prices and
obtain
p
(3)
k ≤ εp(3)M(k) ≤ ε2p
(3)
M2(k)
≤ ... ≤ εtp(3)
Mt(k) = ε
tp
(3)
k .
But εt < 1. This is a contradiction.
As already mentioned before, assuming SPS is more restrictive than actually
needed. Requiring the strict separation property for all points in the set A can
be weakened to requiring it only for the boundary points of the set A. In fact,
we need for the construction of the auxiliary game (N, V˜ ) that outside the set
A the efficient boundary is strictly enlarged. This means the property that if we
take x ∈ V (N) \ A, then x being in the interior of V˜ (N) is the crucial property
to eliminate equilibria with a payoff vector outside the set A. Using this weaker
assumption allows a choice of the set A as in Example 7. An example, where
even this weaker version of the strict positive separability property is violated,
and where our approach cannot be applied can be found in Figure 3.5. Assume as
before that we have always two players and that the coalitional function is given
by V ({1}) = V ({2}) = {0} − R+ and V ({1, 2}) is given as indicated in Figure
3.5.
In contrast to Example 7, in Example 8 the set A is chosen in such a way that
it is a closed interval of a line segment connecting two neighboring corner points,
but not the whole line segment. Because of the polyhedral structure none of the
points in the set A can be strictly separated from the set V ({1, 2}) without the
point.
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V ({1, 2})
A
u2
u1
b
b
0
V ({1, 2})
A
u2
u1
b
b
b
b
0
Example 7 Example 9
Figure 3.5: Examples where SPS is not satisfied.
Another important aspect of our result is the fact that the induced A-market
is not determined uniquely. We have some freedom in different aspects of our
construction and obtain a whole class of markets, that can be used to prove our
main theorem:
• First, to define the induced A-market we use the auxiliary NTU game
(N, V˜ ) where we enlarge the given NTU game (N,V ). For this enlargement
we use for every inner core point one of its normal vectors. This normal
vector is not always unique.
• Second, for the auxiliary game (N, V˜ ) we define the mapping PA which can
be chosen in different ways. The important property is that for the points
outside the given subset of the inner core, A, we have PA(z) ≫ z for all
z ∈ IC(A)\A. Moreover, for points in the given set A we require PA(z) = z
for all z ∈ A.
• Third, we add to the utility function of the induced A-market an ε-term,
that needs to be between certain bounds and hence is not determined
uniquely. Moreover, we can choose different ε for different players.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have continued the work of Shapley and Shubik (1975) and
Qin (1993) to investigate competitive payoff vectors of markets that represent a
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cooperative game and their relation to solution concepts for cooperative games.
We extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the
inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct the induced A-market
depending on a given closed subset of its inner core. This market represents the
game and further has the given set as the set of payoff vectors of competitive
equilibria. More precisely, inspired by the construction of the induced market
of Billera and Bixby (1974) and by the markets that Qin (1993) uses to prove
his two main results, we define a market in an appropriate way to generalize the
results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core. It turns
out that this market is not determined uniquely and thus we obtain a whole class
of markets that has the given closed subset of the inner core as the set of payoff
vectors of competitive equilibria.
In the literature it was already known that one game can be represented by
several markets, see Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin (1993). Our work confirms
that going from NTU games to markets some structural information is added
that is not present in the NTU game. To a given NTU market game we can
associate a huge class of markets that represents the NTU game. In particular,
by choosing the structure, that we add, we can control the set of payoffs of
competitive equilibria.
Another point of view on our results is to analyze situations where we start
with given markets and consider the induced games. Looking at competitive
equilibria and how they appear in the game, we observe that almost everything
is possible. Depending on the specific market the set of competitive equilibrium
payoff vectors might fill up the whole inner core or be almost any closed subset, in
particular any single point. Hence, our result demonstrates that we can not expect
to observe more game theoretic properties of competitive equilibria than knowing
that competitive payoffs are in the inner core. Only by imposing additional
structural assumptions on the markets, for example restricting the class of utility
functions, we may observe additional game theoretic properties.
We establish a link between closed subsets of the inner core and competitive
payoffs of certain economies. Extending the results of Qin (1993) to closed subsets
of the inner core means in particular to establish a link for all solution concepts
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selecting closed subsets of the inner core. Therefore, our results can be seen as a
market foundation of game theoretic solution concepts that select closed subsets
of the inner core. For the particular class of bargaining games a more precise
presentation of the idea of a market foundation can be found in Trockel (1996,
2005) and Brangewitz and Gamp (2011b).
The result presented here includes the result of Qin (1993) for a single point in
the inner core. This holds also in a very general setup by using monotone trans-
formations of utilities in the same way as it was done in Qin (1993). Nevertheless,
if we consider closed subsets of the inner core that contain more than a single
point, the idea to transform the utilities seems not to work. Due to this fact we
assume some separation properties on the game and the given closed subset of its
inner core.
Furthermore, by investigating the NTU case we realized that a simple gener-
alization of the approach of Shapley and Shubik (1975) in the framework of Qin
(1993) does not work and we need to stay closer to the results on NTU games.
More precisely, changing the utility function in the market, that Qin (1993) uses
to prove his second result, in analogy to the TU case of Shapley and Shubik (1975)
to
ui(xi) = min
{
x
(1)i
i , min
u∗∈A
{(
λu
∗ ◦ u∗) · x(5)i
λu
∗
i
}}
does not lead to markets with the desired properties.
Having our result in mind there remains the open question if we can further
weaken our assumptions such that the results can be proved for more general
cases. Another interesting related line of research is to continue to look at the
class of games that are linked to coalition production economies as analyzed by
Inoue (2010b). Given a balanced NTU game Inoue (2010b) defines a coalition
production economy such that this economy represents the game and has more-
over the whole inner core as the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. It
remains an open question if one can find analogously to Qin (1993) and to this
work a coalition production economy such that one inner core point or a certain
92
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
subset of the inner core are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors in this coalition
production economy. Moreover, it is interesting to compare the set of competitive
equilibrium allocations of different market representations of a given NTU mar-
ket game. Does there exist a general and more simple method to obtain desired
competitive payoffs? Can we characterize a class of NTU games where this is
possible? What happens if we restrict our attention for example to bargaining
games?
93
3. COMPETITIVE OUTCOMES NTU
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
For the proof of Lemma 1 we follow the idea of de Clippel and Minelli (2005).
Proof. Let
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
and
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
be a competitive equilibrium allocation at a price
pˆ ∈ Rℓ+ \ {0}. For each individual i ∈ N define the set
Ci =
{
(u,m) ∈ R2|∃zi ∈ Xi : u ≤ ui (zi)− ui (xˆi) ,m ≤ pˆ · (ωi + yˆi − zi)} .
By the concavity of ui, this set is convex. On the other hand, Ci ∩ R2++ = ∅,
as xˆi is optimal for individual i in his budget set.
Suppose (u,m) ∈ Ci and (u,m) ≫ 0, then there exists zi ∈ Xi with
u(xˆi) < u(zi) and pˆ · zi < pˆ · (ωi + yˆi) which means zi gives individual i a
higher utility as xˆi and is affordable under the price system pˆ. This is in
contradiction to the optimality of xˆi.
By the separating hyperplane theorem there exists a non-zero, non-negative vector(
αi, βi
) ∈ R2+ such that we can separate 0 from Ci and obtain
αiui
(
xˆi
) ≥ αiui (zi)− βipˆ · (zi − ωi − yˆi)
for all zi ∈ Xi.
As pˆ · ωi > 0, it follows from the above inequality that we have αi > 0.
To see this suppose αi = 0 (βi > 0). Then, as in equilibrium pˆ · yˆi = 0, we
obtain from the above inequality
0 ≤ pˆ · (zi − ωi − yˆi) for all zi ∈ Xi,
which is not true, as 0 ∈ Xi and pˆ · yˆi = 0. Thus αi > 0.
We can assume αi = 1 without the loss of generality. Moreover, monotonicity
and locally non-satiation of the utility function imply that βi > 0. Let λi = 1
βi
.
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Summing up over all i ∈ S we obtain
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
xˆi
) ≥∑
i∈S
λiui
(
zi
)− pˆ ·∑
i∈S
(
zi − ωi − yˆi)
for all S ⊆ N and for all zi ∈ Rℓ+ with i ∈ S.
If a coalition S could λ-improve on x with
(
x¯i
)
i∈S
(with the production plan
y¯i ∈ Y i), then the previous inequality would be violated, because we have, due
to feasibility, ∑
i∈S
(
x¯i − ωi − y¯i) ≤ 0
and thus we obtain a contradiction by
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)
>
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
xˆi
)
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)− pˆ ·∑
i∈S
(
x¯i − ωi − yˆi)
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)− pˆ ·∑
i∈S
(
x¯i − ωi)
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)− pˆ ·∑
i∈S
y¯i
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)
.
95
3. COMPETITIVE OUTCOMES NTU
3.6.2 Proof of Claim 1
Proof. We show
x
(1)i
i = x
(3)i
i
by contradiction. Then it immediately follows from ui(xi) = cNi that
x
(1)i
i = x
(3)i
i = c
N
i .
Suppose x
(3)i
i > x
(1)i
i . This cannot be utility maximizing in the presence of
strictly positive prices. If player i consumes a little bit less of the ith good of the
3rd group of n goods and invests the - not anymore used - additional budget in
the ith good of the 1st group of n goods, then he can strictly increase his utility.
Precisely, from the assumption ui(xi) = cNi and x
(3)i
i > x
(1)i
i it follows that
x
(1)i
i = c
N
i . For δ sufficiently small, i.e. 0 < δ < x
(3)i
i −x(1)ii , player i can increase
his utility by consuming δ less of the ith good of the 3rd group of n goods and
increasing the consumption in the ith good of the 1st group of n goods by
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δ.
To consume
(
x(1)i +
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δe{i}, 0, x(3)i − δe{i}, 0
)
is still budget feasible for player
i, because
p(1)
(
x(1)i +
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δe{i}
)
+ p(3)
(
x(3)i − δe{i}
)
= p(1)x(1)i + p(3)x(3)i ≤ p · ωi.
Hereby, the last inequality follows from the budget feasibility of xi. Moreover,
the utility of consumer i strictly increases, since
ui
(
x(1)i +
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δ, 0, x(3)i − δ, 0
)
> x
(1)i
i = u
i
(
x(1)i, 0, x(3)i, 0
)
by the choice of δ. This is a contradiction to the assumption that xi is utility
maximizing. Hence, we have x
(3)i
i ≤ x(1)ii .
By exchanging the roles of x
(1)i
i and x
(3)i
i we can analogously show x
(3)i
i ≥ x(1)ii .
Therefore, we have x
(3)i
i = x
(1)i
i .
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Chapter 4
Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash
Bargaining Solutions and
Competitive Payoffs
4.1 Abstract
We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We
show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly
positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the un-
derlying bargaining set are strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every
bargaining game is a market game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude
that for every possible vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solu-
tion there exists an economy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
as its unique competitive payoff vector. We relate the literature of Trockel (1996,
2005) with the ideas of Qin (1993). Our result can be seen as a market founda-
tion for every asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in analogy to the results on
non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games.
4. INNER CORE AND NASH BARGAINING
4.2 Introduction
The inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions represent solution con-
cepts for cooperative games. The inner core is defined for cooperative games
whereas asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions are usually only applied to a sub-
class of cooperative games, namely bargaining games. A recent contribution of
Compte and Jehiel (2010) generalizes the symmetric Nash bargaining solution to
other cooperative games (with transferable utility). In this paper we consider the
relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
for bargaining games. Moreover, as an application of these results we show how
asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions can be justified in a general equilibrium
framework as a competitive payoff vector of a certain economy.
In the first section we give a literature overview to motivate our ideas. In the
second section we recall the definitions of the inner core, a bargaining game and
asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. Afterwards, we investigate for bargaining
games the relationship between the inner core and the set of asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions. Finally, we apply these results to market games and obtain
by this a market foundation of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
4.3 Motivation and Background
The inner core is a refinement of the core for cooperative games with non-
transferable utility (NTU). For cooperative games with transferable utility (TU)
the inner core coincides with the core. A point is in the inner core if there exists
a transfer rate vector, such that - given this transfer rate vector - no coalition
can improve even if utility can be transferred within a coalition according to this
vector. So, an inner core point is in the core of an associated hyperplane game
where the utility can be transferred according to the transfer rate vector. Qin
(1993) shows, verifying a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik (1975), that the inner
core of a market game coincides with the set of competitive payoff vectors of the
induced market of that game. Moreover, he shows that for every NTU market
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game and for any given point in its inner core there exists a market that represents
the game and further has this given inner core point as its unique competitive
payoff vector.
The Nash bargaining solution for bargaining games, a special class of cooper-
ative games, where just the singleton and the grand coalition are allowed to form,
goes back to Nash (1950, 1953). The (symmetric) Nash bargaining solution is
defined as the maximizer of the product of the utilities over the individual ratio-
nal bargaining set or as the unique solution that satisfies the following axioms:
Invariance to affine linear Transformations, Pareto Optimality, Symmetry and
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If the bargaining power of the players
is different an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution can be defined as the maxi-
mizer of an accordingly weighted Nash product. Concerning the axiomatization
this means that the Symmetry axiom is replaced by an appropriate Asymme-
try axiom, see Roth (1979). In addition to the axiomatic approach the litera-
ture studies non-cooperative foundations to justify cooperative solutions like the
(asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution. The idea is to find an appropriate non-
cooperative game whose equilibrium outcomes coincide with a given cooperative
solution (see for example Bergin and Duggan (1999), Trockel (2000)). Here, we
study the foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution by having this
solution as a payoff vector of a competitive equilibrium in a certain economy.
There are different approaches to consider the relationship between cooper-
ative games and economies or markets. On the one hand for example Shapley
(1955), Shubik (1959) Debreu and Scarf (1963) and Aumann (1964) consider
economies as games. On the other hand there is the approach to start with a co-
operative game and to consider related economies as it was introduced by Shapley
and Shubik (1969, 1975).
Starting with a market Shapley (1955) considers markets as cooperative games
with two kinds of players, seller and buyer. He introduces in this context the
general notion of an ‘abstract market game’. This is a cooperative game with
certain conditions on the characteristic function. Shubik (1959) extends the ideas
of Edgeworth (from 1881) and studies ‘Edgeworth market games’. In particular
99
4. INNER CORE AND NASH BARGAINING
he shows that if the number of players of both sides in an Edgeworth market
game is the same, then the set of imputations coincides with the contract curve
of Edgeworth. Furthermore, he considers non-emptiness conditions for the core of
this class of games. Debreu and Scarf (1963) show that under certain assumptions
a competitive allocation is in the core. Aumann (1964) investigates, based among
others on the oceanic games from Milnor and Shapley (1978)1, economies with
a continuum of traders and obtains that in this case the core equals the set of
equilibrium allocations.
Starting with a cooperative game Shapley and Shubik (1969) look at these
problems from a different viewpoint and study which class of cooperative games
can be represented by a market. A market represents a game if the set of utility
allocations a coalition can reach in the market coincides with the set of utility
allocations a coalition obtains according to the coalitional function of the game.
Shapley and Shubik (1969) call any game that can be represented by a market a
‘market game’. In the TU-case it turns out that every totally balanced TU game
is a market game. Furthermore, Shapley and Shubik (1975) start with a TU
game and show that every payoff vector in the core of that game is competitive
in a certain market, the direct market. The direct market has a nice structure:
Besides a numeraire commodity there are as many goods as players and initially
every player owns one unit of ‘his personal commodity’. Moreover, Shapley and
Shubik (1975) show that for a given point in the core there exists at least one
market that has this payoff vector as its unique competitive payoff vector.
The idea of market games was applied to NTU games by Billera and Bixby
(1974). Analogously to the result of Shapley and Shubik (1969) they show that
every totally balanced game, that is compactly convexly generated, is an NTU
market game. Qin (1993) compares the inner core of NTU market games with the
competitive payoff vectors of markets that represent this game. He shows that for
a given NTU market game there exists a market such that the set of equilibrium
payoff vectors coincides with the inner core of the game. In a second result, he
shows that given an inner core point there exists a market, which represents the
1The reference Milnor and Shapley (1978) is based on the Rand research memoranda
from the early 1960’s.
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game and has this given inner core point as its unique competitive equilibrium
payoff. Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large
class of closed subsets of the inner core.
Apart from this literature Trockel (1996, 2005) considers bargaining games
directly as Arrow-Debreu or coalition production economies. One difference to
other literature is that he allows to obtain output in the production without
requiring input. In contrast to Shapley and Shubik (1969, 1975), Trockel (1996,
2005) considers NTU games rather than TU games. Motivated by the approach
of Sun et al. (2008) and the approach of Billera and Bixby (1974), Inoue (2010b)
uses coalition production economies instead of markets. Inoue (2010b) shows
that every compactly generated NTU game can be represented by a coalition
production economy. Moreover, he proves that there exists a coalition production
economy such that its set of competitive payoff vectors coincides with the inner
core of the balanced cover of the original NTU game.
Here, we show that we can apply the main results of Qin (1993) to a spe-
cial class of NTU games, namely bargaining games. By that we obtain a market
foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. In contrast to Trockel
(1996, 2005) we do not use Arrow-Debreu or coalition production economies di-
rectly but we consider bargaining games as market games by using the economies
of Qin (1993). By this we relate the approach of Trockel (1996, 2005) on the
one hand with the ideas of Qin (1993) on the other hand. Our result, simi-
lar to Trockel (1996), can be seen as a market foundation of asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions in analogy to the results on non-cooperative foundations of
cooperative games (see Trockel (2000), Bergin and Duggan (1999)).
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4.4 Inner Core and Asymmetric Nash Bar-
gaining Solution
4.4.1 NTU Games and the Inner Core
Let N = {1, ..., n} with n ∈ N and n ≥ 2 be the set of players. Let N = {S ⊆
N |S 6= ∅} be the set of non-empty coalitions and P(Rn) = {A|A ⊆ Rn} be the
set of all subsets of Rn. Define RS+ =
{
x ∈ Rn+|xi = 0, ∀i /∈ S
}
.
Definition 26 (NTU game). An NTU game is a pair (N,V ), where the coali-
tional function is defined as
V : N → P(Rn)
such that for all non-empty coalitions S ⊆ N we have V (S) ⊆ RS , V (S) 6= ∅ and
V (S) is S-comprehensive.
Definition 27 (compactly (convexly) generated). An NTU game (N,V ) is com-
pactly (convexly) generated if for all S ∈ N there exists a compact (convex)
CS ⊆ RS such that the coalitional function can be written as V (S) = CS − RS+.
In order to define the inner core we first consider a game that is related to
a compactly generated NTU game. Given a compactly generated NTU game we
define for a given transfer rate vector λ ∈ RN+ the λ-transfer game.
Definition 28 (λ-transfer game). Let (N,V ) be a compactly generated NTU
game and let λ ∈ RN+ . Define the λ-transfer game of (N,V ) by (N,Vλ) with
Vλ(S) = {u ∈ RS |λ · u ≤ vλ(S)}
where vλ(S) = max{λ · u|u ∈ V (S)}.
Qin (1994, p.433) gives the following interpretation of the λ-transfer game:
“The idea of the λ-transfer game may be captured by thinking of each player as
representing a different country. The utilities are measured in different currencies,
and the ratios λi/λj are the exchange rates between the currencies of i and j.”
As for the λ-transfer game only proportions matter we can assume without loss
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of generality that λ is normalized, i.e. λ ∈ ∆n = {λ ∈ Rn+|∑ni=1 λi = 1}. Define
the positive unit simplex by ∆n++ =
{
λ ∈ Rn++
∣∣∣∣∑ni=1 λi = 1
}
.
The inner core is a refinement of the core. The core C(V ) of an NTU game
(N,V ) is defined as those utility allocations that are achievable by the grand
coalition N such that no coalition S can improve upon this allocation. Thus,
C(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)| ∀S ⊆ N ∀u′ ∈ V (S) ∃ i ∈ S such that u′i ≤ ui}.
Definition 29 (inner core, Shubik (1984)). The inner core IC(V ) of a compactly
generated NTU game (N,V ) is
IC(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)|∃λ ∈ ∆ such that u ∈ C(Vλ)}
where C(Vλ) denotes the core of the λ-transfer game of (N,V ).
This means a vector u is in the inner core if and only if u is affordable by the
grand coalition N and if u is in the core of an appropriately chosen λ-transfer
game. If a utility allocation u is in the inner core, then u is as well in the core.
For compactly convexly generated NTU games we have the following remark:
Remark 3 (Qin (1993), Remark 1, p. 337). The vectors of supporting weights
for a utility vector in the inner core must all be strictly positive.
4.4.2 Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
We consider a special class of NTU games, where only the singleton or the grand
coalition can form, namely NTU bargaining games. Two-person bargaining games
with complete information and the (symmetric) Nash bargaining solution were
originally defined by Nash (1950).
Alternatively to the notion based on Nash (1950)2 we adapt the notation and
interpret bargaining games here as a special class of NTU games where only the
2Following the idea of Nash (1950) a n-person bargaining game with complete information
is defined as a pair (B, d) with the following properties:
1. B ⊆ Rn,
2. B is convex and compact,
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grand coalition can profit from cooperation. Smaller coalitions are theoretically
possible but there are no incentives to form them as everybody obtains the same
utility as being in a singleton coalition. Starting from the definition of a bar-
gaining game based on Nash (1950) we define an NTU bargaining game. Let
B ⊆ Rn be a compact, convex set and assume that there exists at least one b ∈ B
with b ≫ 0. For normalization purposes we assume here that the disagreement
outcome is 0 and that B ⊆ Rn+. Nevertheless the results presented here can easily
be generalized to the case that the disagreement point is not equal to 0.
Definition 30 (NTU bargaining game). Define an NTU bargaining game3 (N,V )
with the generating set B using the player set N and the coalitional function
V : N −→ P (Rn)
defined by
V ({i}) : = {b ∈ Rn|bi ≤ 0, bj = 0, ∀j 6= i} = {0} − R{i}+ ,
V (S) : = {0} − RS+ for all S with 1 < |S| < n,
V (N) : =
{
b ∈ Rn|∃ b′ ∈ B : b ≤ b′} = B − Rn+.
The definition of an NTU bargaining game reflects the idea that smaller coali-
tions than the grand coalition do not gain from cooperation. They cannot reach
higher utility levels as the singleton coalitions for all its members simultaneously.
Only in the grand coalition every individual can be made better off. In the further
analysis we use the above comprehensive version of an n-person NTU bargaining
game.
One solution concept for bargaining games with complete information is that
3. d ∈ B and there exists at least one element b ∈ B such that d≪ a.
(d ≪ b if and only if di < bi for all i = 1, ..., n. This means that there is a utility
allocation in B that gives every player a strictly higher utility than the disagreement
point.)
B is called the feasible or decision set and d is called the status quo, conflict or disagree-
ment point.
3Billera and Bixby (1973a, Section 4) modeled bargaining games in the same way.
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of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. To define this solution we take as
the set of possible vectors of weights or bargaining powers the strictly positive
n-dimensional unit simplex ∆n++.
Definition 31 (asymmetric Nash bargaining solution). The asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution with a vector of weights θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ ∆n++, for short
θ-asymmetric, for a n-person NTU bargaining game (N,V ) with disagreement
point 0 is defined as the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash product given by∏n
i=1 u
θi
i over the set V (N).
4
Hereby, we consider the symmetric Nash bargaining solution as one particular
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, namely the one with the vector of weights
θ =
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
. Hence, the correct interpretation of “asymmetric” in this sense is
“not necessarily symmetric”.
As the NTU bargaining game (N,V ) is compactly convexly generated, the
set V (N) is closed and convex and hence the maximizer above exists. Note that
the assumption that the vectors of weights are from ∆n++ instead of R
n
++ can be
made without loss of generality.
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is a well-known solution concept
for bargaining games. Similarly to the symmetric Nash bargaining solution the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution satisfies the axioms Invariance to affine
linear Transformations, Pareto Optimality and Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives. As for example shown in Roth (1979, p.20), these axioms together with
an appropriate asymmetry assumption fixing the vector of weights characterize
an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Dropping only the Symmetry axiom
without making an appropriate asymmetry assumption is not sufficient to char-
acterize the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. Peters (1992, p.17–25)
shows that one needs to consider so called “bargaining solutions corresponding
to weighted hierarchies” which include as a special case the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions.
4For bargaining games with a general threat point d ∈ Rn the θ-asymmetric Nash product
is given by
∏n
i=1 (ui − di)θi .
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4.4.3 Inner Core versus Asymmetric Nash Bargaining
Solutions
Having introduced the concept of the inner core and the asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution, we investigate the relationship of these concepts for NTU bar-
gaining games. As in NTU bargaining games only the grand coalition can profit
from cooperation, looking at the inner core only transfer possibilities within the
grand coalition need to be considered. Hereby, it turns out that there is a close
connection between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions:
Proposition 13. Let (N,V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game with disagree-
ment point 0 and generating set B ⊆ Rn++.
• Suppose we have given a vector of weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆n++. Then the
θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, aθ, is in the inner core of (N,V ).
• For any given inner core point aθ we can find an appropriate vector of
weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆n++ such that aθ is the maximizer of the θ-
asymmetric Nash product
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i .
Proof.
“⇒” Suppose aθ is the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. To prove that aθ
is in the inner core of (N,V ), we need to show that aθ is in the core of the
NTU bargaining game (N,V ) and that there exists a transfer rate vector
λθ ∈ ∆n+ such that aθ is in the core of the λθ-transfer game (N,Vλθ).
aθ is the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash product
n∏
i=1
uθii
over V (N). Since there exists at least one u≫ 0 in V (N) the θ-asymmetric
Nash product is strictly positive and thus aθ is as well the maximizer of the
logarithm of the θ-asymmetric Nash product
g(u) =
n∑
i=1
θilog(ui).
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Since aθ is the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash product, aθ is Pareto
optimal. Thus, there is no coalition S that can improve upon aθ. Remember
that we are considering bargaining games. Thus in particular no singleton
coalition can improve upon aθ. We conclude that aθ has to be in the core
of the bargaining game (N,V ).
Next, we show that aθ is as well in the core of an appropriately chosen λ-
transfer game. The gradient of the function g(u) at aθ is given by ∂g
∂x
(aθ) =(
θ1
aθ1
, ..., θn
aθn
)
. We show now, that we have
∂g
∂x
(aθ) · x ≤ ∂g
∂x
(aθ) · aθ
for all x ∈ V (N).5 To see this, let x ∈ V (N) and t ∈ [0, 1] and define
xt = tx + (1 − t)aθ. Observe that xt ∈ V (N) since V (N) is convex. Now
we get using the maximality of aθ and by applying Taylor’s Theorem that
0 ≥ g(xt)−g(aθ) = (xt−aθ)·∂g
∂x
(aθ)+O
(
|xt − aθ|2
)
= t(x−aθ)·∂g
∂x
(aθ)+O(t2).
This means that we have
∂g
∂x
(aθ)(x− aθ) ≤ 0
and hence
∂g
∂x
(aθ) · x ≤ ∂g
∂x
(aθ) · aθ.
Taking the normalized gradient, defining
λθ =

 θ1aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi


and observing that λθ ≫ 0 we obtain that aθ is in the core of the λθ-transfer
game (N,Vλθ).
“⇐” If a ∈ Rn+ is some given vector in the inner core of (N,V ), then a is in
the core of (N,V ) and there exists a transfer rate vector λ ∈ ∆n+ such that
5Compare for the idea of this argument Rosenmu¨ller (2000, p. 549).
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a is in the core of the λ-transfer game (N,Vλ). Since a is in the core of
the λ-transfer game and the NTU bargaining game (N,V ) is compactly
generated, we know that λ needs to be strictly positive in all coordinates.
Otherwise at least one coalition could still improve upon a. We have a≫ 0,
because a is in the inner core. If we now take the vector of weights of the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution equal to
θ = (θ1, .., θn) =
(
λ1a1∑n
i=1 λiai
, ...,
λnan∑n
i=1 λiai
)
then a is the maximizer of the asymmetric Nash product
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i over
V (N). Hereby, similar arguments as in the first step can be used to show
that this is the appropriate choice of θ. Hence, a is the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution with weights θ of the bargaining game (N,V ).
One direction of Proposition 13 can be generalized to the case where the
generating set is a subset of Rn+ but not a subset of R
n
++. The set of asymmetric
Nash bargaining solutions is always contained in the inner core, but the inner core
might be strictly larger then the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
This can be seen in the following two-player example with disagreement point
(0, 0):
b
b
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
0
Figure 4.1: Example.
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The two points on the axis are in this example in the inner core, as there exits
a strictly positive transfer rate vector λ, such that they are in the core of the
λ-transfer game. But they cannot result from an asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution as any of these solutions chooses only points that are strictly larger than
the disagreement point in all coordinates. Thus, the inner core is in this example
strictly larger than the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
Hence, in general for underlying bargaining sets from Rn+ and not necessarily
from Rn++ Proposition 13 reduces to the following statement:
Proposition 14. Let (N,V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game with disagree-
ment point 0 and underlying bargaining set from Rn+.
• Suppose we have given a vector of weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆n++. Then
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution aθ for θ is in the inner core of
(N,V ).
4.5 Application to Market Games
4.5.1 Market Games
In this section we use the result from the preceding section to investigate the
relationship between asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive pay-
offs of a market that represents the n-person NTU bargaining game. We start
by showing that every NTU bargaining game is a market game. Afterwards, we
apply the results of Qin (1993) and Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) to our results
from the previous section.
Definition 32 (market). A market is given by E = (Xi, Y i, ωi, ui)
i∈N
where for
every individual i ∈ N
- Xi ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set, where
ℓ ≥ 1 is the number of commodities,
- Y i ⊆ Rℓ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the production set, such
that Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0},
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- ωi ∈ Xi − Y i, the initial endowment vector,
- and ui : Xi → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility function.
Note that in a market the number of consumers coincides with the number of
producers. Each consumer has his own private production set. This assumption
is not as restrictive as it appears to be. A given private ownership economy
can be transformed into an economy with the same number of consumers and
producers without changing the set of competitive equilibria or possible utility
allocations, see for example Qin and Shubik (2009, section 4). Differently from
the usual notion of an economy a market is assumed to have concave and not just
quasi-concave utility functions.
Let S ∈ N be a coalition. The feasible S-allocations are those allocations
that the coalition S can achieve by redistributing their initial endowments and
by using the production possibilities within the coalition.
Definition 33 (feasible S-allocation). The set of feasible S-allocations is given
by
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ S,∑
i∈S
(xi − ωi) ∈
∑
i∈S
Y i
}
.
Hence, an S-allocation is feasible if there exist for all i ∈ S production plans
yi ∈ Y i such that ∑i∈S(xi − ωi) =∑i∈S yi.
In the definition of feasibility it is implicitly assumed that by forming a coali-
tion the available production plans are the sum of the individually available pro-
duction plans. This approach is different from the idea to use coalition production
economies, where every coalition has already in the definition of the economy its
own production possibility set. Nevertheless, a market can be “formally” trans-
formed into a coalition production economy by defining the production possibility
set of a coalition as the sum of the individual production possibility sets.
Definition 34 (NTU market game). An NTU game that is representable by a
market is aNTU market game, this means there exists a market E = (Xi, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N
such that (N,VE) = (N,V ) with
VE(S) = {u ∈ RS | ∃ (xi)i∈S ∈ F (S), ui ≤ ui(xi), ∀ i ∈ S}.
110
4.5. APPLICATION TO MARKET GAMES
For an NTU market game there exists a market such that the set of utility
allocations a coalition can reach according to the coalitional function coincides
with the set of utility allocations that are generated by feasible S-allocations in
the market or that give less utility than some feasible S-allocation.
In order to show that every NTU bargaining game is a market game we use
the following result from Billera and Bixby (1974):
Theorem 14 (2.1, Billera and Bixby (1974)). An NTU game is an NTU market
game if and only if it is totally balanced and compactly convexly generated.
Proposition 15. Every bargaining game (N,V ) is a market game.6
Proof. We show that every bargaining game is totally balanced. Suppose we have
an n-person NTU bargaining game. For totally balancedness we need to check
that for every coalition T ⊆ N and for all balancing weights
γ ∈ Γ(eT ) =

(γS)S⊆T ∈ R+|
∑
S⊆T
γSe
S = eT


we have ∑
S⊆T
γSV (S) ⊆ V (T ).
Since the worth each coalition S ( N can achieve is V (S) = {0} − R+ and since
the grand coalition N can achieve V (N) = B − Rn+ with at least one element
b ∈ B with b≫ 0, we have for all S ⊆ N that V (S) ⊆ V (N) holds. Since for all
S ⊆ N we have for the balancing weights 0 ≤ γS ≤ 1 and
∑
S⊆T γSe
S = eT the
balancedness condition is satisfied. Thus, the bargaining game is totally balanced
and hence a market game.
We now define a competitive equilibrium for a market E .
Definition 35 (competitive equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for a market
E is a tuple (
(xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ
) ∈ Rℓn+ × Rℓn+ × Rℓ+
6This result was already observed by Billera and Bixby (1973a, Theorem 4.1). In their
proof they define a market representation of a bargaining game withm ≤ n2 commodities
and nondecreasing utility functions.
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such that
(i)
∑
i∈N xˆ
i =
∑
i∈N (yˆ
i + ωi) (market clearing),
(ii) for all i ∈ N , yˆi solves maxyi∈Y i pˆ · yi (profit maximization),
(iii) and for all i ∈ N , xˆi is maximal with respect to the utility function ui in
the budget set {xi ∈ Xi|pˆ · xi ≤ pˆ · (ωi + yˆi)} (utility maximization).
Given a competitive equilibrium
(
(xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ
)
its competitive payoff
vector is defined as
(
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
.
Qin (1993) investigates the relationship between the inner core of an NTU
market game and the set of competitive payoff vectors of a market that represents
this game. He establishes, following a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik (1975),
the two theorems below analogously to the TU-case of Shapley and Shubik (1975).
Theorem 15 (3, Qin (1993)). For every NTU market game and for any given
point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and further has
the given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
Theorem 16 (1, Qin (1993)). For every NTU market game, there is a market
that represents the game and further has the whole inner core as its competitive
payoff vectors.7
4.5.2 Results
Now we apply Theorem 3 of Qin (1993) to prove the existence of an economy cor-
responding to some vector of weights θ ∈ ∆n++, such that the unique competitive
payoff vector of this economy coincides with the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution of the n-person NTU bargaining game.
Proposition 16. Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N,V ) (with disagree-
ment point 0 and generating set from Rn+) and a vector of weights θ ∈ ∆n++,
there is market that represents (N,V ) and where additionally the unique competi-
tive payoff vector of this market coincides with the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution aθ of the NTU bargaining game (N,V ).
7A market that satisfies this property is the so called “induced market” introduced by
Billera and Bixby (1974). Its definition can be found in Qin (1993).
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Proof. (N,V ) is a market game by Proposition 15. Moreover, Proposition 13
(or Proposition 14 respectively) shows, that the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution aθ is an element of the inner core. Thus, we can apply Theorem 3 from
Qin (1993).
The market behind Proposition 16 can be taken from Qin (1993) or Brange-
witz and Gamp (2011a) taking necessary monotone transformations of the original
game as done in Qin (1993) into consideration. A version of these markets for
NTU bargaining games can be found in Appendix 4.7.1 and 4.7.3.
An Alternative Market for Proposition 16
The two markets from Qin (1993) or Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) have a quite
complicated structure. In the following we give a simpler version a market, where
strictly positive prices are required. This market is a modification from Brange-
witz and Gamp (2011a).
Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N,V ) and a vector of weights θ ∈
∆++. Let a
θ be the θ-asymmetric bargaining solution. From Proposition 13 (or
Proposition 14 respectively) we know that the corresponding λθ-transfer game is
(N,Vλθ)
λθ =

 θ1aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi

 .
Figure 4.2 illustrates as an example for N = {1, 2} the sets V ({1, 2}) and
Vλθ({1, 2}) for an NTU bargaining game with disagreement point (0, 0).
Let z ∈ Vλθ (N) and t¯z = min
{
t ∈ R+|z − teN ∈ V (N)
}
. Define the mapping
Pθ by Pθ : Vλθ (N) −→ V (N) via Pθ (z) = z− t¯zeN . Figure 4.3 illustrates for the
same example as in Figure 4.2 the mapping Pθ.
The market for the NTU bargaining game (N,V ) and vector of weights θ,
denoted by EV,θ, is defined as follows: Let for every individual i ∈ N be
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × Rn+ × {0} ⊆ R3n,
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Vλθ({1, 2})
V ({1, 2})
aθ
u2
u1
0
b
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the sets V ({1, 2}) and Vλθ({1, 2}).
aθ
u1
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Figure 4.3: Illustration of the mapping Pθ.
- the production set
Y i = convexcone



 ⋃
S∈N\{N}
{(
0, 0,−eS)}


⋃ ⋃
c∈(Vλθ (N)∩R
n
+)
{(
Pθ(c), c,−eN
)}

 ⊆ R3n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, 0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : Xi → R with ui (xi) = min(x(1)ii , x(2)ii )
where x(1)i denotes the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th coordi-
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nate; similarly x(2)i and x
(2)i
j .
It can be shown using the arguments of Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) that
the market EV,θ represents the NTU bargaining game (N,V ) and has as its unique
competitive equilibrium payoff vector (assuming strictly positive equilibrium price
vectors) the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution aθ. For the method of proof
and the details we refer to Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a). Here, we only state
how the competitive equilibria of the market EV,θ look like:
The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
,
(
aθ
){i}
, 0
))
i∈N
and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ, aθ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ, λθ, 2 λθ ◦ aθ
)
with λθ ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθi aθi , constitute a competitive equilibrium in
the market EV,θ.
Considering NTU bargaining games as NTU market games there is a market
such that the same sets of utility allocations are reachable in the game and the
market. Proposition 16 shows that in the class of markets representing a given
NTU bargaining game there is a market that has a given asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution (with a fixed vector of weights) as its unique competitive payoff
vector. We establish a link between utility allocations coming from asymmetric
Nash bargaining in NTU bargaining games and payoffs arising from competitive
equilibria in certain markets. Our result, similar to Trockel (1996), can be seen as
a market foundation of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. Instead of consid-
ering non-cooperative games to give foundations of cooperative solutions, we link
cooperative behavior described by asymmetric Nash bargaining with competitive
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behavior in markets.
In addition a similar interpretation holds true for the whole inner core and
certain of its subsets. Combining Proposition 13 with Theorem 1 of Qin (1993)
we obtain:
Proposition 17. Let (N,V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game with disagree-
ment point 0 and generating set from Rn++. Then there is market that represents
(N,V ) and where additionally the set of asymmetric Nash solutions of (N,V )
coincides with the set of competitive payoff vectors of the market.
Proof. (N,V ) is a market game by Proposition 15 and the set of asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights coincides with
the inner core of (N,V ) by Proposition 13. Thus, we can apply Theorem 1 of
Qin (1993).
The two results of Qin (1993) we use above represent two extreme cases. On
the one hand he uses the whole inner core and on the other hand he uses only
one single point from the inner core. Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) show how
the results of Qin (1993) can be extended to a large class of closed subsets of the
inner core. Using their results we obtain:
Proposition 18. Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N,V ) (with disagree-
ment point 0 and generating set from Rn+) and a closed set Θ ⊂ ∆n++ of strictly
positive vectors of weights. Moreover, assume that every θ-asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution aθ with vector of weights θ ∈ Θ can be strictly separated from
the set V (N) \ {aθ}.8 Then there is market that represents the NTU bargaining
game (N,V ) and the set of competitive payoff vectors of this market coincides
with the set of θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions with vectors of weights
θ ∈ Θ, {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}, of the NTU bargaining game (N,V ).
Proof. (N,V ) is a market game by Proposition 15. Moreover, Proposition 13
(or Proposition 14 respectively) shows, that the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
8More details concerning this assumptions and how they might be weakened can be found
in Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a).
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solution with a vector of weights θ ∈ ∆n++ is an element of the inner core. Fur-
thermore, note that the set of vectors of weights Θ is assumed to be closed. If
we take now as a parameter the vectors of bargaining weights θ and consider the
function that associates to every vector of weights θ the θ-asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution aθ, we observe that this function is continuous in θ.9 Moreover,
as continuous functions map compact sets into compact sets, we know that if we
take a closed set of vectors of weights Θ that the set of θ-asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solutions {aθ|θ ∈ Θ} is closed. Therefore, the assumptions in Brangewitz
and Gamp (2011a) are satisfied and their result can be applied.
Proposition 17 can be regarded as the other extreme case in contrast to the
result in Proposition 16. Knowing that competitive payoff vectors are under weak
assumptions always in the inner core (compare de Clippel and Minelli (2005),
Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a)), in the class of markets representing a game
the market behind Proposition 17 is the market with the largest set of possible
competitive payoff vectors.
Proposition 18 has the following interpretation: If the vector of weights or
interpreted differently the bargaining power is not exactly known, then as an
approximation using Proposition 18 we obtain the coincidence of the set of asym-
metric Nash bargaining solutions with a closed subset of weight vectors and the
set of competitive payoff vectors of a certain market.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The results above show that asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions as solution
concepts for bargaining games are linked via the inner core to competitive payoff
vectors of certain markets. Thus, our result can be seen as a market foundation
of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. This result holds for bargaining
games in general as any asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is always in the
inner core (Proposition 14). The idea of a market foundation parallels the one
that is used in implementation theory. Here, rather than giving a non-cooperative
9To see this we use Theorem 2.4 of Fiacco and Ishizuka (1990) applied to maximization
problems.
117
4. INNER CORE AND NASH BARGAINING
foundation for solutions of cooperative games, we provide a market foundation.
Our result may be seen as an existence result.
Another interesting related line of research, that we do not follow here, is to
consider the recent definition of Compte and Jehiel (2010) of the coalitional Nash
bargaining solution. They consider cooperative games with transferable utility
(TU) and define the coalitional Nash bargaining solution as the point in the core
that maximizes the Nash product (with equal weights). Thus, using Theorem 2 of
Shapley and Shubik (1975) for TU market games, where they define for any given
core point a market that has this point as its unique competitive payoff vector,
gives a market foundation as well for the symmetric coalitional Nash bargaining
solution by choosing the symmetric coalitional Nash bargaining solution as this
given core point. It seems interesting to study how this idea can be generalized for
asymmetric coalitional Nash bargaining solutions or for (asymmetric) coalitional
Nash bargaining solutions for NTU games.
Our approach parallels the one in Trockel (1996, 2005). Trockel (1996) is
based on a direct interpretation of a n-person bargaining game as an Arrow-
Debreu economy with production and private ownership, a so called bargaining
economy. He shows that, given a bargaining economy, the consumption vector
of the unique stable Walrasian equilibrium coincides with the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution with the vector of weights corresponding to the shares in the
production of the bargaining economy. The main difference between our result
and his is that Trockel (1996) did not consider markets in the sense of Billera and
Bixby (1974) or Qin (1993) and thus his bargaining economies do not constitute
the kind of market representation as defined in Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin
(1993). Similarly Trockel (2005) uses coalition production economies to establish
a core equivalence of the Nash bargaining solution. By using the markets of
Qin (1993) we obtained a market foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. This can be seen as a link between the literature on market games (as
in Billera and Bixby (1974), Qin (1993)) and the ideas of Trockel (1996, 2005).
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 The Market behind Proposition 16 from Qin
(1993)
Qin (1993) considers NTU games in general and does not restrict his attention to
NTU bargaining games. The market behind Proposition 16 from Qin (1993) has
a simpler structure if we restrict our attention to NTU bargaining games. The
difference lies in the description of the private production sets.
To show his result Qin (1993) modifies the given NTU game by applying a
strictly monotonic transformation to the utility functions. This allows him to
assume that the given inner core point can be strictly separated in the modified
NTU game. Qin (1993) shows that this market represents the modified game
and that the given inner core point is the unique competitive payoff vector of this
economy. By applying the inverse strictly monotonic transformation to the utility
functions he obtains his result. As we do not want to restrict our attention to
bargaining games with strictly convex generating sets, a similar transformation
need to be applied to the NTU bargaining game to use the market defined below.
The transformed bargaining game is denoted by (N, V¯ ) with generating set
C¯N . Define for the grand coalition N the following sets
A1N =
{(
uN ,−eN ,−eN ,−eN , 0) |uN ∈ C¯N} ⊆ R5n,
A2N =
{(
uN , 0,−eN , 0,−eN) |uN ∈ C¯N} ⊆ R5n,
A3N =
{(
uN , 0, 0,−eN ,−eN) |uN ∈ C¯N} ⊆ R5n,
and for the remaining coalitions
A1S =
{(
0,−eS ,−eS ,−eS , 0)} ⊆ R5n,
A2S =
{(
0, 0,−eS , 0,−eS)} ⊆ R5n,
A3S =
{(
0, 0, 0,−eS ,−eS)} ⊆ R5n,
119
4. INNER CORE AND NASH BARGAINING
Let θ ∈ Θ be a given vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution. Define
λθ =

 θ1aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi

 .
Let EV¯ ,θ =
(
Xi, Y i, ωi, ui
)
i∈N
be the market with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × {(0, 0, 0)} × Rn+ ⊆ R5n+ ,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S⊆N
(
A1S ∪A2S ∪A3S
)] ⊆ R5n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}
) ∈ R5n+ ,
- the utility function ui(xi) = min
{
x
(1)i
i ,
∑n
j=1 λ
θ
j a
θ
j x
(5)i
j
λi
}
where x(1)i denotes the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th coordi-
nate; similarly x(5)i and x
(5)i
j .
Qin (1993) shows that the market EV¯ ,θ represents the modified NTU bar-
gaining game (N, V¯ ) and has as its unique competitive payoff vector aθ, a given
inner core point. For the method of proof and the details we refer to Qin (1993).
Here, we only state for the case of NTU bargaining games how the competitive
equilibria of the market EV¯ ,θ look like:
The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0, 0, 0, e{i}
))
i∈N
and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN ,−eN ,−eN , 0
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ,
1
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
,
1
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
,
1
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
, λθ ◦ aθ
)
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with λθ ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθi aθi , constitute the unique competitive equi-
librium in the market EV¯ ,θ.
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4.7.2 The Market behind Proposition 17 from Qin
(1993)
Similarly to Proposition 16 the market behind Proposition 17 from Qin (1993),
called the induced market of an NTU market game, simplifies for NTU bargaining
games to:
Definition 36 (induced market). Let (N,V ) be NTU bargaining game. The
induced market of the game (N,V ) is defined by EV = (Xi, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N with for
each individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × {0} ⊆ R2n,
- the production set
Y i = convexcone

 ⋃
S∈N\N
{
(0,−eS)} ∪ (CN × {−eN})

 ⊆ R2n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : Xi → R with ui(xi) = x(1)ii
where x(1)i denotes the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th coordi-
nate.
Qin (1993) shows that the market EV represents the NTU bargaining game
(N,V ) and has as its set of competitive payoff vectors the whole inner core. For
the method of proof and the details we refer to Qin (1993). Here, we only state for
the case of NTU bargaining games how the competitive equilibria of the market
EV look like:
Let θ ∈ Θ be a given vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution. Define
λθ =

 θ1aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi

 .
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The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0
))
i∈N
and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ, λθ ◦ aθ
)
with λθ ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθi aθi , constitute a competitive equilibrium in
the market EV .
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4.7.3 The Market behind Proposition 18
Similarly to Proposition 16 and Proposition 17 the market behind Proposition
18 from Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a), called the induced A-market of an NTU
market game, can be simplified for NTU bargaining games (under the assumptions
of Proposition 18). For θ ∈ Θ define
λθ =

 θ1aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi

 .
Let (N, V˜ ) be the NTU-game defined by
V˜ (S) =
{
V (S) if S ⊂ N⋂
θ∈Θ
{
u ∈ Rn|λθ · u ≤ λθ · aθ} if S = N
where aθ denotes the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
Define the mapping PΘ : V˜ (N) −→ V (N) via
PΘ (x) = x− t¯xeN .
Define
C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)∣∣∃t ∈ R+ such that z − teN ∈ CN} .
Then we also have C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)∣∣z − t¯zeN ∈ CN}.
For the definition of the production sets define for all coalitions S ∈ N \ {N}
A1S =
{(
0,−eS , 0,−eS ,−eS)} ,
A2S =
{(
0, 0, 0,−eS , 0)} ,
A3S =
{(
0, 0, 0, 0,−eS)}
and for the grand coalition N define
A1N =
{(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN ,−eN) |c˜N ∈ C˜N} ,
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A2N =
{(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N ,−eN , 0) |c˜N ∈ C˜N} ,
A3N =
{(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N , 0,−eN) |c˜N ∈ C˜N} .
The market EV,Θ using the closed set of weights Θ of the NTU bargaining
game is defined by
EV,Θ = (Xi, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N
with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × {0} × Rn+ × {0} × {0} ⊆ R5n,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S∈N
(
A1S ∪A2S ∪A3S
)] ⊆ R5n
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : Xi → R with
ui
(
xi
)
= min

x(1)ii , x(3)ii + ε∑
j 6=i
x
(3)i
j


where ε is chosen such that ε < λθi =
λθi
1 ≤
λθi
λθj
for all θ ∈ Θ and x(1)i denotes
the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th coordinate; similarly x(3)i
and x
(3)i
j .
Using Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) it can be shown that the market EV,Θ
represents the NTU bargaining game (N,V ) and its set of competitive equilibrium
payoff vectors coincides with the set {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}. For the method of proof and
the details we refer to Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a).
The competitive equilibria of the market EV,Θ are of the following form: Let
θ ∈ Θ be the vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0,
(
aθ
){i}
, 0, 0
))
i∈N
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and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN , aθ,−eN ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ,
2
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
, λθ,
2
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
,
2
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
))
with λθ ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθi aθi , constitute a competitive equilibrium in
the market EV,Θ.
In addition to the market EV,Θ Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) define a market
where the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria with a strictly positive
equilibrium price vectors coincides with the set {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}. This market, denoted
by E0V,Θ, is defined as follows: Let for every individual i ∈ N be
- the consumption set Xi = Rn+ × {0} × Rn+ × {0} ⊆ R4n,
- the production set
Y i = convexcone



 ⋃
S∈N\{N}
{(
0,−eS , 0,−eS)}


∪

 ⋃
c˜N∈C˜N
(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN)



 ⊆ R4n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : Xi → R with ui (xi) = min(x(1)ii , x(3)ii ).
Similarly as for the market presented before, it can be shown using Brangewitz
and Gamp (2011a) that the market E0V,Θ represents the NTU bargaining game
(N,V ) and its set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors with strictly positive
prices coincides with the set {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}. For the method of proof and the
details we refer to Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a). Here, we only state how the
competitive equilibria of the market E0V,θ look like:
126
4.7. APPENDIX
Let θ ∈ Θ be the vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0,
(
aθ
){i}
, 0
))
i∈N
and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN , aθ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ, λθ ◦ aθ, λθ, λθ ◦ aθ
)
with λθ ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθi aθi , constitute a competitive equilibrium in
the market E0V,Θ.
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Chapter 5
Asymmetric Nash Bargaining
Solutions and perfect
Competition
5. NASH BARGAINING AND PERFECT COMPETITION
5.1 Introduction
The idea of this paper is to study the compatibility of competitive equilibria with
concepts of bargaining theory and in particular with the asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution. We consider a pure exchange economy and study this economy
on the one hand with means of general equilibrium theory and on the other hand
with means of cooperative bargaining theory. It turns out that sets of competi-
tive equilibrium allocations and of allocations resulting from an asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution coincide as long as one restricts attention to economies where
agents have homogeneous (of degree 1) utility functions and where the initial
endowments are proportionally distributed. We also study what happens when
these assumptions are relaxed or changed. Our result holds as well if the agents
have utility functions that are homogeneous of the same degree k with 0 < k ≤ 1.
It is well known that in general there does not exist a cooperative solution
that always yields the same allocations as the competitive equilibrium. Sertel
and Yildiz (2003) show in the context of pure exchange economies interpreted as
bargaining games ”that there are distinct exchange economies whose Walrasian
equilibrium welfare payoffs disagree but which define the same bargaining problem
and should have hence determined the same bargaining solution and its payoffs.”
In the economies, that they consider, agents have utility functions that are not
homogeneous. Furthermore, the endowments are not proportionally distributed.
Therefore, the results of Sertel and Yildiz (2003) just show the impossibility of
a Walrasian bargaining solution in a very general setup. Under more restric-
tive conditions it is possible to give a bargaining solution that yields the same
allocation as Walrasian equilibria. John (2005) considers economies with linear
utility functions and proportionally divided endowments. In this situation a cer-
tain asymmetric Nash bargaining solution yields exactly competitive equilibrium
allocations. Moulin (2003) mentions only in passing that there should exist a ver-
sion of the result of John (2005) in the context of homogeneous utility functions.
Our work offers such a more general version of the results of John (2005) but
also demonstrates the limitations of the approach. The result is not robust and
already with other utility representations of the same preferences the implications
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of the result do not hold anymore.
Comparing economies and games it is well known that payoffs of utility allo-
cations generated by competitive equilibria are in the core of the game induced
by the economy. De Clippel and Minelli (2005) even show that payoffs of compet-
itive equilibrium allocations are under mild conditions not only in the core, but
even in the inner core, a refinement of the core. But this result can be regarded
as being sharp. For example Qin (1993) shows for markets, a certain class of
economies with production, that every single point in the inner core of a so called
market game can be the payoff of an equilibrium of some economy inducing this
game. So, payoffs of utility allocations generated by competitive equilibria can be
mainly anything within the inner core. This conclusion is no more correct under
the restrictive assumption of homogeneous utility functions. Our result illustrates
that, given these assumptions, payoffs of competitive equilibria are not only some
subset of the inner core but are always a certain point in the inner core - the
point that the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution chooses.
There is another branch of literature studying the relation of competitive
equilibria and the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution. Trockel (1996, 2000)
introduces an alternative approach and interprets in an NTU-context bargaining
games directly as Arrow-Debreu or as coalition production economies. He shows
that the unique equilibrium of such an economy coincides with the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution of the underlying game where the weights of the bar-
gaining solution correspond to the shares in production. One difference to other
literature is that he uses a stylized models with outputs in the production with-
out requiring inputs. Also Brangewitz and Gamp (2011b) study the relation of
competitive equilibria and the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. They show
that given a bargaining game there exists a market that represents this game and
the utility allocations given by competitive equilibria coincide with those utility
allocations given by the Nash bargaining solution. Comparing Trockel (1996,
2000) and Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) with the results of this work the main
difference is that Trockel (1996, 2000) as well as Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a)
start with a cooperative game and look at certain induced economies. The com-
petitive equilibrium allocations in those economies coincide with the allocations
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generated by an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Here we start with an
economy and compare this result with an induced bargaining game.
Ervig and Haake (2005) also compare economies and bargaining games. They
show that in their model the payoffs of competitive equilibria coincide with payoffs
resulting from asymmetric versions of the Perles-Maschler bargaining solution.
The main reason for their different result is that they restrict consumer demand
by the total endowments of the economy.
One aim of this work is to clarify the relation of the articles of Sertel and
Yildiz (2003) and John (2005) with results of Chipman and Moore (1979) and
Polterovich (1975). Chipman and Moore (1979) discuss the relation of individual
demand, aggregate demand and social welfare functions. They consider in partic-
ular the question whether the market demand function can be seen as the demand
function of some representative consumer. Hereby, they also consider homothetic
preferences and homogeneous utility functions. The main difference to our result
is that they do not take the viewpoint of cooperative game theory and do not
mention the relation to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. As they con-
sider the preferences as the data of the model - and not the utility functions like it
is typically done in cooperative game theory - they do not study problems arising
from different utility representations of the same preferences or from the unusual
choice of the status quo point. Polterovich (1975) also considers pure exchange
economies. He introduces a concept that maps sets of utility functions on feasible
allocations. So, his concept is similar to a social choice rule. It turns out that this
concept is related to competitive equilibria and to the Nash bargaining solution.
Furthermore, he proves a result about aggregate demand that is very close to the
result of Chipman and Moore (1979).
5.2 Basic definitions
5.2.1 Economies
We consider economies with n consumers i = 1, ..., n and m commodities j =
1, ..., l where we also use the notation I = {1, ..., n} and J = {1, ..., l}. An economy
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is a tuple
((
(Xi, ui)ni=1
)
, e
)
. Xi = Rl+ is the consumption set of consumer i. Each
consumer is described by a utility function
ui : Xi −→ R (5.1)
which is weakly increasing, locally nonsatiated, concave, continuous and homo-
geneous of degree 1.
The total endowments of an economy are given by the commodity vector e =
(ej)
l
j=1 ∈ Rl++. Denote with E the set of all economies satisfying these proper-
ties.
Denote for a, b ∈ Rl with a · b the scalar product of a and b, i.e. a · b =∑li=1 aibi.
An allocation x = (xi)ni=1 ∈
n×
i=1
Xi is feasible if it satisfies the inequality
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ e.
Denote with A ⊂
n×
i=1
Xi the set of feasible allocations.
To study competitive equilibria of these economies we will have to specify
which agent is endowed with which amount of goods. We will focus on the case
that each agent is endowed with some fraction of the total endowments meaning
that for each i ∈ I there exists some αi ≥ 0 with
n∑
i=1
αi = 1 such that the
endowments of agent i are given by ei = αie. Now we can look at the allocations
that we obtain by applying the concept of the competitive equilibrium to this
situation. We focus on allocations given by competitive equilibria. Therefore, we
use the following definition:
Definition 37. An allocation x¯ =
(
x¯i
)n
i=1
∈ A is called a Walras allocation with
respect to (the ownership or income distribution) α if there exists a price vector
p = (pj)
l
j=1 ∈ Rl+ \ {0} such that
i) For i = 1, ..., n : x¯i maximizes ui
(
xi
)
subject to
xij ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., l,
p · xi ≤ p · (αie) for all i = 1, ..., n
ii)
n∑
i=1
x¯i ≤ e and p ·
(
n∑
i=1
x¯i − e
)
= 0.
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5.2.2 Economies as bargaining games
Another approach to model the situation above is to use cooperative game theory
and in particular bargaining theory. One first analyzes which allocations of utility
are feasible in these economies and uses this to define an induced bargaining
game. In a second step one can apply one of the solution concepts described
in the literature about bargaining games. We start with defining the relevant
concepts:
Definition 38. An n-player bargaining game is a pair V = (U, d) with the
following properties:
1. U ⊂ Rn, d ∈ U ,
2. U is convex and closed,
3. Ud =
{
x ∈ U ∣∣x ≥ d} is bounded,
4. U is comprehensive, i.e. x ∈ U and z ≤ x implies z ∈ U .
Hereby, the status quo point d ∈ Rn is describing the utilities of the agents if
they do not agree to cooperate. If all agents agree to cooperate they are able to
achieve any of the distributions of utilities described by the set U .
A bargaining solution some class of bargaining games U0 is a mapping ϕ that
maps every bargaining game from U0 to Rn and that satisfies
1. ϕ is feasible, i.e. ϕ(U, d) ∈ U ,
2. ϕ is individually rational, i.e. ϕ(U, d) ≥ d,
3. ϕ is Pareto efficient, i.e. ϕ (U, d) is Pareto efficient in U .
The (symmetric) Nash bargaining solution is defined as the maximizer of the
product of the utilities over the individual rational bargaining set or as the unique
solution that satisfies the following axioms: Invariance to positive affine linear
Transformations, Pareto Optimality, Symmetry and Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives. An asymmetric version of the Nash bargaining solution can be
defined as the maximizer of an accordingly weighted Nash product.
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Definition 39. Let α = (αi)
n
i=1 be a vector of weights, i.e. αi > 0 for i = 1, ..., n
and
n∑
i=1
αi = 1. Then the α-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is the bargaining
solution that maps a bargaining game (U, d) to the (unique) maximizer of the the
function
Uα(u) =
n∏
i=1
(ui − di)αi (5.2)
over the set U .
Concerning the axiomatization this means that the Symmetry axiom is re-
placed by an appropriate Asymmetry axiom, see for example Roth (2008, The-
orem 3). Then, the α-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is characterized
through the axioms Covariance with affine linear transformations of utility, In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Individual rationality in addition to
an condition describing the solution on symmetric hyperplane games. Hereby,
we observe for the case α =
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
the well known (symmetric) Nash bar-
gaining solution as a special case of the asymmetric bargaining solution. Hence,
the expression “asymmetric Nash bargaining solution” should be understood as a
specific not necessarily symmetric version of the Nash bargaining solution.
Now, we can consider bargaining games induced by pure exchange economies.
Define a mapping U from the set of economies E to P (Rn+). Given an economy
f = ((ui, )
n
i=1 , e) the set
U(f) :=
{
u ∈ Rn∣∣∃x ∈ A : ui ≤ ui(xi) for all i ∈ I} ⊆ Rn
consists of all feasible utility vectors for this economy. Now we can define a
bargaining game induced by an economy:
Definition 40 (induced bargaining game). The bargaining game induced by an
economy f ∈ E is the pair (U(f), 0) .
By the properties of f it is obvious that U(f) is compactly, convexly generated
and comprehensive and furthermore 0 ∈ U(f). Hence, (U(f), 0) has the usual
properties required for a bargaining problem with status-quo point 0 ∈ Rn+.
135
5. NASH BARGAINING AND PERFECT COMPETITION
Now, we can apply the α-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to this bargain-
ing game. To be able to compare the utility allocations given by the α-asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution with Walras allocations with respect to α we translate
utility allocations to allocations of goods leading to the utilities. Thus, define the
mapping U˜α from the set of allocations to the reals defined by
U˜α (x) =
n∏
i=1
(
ui
(
xi
))αi .
Definition 41. A feasible allocation x¯ ∈ A is called a Nash allocation with
respect to α if it maximizes U˜α on the set of all feasible allocations, i.e. if x¯ is a
solution to
max U˜α(x) subject to
xij ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., l
m∑
i=1
xij − ej ≤ 0 for all j = 1, ..., l
Now, the following Lemma shows that this definition is the“correct”definition.
Lemma 5. A feasible allocation x =
(
xi
)n
i=1
is a Nash allocation with respect
to α if and only if the vector of utilities
(
ui
(
xi
))n
i=1
is the α-Nash bargaining
solution of the bargaining game (U(f), 0).
Proof. Lemma 5 follows directly from the definitions.
5.2.3 A generalization of Chipman and Moore (1979)
The results of Chipman and Moore (1979) will play a crucial role in the proof
of the main result. We present a modified and more general version of their
result. Hereby, we denote with Gi
(
p, ωi
)
the Walrasian demand correspondence
of agent i at price p ∈ Rl+ if he is endowed with the commodity bundle ωi ∈
Rl++; denote with G (p, ω) the set of maximizers of the function U˜
α on the set{
x ∈
n×
i=1
Xi
∣∣ n∑
i=1
p · xi ≤ p · ω
}
.
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Theorem 17. If there exists k > 0 such that for each agent i his utility function
ui is homogeneous of degree k and weakly increasing and if the income shares are
fixed to α (αi ≥ 0 ∀i,
∑
αi = 1), then for any endowment vector ω ∈ Rl+ we have
G (p, ω) =
n∑
i=1
Gi (p, αiω) .
Proof. For the case k = 1 this Theorem is just a reformulation of Theorem 4.2 of
Chipman and Moore (1979) and hence follows directly from their result. While
Chipman and Moore (1979) denote their result in terms of Marshallian demand
we use the notation in terms of Walrasian demand here. This does not make a
crucial difference as for any price p ∈ Rl+ we have that agent i owns the fraction
αi of the total wealth.
For the case k 6= 1 the proof of Chipman and Moore (1979) can be adapted
by using the following two results.
First, if a utility function ui is homogeneous of degree k (and satisfies the
other assumptions) then the corresponding indirect utility function is of the form
Vi(p, p · (αiω)) = (p · (αiω))
k
γi(p)
for a suitable function γi : R
l
+ −→ R+. This follows directly from the fact that
for homothetic preferences the income elasticity of the demand is equal to 1.
Second, one considers the maximization of the product
n∏
i=1
(
(di (p · ω))k
γi (p)
)αi
=
(p · ω)k∏n
i=1 γi (p)
αi
n∏
i=1
dαiki
as a function of (d1, ..., dn) with respect to the constraint di ≥ 0,
∑
di = 1.
Following the proof of Chipman and Moore (1979) the crucial step is to show
that setting di = αi for all i maximizes this product.
Obviously, any solution satisfies di > 0. Removing constant factors and ap-
plying the monotone transformations k
√
and ln to the target function we obtain
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the equivalent maximization problem
max
n∑
i=1
αi ln (di) (5.3)
w.r.t.
∑
di = 1. (5.4)
Using the Lagrange approach we get that for a maximizer of this problem
dˆ1, ..., dˆn there exists λ ≥ 0 such that for all i
αi
dˆi
= λ
and ∑
dˆi = 1.
It is easy to see that λ = 1 and dˆi = αi is the unique solution to this system of
equations.
Hence, dˆi = αi is the unique solution for this maximization problem.
Together with Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 from Chipman and Moore (1979) this
completes the proof.
This result shows that under the given assumptions the function U˜α can be
regarded as the utility function of a representative consumer. While Chipman
and Moore (1979) denote their result in terms of Marshallian demand we use the
notation in terms of Walrasian demand here. Furthermore, compared with the
version of Chipman and Moore (1979) this version is more general as it includes
the case that utility functions are homogeneous of degree k. Hereby, one should
be aware of the fact that the utility functions of all agents have to be homogeneous
of the same degree.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 The main results
Proposition 19. An allocation x¯ =
(
x¯i
)m
i=1
is a Nash allocation with respect to
α if and only if it is a Walras allocation with respect to α.
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Proof. 1. Assume that x¯ is a Walras allocation with respect to α. By the
definition of a Walras allocation there exists a price vector p ∈ Rl+ \ {0}
such that (p, x¯) is an α-Walrasian equilibrium. By definition this means
that for each i the vector x¯i maximizes ui
(
xi
)
subject to xi ≥ 0 and
p · xi ≤ p · (αie). By Theorem 17 this implies that x¯ is a maximizer of the
function
U˜α(x) =
n∏
i=1
ui
(
xi
)αi
on the set
Bp =
{
x ∈
n×
i=1
Xi
∣∣ n∑
i=1
p · xi ≤ p · e
}
.
Notice that
A ⊆ Bp
and that
x¯ ∈ A.
Hence, x¯ also maximizes U˜α(x) on the set A. So, x¯ is a Nash allocation
with respect to α.
2. Let x¯ = (x¯)ni=1 be a Nash allocation with respect to α. By the definition of
Nash allocations the allocation x¯ maximizes U˜α(x) =
n∏
i=1
ui
(
xi
)αi on the
set A. Notice that the function Uα is quasiconcave and that for each i ∈ I
the utility function ui is concave.
Therefore the set
T =
{
z ∈ Rl+
∣∣∃xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, ..., n, such that ∑xi = z, U˜α (x1, ..., xn) > U˜α (x¯)}
is convex. Furthermore, we observe that e /∈ T . By the separating Hyper-
plane Theorem there exists an vector p ∈ Rl with p 6= 0 such that p·y > p·e)
for all y ∈ T .
As the utility functions are weakly increasing and locally nonsatiated and
as the function Uα is strictly increasing , we observe that for all x ∈ A with
x > x¯ we have U˜α(x) > U˜α(x¯). It follows that p ≥ 0 holds.
Thus, for any allocation xˆ = (xˆ)ni=1 with U˜
α (xˆ) > U˜α (x¯) we have that
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p · (∑ xˆi) > p · e. Furthermore, we observe p ·( n∑
i=1
x¯i
)
≤ p · e. Therefore, x¯
maximizes U˜α(x) on the set Bp. Applying Theorem 17 it follows that for
all i the vector x¯i maximizes ui on
{
xi ∈ Rl+
∣∣p · xi ≤ p · (αie)}. Hence, the
tuple
(
p,
(
x¯i
)n
i=1
)
is an α-Walrasian equilibrium and the allocation x¯ is a
Walras allocation with respect to α.
There are some immediate consequences of this result that can be used to
derive properties of competitive equilibria under the given assumptions:
• Fix some vector of weights α. It is well known that the α-asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution yields a single point. Hence, each agent’s utility
is constant on the set of of Nash allocations with respect to α. As Nash
allocations coincide with Walras allocations the same holds true for Walras
allocations with respect to α.
• As the utility functions are concave and as each agent’s utility is constant on
the set of Nash allocations, it is easy to see that the set of Nash allocations
with respect to α is convex. The same holds true for the set of Walras
allocations with respect to α.
• It is easy to see that an allocation x¯ can be at the same time Nash allocation
with respect to α1 and α2 for different vectors of weights α1, α2. Then, x¯ is
also a Walras allocations with respect to α1 and α2. This implies that x¯ is
an equilibrium allocation for different prices p1 ∈ Rl+ and p2 ∈ Rl+. Thus,
it can happen that an allocation is an equilibrium allocation for different
prices (and different endowments).
• In this context it is individual rational to apply the α-asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution with status quo point 0. This follows from the fact
that Nash allocations coincide with Walras allocation together with the fact
that Walras allocations are individual rational. This point is not a priori
clear as individual rationality has to be seen in relation to the utility of the
endowments vectors. Individual rationality as given in the axiomatization
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of the α-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with status quo point 0 just
shows that the each agent receives at least 0.
The implications of Proposition 19 also hold if all the utility functions are
homogeneous of the same degree k with 0 < k < 1 instead of homogeneous of
degree 1. Hereby, one should be aware of the fact if a function is homogeneous of
degree k > 1 then this function can not be concave.1
Corollary 1. Suppose for some 0 < k < 1 the utility functions of all agents
i ∈ I are homogeneous of degree k and that in addition all assumptions (except
homogeneity of degree 1) from Section 2 hold. Then, an allocation x¯ =
(
x¯i
)m
i=1
is a Nash allocation with respect to α if and only if it is a Walras allocation with
respect to α.
Proof. This Proposition can be shown in the same way like Proposition 19.
Hereby, it is important to see that the homogeneity of degree 1 enters in the
proof of Proposition 19 only indirectly via Theorem 17. But Theorem 17 is also
valid for utility functions that are homogeneous of degree k with 0 < k < 1.
To prove Corollary 1 it is important that all the utility functions are homo-
geneous of the same degree. If the utility functions are homogeneous of different
degrees the implication of the result does not have to hold. This point will be
discussed more precisely in subsection 5.5.3.
5.3.2 Non-proportional endowments
If the initial endowments are not proportionally distributed there is the problem
that it is not clear for which α the α-symmetric Nash bargaining solution could
be applied.
If the initial endowments are ω =
(
ωi
)n
i=1
one can compute an equilibrium price
1To see this suppose that a function f is homogeneous of degree k > 0 and concave and
suppose that for some x we have f(x) > 0. Then we have f(x) = f
(
1
2
0 + 1
2
2x
) ≥
1
2
f(0) + 1
2
f(2x) = 0 + 1
2
f(2x) = 2k−1f(x) ⇒ 1 ≥ 2k−1. If k > 1 this inequality is not
satisfied.
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vector p (ω). As seen before, this price vector does not have to be unique. Now,
one can compute the vector of weights α (p(ω), ω) ∈ Rn+ given by
αi (p(ω), ω) :=
{
t ∈ R+
∣∣p (ω) · (teN) = p · ωi}
for i ∈ N . Using this definition, it is easy to see that Walras allocations (coming
from the vector of initial endowments ω) are also Nash allocations with respect to
α (p(ω), ω). Hereby, one can not just look on the data of the model and knows for
which α the α-bargaining solution is related to competitive equilibria (given ω).
One first has to compute α (p(ω), ω) via the equilibrium prices and then is able
to construct α. Moreover, we observe that the vector α (p(ω), ω) depends on the
choice of the equilibrium price vector and the equilibrium price vector does not
have to be unique. In particular, consider the situation that ω is already a Nash
allocation with respect to some α. Then, it can happen that ω is an equilibrium
allocations for different prices which leads to different choices of α.
On the other hand consider that some allocation x¯ is a Nash allocation for some
α. Then, by Proposition 19 there exists a price p ∈ Rl+ such that (p, x¯) is an
α-Walrasian equilibrium. Then, x¯ is obviously an equilibrium allocation for all(
ωi
)n
i=1
satisfying p ·ωi = p ·(αie) for i = 1, ..., n. Moreover, one should recall that
x¯ can also be a Nash allocation with respect to some α′ 6= α. In this way, one
could find even more vectors of endowments such that x¯ is a Walras allocation with
respect to these endowments. Again, we observe the problem that the relation of
α and ω is only indirect via the equilibrium prices.
To summarize, these result illustrate that it is mathematically possible to
relate Walras allocation and Nash allocations even if the vector of initial endow-
ments is not proportionally distributed. Nevertheless, there is a problem with the
economic interpretation. The relation of ω and α is in both cases indirectly via
equilibrium prices. Thus, the concepts of cooperative game theory and general
equilibrium theory are mixed. We do no more analyze distinct concepts and hence
a comparison of those is not that meaningful.
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5.4 Discussion of the status quo point 0
The status quo point 0 in the previous section may be considered as a surprising
choice. The usual interpretation of the status quo point is that this point describes
the utilities of the agents in the case that cooperation fails to happen. In the
situation of a pure exchange economy no cooperation could be understood as
saying that no trade happens and each agents stays with his initial endowments.
Hence, the first idea for the choice of a status quo point could be to choose it as the
vector of utilities that agents obtain by consuming their own initial endowments.
We choose the status quo point 0 ∈ Rn here. Hereby, the following example
shows that implications of the result of the previous section only hold if one really
chooses the status quo point 0. Choosing the utilities of the endowments of the
agents as status quo point can (and typically does) lead to a failure of the results:
Example 1. Consider an economy with two agents i = 1, 2 and two commodities
j = 1, 2. The utility function of agent 1 is given by
u1(x11, x
1
2) = x
1
1 + 2x
1
2
and the utility function of agent 2 is given by
u2(x21, x
2
2) = 2x
2
1 + x
2
2.
The endowments of the agents are given by
ω1 = ω2 = (1, 2)
what means that the set of total endowments is splitted according to α =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Denote by U the allocations of utility that are feasible in this economy.
The unique Walrasian equilibrium price vector is p¯ = (1, 12). This leads to the
following demand in equilibrium: For agent 1:
x1∗
(
p¯, ω1
)
= (0, 4),
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for agent 2:
x2∗
(
p¯, ω2
)
= (2, 0)
They constitute the unique Walras allocation with respect to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
The utility of the endowments for agent 1 is u1(ω1) = 5 and for agent 2 is
u2(ω2) = 4.
The
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
-Nash solution of the bargaining game (U, (5; 4)) yields the allocation of
utility
(
13
2 ,
19
4
)
. This corresponds to the allocation of goods xˆ =
((
0, 134
)
,
(
2, 34
))
.
This allocation can be regarded as a Nash allocation for the status quo point (5; 4),
but this allocation is different from the Walras allocation x∗ = ((0, 4) (2, 0)).
The
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
-Nash solution of the bargaining game (U, (0)) is u∗ = (8, 4). Hence,
the Nash allocation with respect to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
is x∗ = ((0, 4), (2, 0)) and this coincides
with the Walras allocation with respect to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Figure 1 illustrates the situation of this example. On the axes the utility levels
of the agents are drawn. The point A = (8, 4) is the Nash allocation with respect
to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
and at the same time Walras allocation with respect to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. The
point B = (5, 4) denotes the vector of utilities of the endowments. So it is easy
to see that agent 2 can not improve through trade in the equilibrium compared
to the utility he receives through his endowments. If the point B is chosen as the
reference point the
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
-symmetric Nash bargaining solution yields the point
C =
(
13
2 ,
19
4
)
where both agents have a higher utility than in point B.
There is a further reason why the status quo point 0 has to be chosen here.
Remember that the utility functions of the agents are positively homogeneous.
Hereby, the notation hides the fact that the utility functions are homogeneous
in relation to the reference point 0 ∈ Rl, the consumption bundle that describes
no consumption. Looking at the induced bargaining game this translates to the
status quo 0 ∈ Rn+ where payoffs in terms of utility are in relation to the utility
of consuming nothing, i.e. 0 =
(
ui (0)
)n
i=1
.
144
5.5. ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULT
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
u1
u2
b
A
b
B
b
C
Figure 5.1: Example
5.5 Robustness of the result
5.5.1 Non-homogeneous utility functions
Looking at the results from section 5.3 one could think that these results are in
conflict with the results of Sertel and Yildiz (2003) or the results of Qin (1993).
While here competitive outcomes are captured by the asymmetric bargaining so-
lution, the results of Qin (1993) and others show that competitive outcomes can
be mainly anything within the inner core. The reason for these different results
are the more restrictive assumptions (in particular homogeneity of the utility
functions) in this work. The question arises whether there are less restrictive
assumptions which still lead to the same result.
We begin with an example in the spirit of the results of Sertel and Yildiz (2003). In
this example Nash allocations with respect to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
and Walras allocations with
respect to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
do not coincide. Moreover, in this example the set of Walras al-
locations can not coincide with the set of allocations chosen by any (single-valued)
bargaining solution. The example given in Sertel and Yildiz (2003) illustrates the
same fact. In their example the utility functions are not homogeneous and the
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endowments are not proportionally distributed. In contrast, we give an example
where the endowments are proportionally distributed but the utility functions are
not homogeneous. Hence, our example illustrates that certain assumptions on the
utility functions are necessary to show our result. The example is a modification
of an economy given in Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Example 15.B.2).
Example 2. Consider a pure exchange economy with two consumers 1 and 2 and
two goods where quantities of these goods are typically denoted by x and y. Let
z¯ = 2
8
9 − 2 19 . Let X1 = X2 = R2+ be the consumption set of the agents, let
u1(x, y) = x− 1
8
y−8
and
u2(x, y) = (y − 2 + z¯)− 1
8
(x+ z¯ − 2)−8
be the utility functions of the agents. The endowments of the agents are given by
ω1 = ω2 = (2, z¯).
Hereby, each of the agents owns one half of the total endowments.
Looking for competitive equilibria one obtains that the price vectors p1 =
(1, 1); p2 = (1, 2); p3 = (1,
1
2) are competitive equilibrium price vectors.
The Walrasian demands xi(p, ωi) of agent i = 1, 2 for the prices p1 and p2 are:
• x1(p1, ω1) ≈ (1, 77; 1),
• x1(p2, ω1) ≈ (1, 69; 0, 93),
• x2(p1, ω2) ≈ (2, 23; 0, 54),
• x2(p2, ω2) ≈ (2, 31; 0, 62).
The corresponding indirect utility functions vi
(
p, ωi
)
take the following values in
equilibrium:
• v1 (p1, ω1) ≈ 1, 64,
• v1 (p2, ω1) ≈ 1, 46,
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• v2 (p1, ω2) ≈ 1, 64,
• v2 (p2, ω2) ≈ 1, 77.
We observe in this single economy different payoffs in terms of utility for
different equilibria. If we model the situation with a bargaining situation and
apply any bargaining solution we obtain a unique payoff in terms of utility. Hence,
no bargaining solution can obtain all different equilibrium allocations at the same
time.
To summarize this example shows the economy defined above is also an example
in the spirit of Sertel and Yildiz (2003). In contrast to the example of Sertel
and Yildiz (2003), the total endowments are proportionally distributed in our
example.
The example illustrates that the implications of the results from section 5.3
do not hold if one allows for a very large class of utility functions. But for which
class of utility functions is the result valid? Is it the class of homogeneous utility
functions or is the result even valid for a larger class of utility functions? It is
complicated to give a clear answer to these questions because homogeneity is used
here as a local property in relation to the point 0 ∈ Rl. For example, if the utilities
are not homogeneous in a subset of the consumption set which is not important
for the maximization problems for Nash and Walras allocations the implications
of the result remain valid. The question is whether structural deviations from
homogeneity lead to a breakdown of the results. In subsection 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 we
consider two types of deviations from homogeneity. We will see that although we
modify the utility functions in both cases in a way, such that they still represent
the same preferences, after these modifications Nash and Walras allocations do
no more coincide. Thus, these results illustrate that the result is not robust with
respect to these perturbations of the utility functions.
5.5.2 Shifts of utility functions
For the first modification we consider a situation with two agents and two com-
modities. For simplicity we assume that e = (1, 1). Given some 0 < b < 1 we
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can use the vector α = (b, 1− b) as vector of weights. Suppose that the utility
functions of the agents u1 and u2 are strictly increasing, concave, homogeneous
of degree 1 and continuously differentiable. Furthermore, suppose that for each
i ∈ I and for each j ∈ J we have for all xi−j ∈ Rl−1++ that lim
xij→0
∂ui(xij ,xi−j)
∂xij
= ∞
holds. These conditions ensure interior solutions of the maximization problems
that one considers to find Nash or Walras allocations. Furthermore, Nash and
Walras allocation can be characterized via first order conditions. Given the re-
sults from Proposition 19 we know that Walras allocations with respect to α and
Nash allocations with respect to α coincide.
We modify the situation by changing the utility function of agent 1 to u1ε = u1+ε
for some ε 6= 0. We will refer to situation A as the situation where agent 1 has
the utility function u1 and to situation B as the situation where agent 1 has the
utility function u1ε.
Proposition 20. In situation B Walras allocations with respect to α and Nash
allocations with respect to α do not coincide.
Proof. Suppose that x¯ is a Walras allocation with respect to α in situation B. As
adding ε to u1 is a monotone transformation of utility we have that x¯ is a Walras
allocation with respect to α in situation A. By proposition 19 x¯ is also a Nash
allocation with respect to α in situation A. Now, suppose to the contrary that x¯
is also a Nash allocation with respect to α in situation B.
First, consider situation A. Under the given conditions Nash allocations can
be characterized by first order conditions. Plugging in the feasibility conditions
we can rewrite the constrained maximization problem
max
[
u1
(
x11, x
1
2
)]α [
u2
(
x21, x
2
2
)]1−α
with respect to x1 + x2 ≤ (1, 1)
to the unconstrained maximization problem
max
[
u1
(
x11, x
1
2
)]α [
u2
(
1− x11, 1− x12
)]1−α
.
Taking the partial derivative with respect to x11 and looking at the first order
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condition we obtain
α
(
u1
(
x¯11, x¯
1
2
))α−1 ∂u1
∂x11
(x¯11, x¯
1
2)u
2
(
1− x¯11, 1− x¯12
)1−α
− (1− α) (u1(x¯11, x¯12))α (u2 (1− x¯11, 1− x¯12))−α ∂u2∂x21
(
1− x¯11, 1− x¯12
)
= 0. (5.5)
As u2 is strictly increasing and hence ∂u
2
∂x21
> 0, equation (5.5) can be rewritten as
u1
(
x¯11, x¯
1
2
)
=
α
1− αu
2
(
1− x¯11, 1− x¯12
) ∂u1∂x11 (x11, x12)
∂u2
∂x21
(
1− x¯11, 1− x¯12
) . (5.6)
If one now considers situation B one obtains the following equation in the same
way:
u1
(
x¯11, x¯
1
2
)
+ ε =
α
1− αu
2
(
1− x¯11, 1− x¯12
) ∂u1ε∂x11 (x11, x12)
∂u2
∂x21
(
1− x¯11, 1− x¯12
) . (5.7)
But ∂u
1ε
∂x11
= ∂u
1
∂x11
. Hence, it follows that
u1
(
x¯11, x¯
1
2
)
+ ε =
α
1− αu
2
(
1− x¯11, 1− x12
) ∂u1∂x11 (x¯11, x¯12)
∂u2
∂x21
(
1− x¯11, 1− x¯12
) . (5.8)
Using equation (5.6) it follows
ε = 0.
Hence, as ε 6= 0, we have a contradiction. Thus, x¯ is not a Nash allocations with
respect to α in situation B.
5.5.3 Different degrees of homogeneity
Another way to modify the utility functions is to modify them in a way such that
they are not homogeneous of the same degree. As already mentioned before the
implications of Proposition 19 only hold if the utility functions of all agents are
homogeneous of the same degree k. To see this we start with a situation where
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the utility functions of all agents are homogeneous of degree 1. Then, for some
agent j we modify the utility function of this agent by applying the monotone
transformation (.)m for a sufficiently small m > 0. By applying this monotone
transformation we do not change the preferences of the agent. Nevertheless, we
change the degree of homogeneity of the function from homogeneity of degree 1
to homogeneity of degree m. Obviously, this transformation does not change the
set of Walras allocations with respect to α. But we will see that this modification
changes the set of Nash allocations with respect to α.
More general, we first consider the situation that we modify the utility function of
agent j by applying the transformation (.)mj with mj > 0. This does not change
the set of Walras allocations with respect to α but it changes the set of Nash
allocations in the following way. Looking at the Nash product this transforms to
n∏
i=1
((
ui
(
xi
))mi)αi .
Maximizing this product is equivalent to maximizing the product
n∏
i=1
(
ui
(
xi
))βi
with βi =
miαi
n∑
j=1
mjαj
where we have
n∑
i=1
βi = 1. Hence, this transformation leads
to an application of the β-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Hereby, by
choosing the transformationsmi for i = 1, ..., n we can basically choose any vector
of weights β. The following Proposition shows that using this transformation we
can change the set of Nash allocations (with respect to α). Hereby, we use the
modification of just one utility function.
Proposition 21. Consider a situation where the utility functions of all agents i ∈
I are weakly increasing, locally nonsatiated, concave, continuous and homogeneous
of degree 1 and fix some vector of weights α. Suppose that for some Nash allocation
with respect to α denoted by x¯ there exists an agent j ∈ I and a feasible allocation
xˆ with ∏
i 6=j
(
ui
(
xˆi
))αi >∏
i 6=j
(
ui
(
x¯i
))αi .
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Then, there exists an m > 0 with the following property: If the utility function of
agent j is changed to u˜j =
(
uj
)m
then Walras allocations with respect to α and
Nash allocations with respect to α do not coincide.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for any 0 < m ≤ 1 after the monotone trans-
formation (.)m Nash allocations with respect to α and Walras allocations with
respect to α coincide. We will refer to the situation before applying the mono-
tone transformation as situation 1 and to the situation after the transformation
as situation 2.
First notice that applying the monotone transformation (.)m does not change the
set of Walras allocations with respect to α. We will show that for sufficiently
small m > 0 this transformation changes the set of Nash allocations with respect
to α.
As x¯ maximizes also in situation 2 the α-asymmetric Nash product, we have
(
uj
(
x¯j
)m)αj ∏
i 6=j
(
ui
(
x¯i
))αi ≥ (uj (xˆj)m)αj ∏
i 6=j
(
ui
(
xˆi
))αi .
This implies (
uj
(
x¯j
)m)αj
(uj (xˆj)m)
αj ≥
∏
i 6=j
(
ui
(
xˆi
))αi
∏
i 6=j
(ui (x¯i))αi
and hence (
uj
(
x¯j
)
uj (xˆj)
)m
≥

∏
i 6=j
(
ui
(
xˆi
))αi
(ui (x¯i))αi


1
αj
.
Notice, that the term on the right does not depend on l and is larger than 1. Fur-
thermore, lim
m→0
(
uj(x¯j)
uj(xˆj)
)m
= 1. Hence, for sufficiently small m > 0 the inequality
is not satisfied. This is a contradiction. Hence, there exists an m > 0 such that
in situation 2 Nash and Walras allocations do not coincide.
If the Pareto surface of the induced bargaining game in situation 1 is smooth,
then even for all 0 < m < 1 the sets of Nash and Walras allocations do not
coincide any more. If the Pareto surface of the induced bargaining game has a
kink then it may happen that for some set of real numbers m > 0 we observe the
same set of Nash allocations with respect to α.
151
5. NASH BARGAINING AND PERFECT COMPETITION
Example 1 (continued)
In example 1 we have a kink at the Walras allocation. The vector of utilities (8, 4)
is the Nash bargaining solution for all vectors of weights α with α1 ∈
[
1
2 ,
4
5
]
. If we
apply the monotone transformation to the utility function of agent 2 for some m
this is equivalent to using the vector of weights
( 1
2
1
2
m+ 1
2
,
1
2
m
1
2
m+ 1
2
)
in the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution. Hence, we observe that after applying the monotone
transformation for any m ∈ [14 , 1] Nash allocations with respect to (12 , 12) and
Walras allocations with respect to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
still coincide. If m < 14 then the set of
Nash allocations changes and hence Walras and Nash allocations do not coincide.
There is also a positive implication of this analysis. Suppose that the utility
functions of the agents are not homogeneous of the same degrees and the utility
function of agent i is homogeneous of degree ki. Then, after applying the concave,
monotone transformation (.)
mini∈I ki
ki to the utility function of agent i the utility
functions of all agents are homogeneous of the same degree (and still concave).
Hence, after this transformation Walras and Nash allocations coincide.
5.6 Relation to Polterovich (1975)
It is interesting to see our result as well as the result of Chipman and Moore
(1979) in contrast to an article written by Polterovich (1975). This article is
not very well known since it was originally published in Russian language (in
1973). We have only access to one printed version of a translation of it. In
this article Polterovich considers economies where the number of agents, income
shares, consumption sets and production are fixed and only the (cardinal) utility
functions vary. Hereby, he uses an unusual kind of production describing the
“total vector outputs of consumer goods available to society” without requiring
inputs. To compare this result with ours we focus in the following on the case
that only one vector of output goods is available to the society, namely the vector
of total endowments e. Polterovich introduces a set valued concept that maps
sets of utility functions (u1, ..., un) from a class of utility functions F to feasible
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allocations. Thus, the concept is similar to a social choice rule. The difference
is that it is not defined on the preferences of the agents but on the cardinal
utility functions of the agents. This so called “solution of the distribution
problem” is characterized through 4 axioms. Axiom 1 describes invariance of the
solution with respect to positive linear and affine transformations of the utility
functions. Axiom 2 requires invariance of the solution with respect to changes
of the utility functions in favor of the allocations that are already chosen before
the change of the utility functions. This axiom can be regarded as a cardinal and
weaker version of Maskin monotonicity. The condition would follow from Maskin
monotonicity. Axiom 3 describes the solution on economies where the agents have
identical, linear and monotonically increasing utility functions. It captures ideas
like efficiency and proportionality of the utilities of incomes in those economies.
The fourth axiom says that given a set of utility functions each agent’s utility is
constant on the set of all allocations the solution yields. The formal versions of
the axioms are given in the appendix.
Polterovich (1975) proves in Theorem 6 that under certain conditions the
solution of the distribution problem exists. Furthermore, if the solution exists
it yields exactly the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. The conditions
he requires include the case that the class of utility functions F is the set of
utility functions which are positive and homogeneous. Thus, the solution of the
distribution can be applied in the context of our work.
In a second part Polterovich (1975) considers a characterization of competitive
equilibrium allocations as maximizers of a certain maximization problem.
Theorem 18 (Polterovich, 1975). Suppose that for each i the utility function ui
is positive, homogeneous of degree ki > 0,nonnegative on X
i = Rm+ and that X
i
contains a vector where ui is strictly positive.
(a) The tupel
((
xi
)n
i=1
, p∗
)
is a Walrasian equilibrium
if and only if
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(b) the allocation
(
xi
)n
i=1
forms a solution of the problem
max
n∑
i=1
αi
ki
lnui
(
xi
)
with respect to
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ e, (5.9)
xi ∈ Xi,
and p∗ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the inequality
of (5.9).
Hereby, one should be aware that, given the conditions of the theorem, the
function
n∑
i=1
αi
ki
lnui
(
xi
)
does not have to be concave or quasiconcave. In the proof
he claims that for a maximzer x∗ in (b) it follows that
n∑
i=1
αi
ki
lnui
(
x∗i
) ≥ n∑
i=1
αi
ki
lnui
(
xi
)
+ p∗ ·
(
e−
n∑
i=1
xi
)
for all xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, ..., n. Hence, the second part implicitly assumes the
existence of Lagrange multipliers and (quasi)concavity properties of the target
function. This should have been assumed in the conditions of the Theorem.
Thus, in fact a maximzer in b) maximizes the target function with respect to
p∗ · (∑xi) ≤ p∗ · e, given a price vector p∗. Hence, this result is the analogue of
the result of Chipman and Moore (1979) but only analyzing equilibrium alloca-
tions and not properties of the demand in general. On the other hand the result
is more general in the sense that it includes the case that the utility functions are
homogeneous of a degree not equal to 1. From a historical point of view this is
interesting as Polterovich (1975) was published earlier than Chipman and Moore
(1979).
In a short remark Polterovich (1975) mentions that, given the conditions of
Theorem 18, assuming that the utility functions are homogeneous of the same
degree 0 < k ≤ 1 and assuming that α = ( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
, then his solution of the
distribution yields the same allocation like the symmetric Nash solution for status
quo point 0 in an induced bargaining game. He does not elaborate on the details
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of the proof. In particular, he does not assume concavity of the utility functions
but claims that in the induced bargaining game “all of Nash’s assumptions are
satisfied” where he refers to Nash (1950). But concavity would be necessary to
show that the induced bargaining game is a bargaining game in the sense of
Nash (1950). Without this assumption the bargaining set does not have to be
convex. Moreover, his arguments and the application of Theorem 18 require that
the function
n∑
i=1
αi
ki
lnui
(
xi
)
is quasiconcave. This does not follow from the other
assumptions and so the remark as presented in Polterovich (1975) is not correct.
Nevertheless, if one assumes concavity of the single utility functions ui, then
the function
m∑
i=1
αi
ki
lnui
(
xi
)
is concave. Thus, if one adds this assumption the
results become correct. Then, the (symmetric) Nash solution yields the same
allocations as the solution of the distribution problem of Polterovich and, fur-
thermore, the allocations given by the solution of the distribution problem and
competitive equilibrium allocations coincide. Thus, indirectly Polterovich (1975)
shows that Nash allocations and competitive equilibrium allocations coincide and
obviously he was aware of that. He did not pay attention to this relation as he
was more interested in the relation of the solution of the distribution problem
with the Nash bargaining solution. The results of Polterovich were not observed
in the western world as for example Shubik (1984) writes: ”There is a strong
analogy though no formal equivalence that we know of between the comparison
weights that we must introduce in order to obtain a feasible transfer value and
the prices in a competitive market.” Shubik refers hereby to the λ-transfer value
and must have know that in the context of bargaining games the λ-transfer value
coincides with the Nash bargaining solution. We can state that Polterovich was
the first who observed such a relation.
To summarize, the results of Polterovich (1975) can be used to show our result
in a very similar way like it is done in Section 5.3. Furthermore, Polterovich (1975)
mentions already a relation of the Nash bargaining solution with competitive
equilibria. This result is not as general as ours as Polterovich only considers the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution. Moreover, the conditions he requires are
not sufficient to show the result.
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5.7 Conclusion
This article analyzes the relation of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and
competitive equilibria in the context of homogeneous utility functions and a pro-
portional division of the endowments. It is shown that given some restrictive
assumptions a certain asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions yields the same al-
locations as competitive equilibria. It is interesting to see this result in contrast
to the results of Sertel and Yildiz (2003) who claim that there does not exist
a Walrasian bargaining solution. Our result suggests that the Nash bargaining
solution is in some sense a Walrasian bargaining solution.
We observe that the result requires an unusual choice of the status quo point.
The result also strongly depends on the choice of the utility function representing
the preferences. It is not robust with regard to monotone transformations of the
utility functions. This fact highlights the differences between the cardinal utilities
in cooperative game theory and the ordinal preferences in general equilibrium
theory.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 The solution of the distribution problem
We recall the definition of Polterovich (1975) of his solution of the distribution
problem. Hereby, we focus on the case that one vector of outputs is available
to the society, namely the vector of the total endowments e ∈ Rl+. Xi ⊂ Rl+
denotes the consumption set of agent i. We consider vectors of utility functions
of the agents f =
(
f1, ..., fn
)
that are elements of some class of vectors of utility
functions F .
Definition 42. The correspondence D : F −→
n×
i=1
Xi is called a solution of the
distribution problem in class F , (and the allocation D(f) is called valid), if the
following four conditions hold:
1. The mapping D is invariant with respect to positive linear transformations
of utility function: if f =
(
f1, ..., fn
) ∈ F, f i = ϕi for all i 6= j, ϕj =
af j + b, a > 0, b ∈ R, then D(f) = D(ϕ).
2. Under a change of preferences in favor of the valid allocation, it remains
valid: if f, ϕ ∈ F, f i = ϕi for all i 6= j, ϕj (xj) ≤ f j (xj) for any xj ∈ Xj ,
z =
(
z1, ..., zn
) ∈ D(f) and ϕj (zj) = f j (zj) , then z ∈ D(ϕ).
3. Let all utility functions be identical, linear and monotonically increasing
with respect to all their arguments: f i
(
xi
)
= c ·xi, i = 1, ..., n, c ∈ Rl, c ≥
0. If the feasible allocation z =
(
z1, ..., zn
)
(a) reaches a maximum utility under a given technology, i.e.
n∑
i=1
c · xi = c · e
, and if it
(b) provides proportionality in the utility of income,i.e.
αic · zj = αjc · zi, i, j = 1, ..., n,
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then it follows that z is a valid allocation, i.e. z ∈ D(f).
4. For any f ∈ F all valid allocations are equivalent: if x, z ∈ D(f) it follows
that f i
(
xi
)
= f i
(
zi
)
, i = 1, ..., n.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Within the four chapters of this thesis we have studied several problems arising in
the context of market games. Each chapter discusses its respective topic in detail
and ends with a conclusion summarizing its results. Nevertheless for completeness
we will briefly restate our achievements at this point:
First, we analyze a problem in the context of TU market games. We show
that given a closed, convex subset of the core of a TU market game there exists
a market which represent the game and furthermore has the given subset of the
core as the set of its competitive payoff vectors. The main insight is that within
the class of markets representing a TU market game the markets can have many
different kinds of payoffs. Our work generalizes the results of Shapley and Shubik
(1975) as it contains their results as a special case. Furthermore, it is interesting
to see the techniques of the proofs in contrast to the techniques used in the NTU
case.
In the third chapter of this work we analyze NTU marked games. We extend
the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given
an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed subset
of its inner core. This market represents the game and further has the given set
as the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria. Our work confirms that going from
NTU games to markets some structural information is added that is not present
in the NTU game. To a given NTU market game we can associate a huge class of
markets that represents the NTU game. In particular, by choosing the structure,
Concluding Remarks
that we add, we can control the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria.
In the fourth chapter we consider NTU bargaining games and prove that
those games are NTU market games. Our results show that asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions as solution concepts for bargaining games are linked via the
inner core to competitive payoff vectors of certain markets. Thus, our result can
be seen as a market foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. This
result holds for bargaining games in general as any asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution is always in the inner core. The idea of a market foundation parallels
the one that is used in implementation theory. Here, rather than giving a non-
cooperative foundation for solutions of cooperative games, we provide a market
foundation. Our result may be seen as an existence result.
In the last chapter we consider pure exchange economies and study these
economies on the one hand with means of general equilibrium theory and on
the other hand with means of cooperative bargaining theory. We prove that
sets of competitive equilibrium allocations and of allocations resulting from an
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution coincide as long as one restricts attention
to economies where agents have homogeneous (of degree k ≤ 1) utility functions
and where the initial endowments are proportionally distributed. This result
suggests that in the context of homogeneous utility functions the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution can be seen as a Walrasian bargaining solution.
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Summary
Summary
This dissertation studies several aspects of the relation of general equilibrium
theory and cooperative game theory. Hereby, the focus is on the relation
of solution concepts of the different fields. We discuss the relation of com-
petitive equilibria with solution concepts for cooperative games like core,
inner core or asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. We consider games
and study which solutions appear as equilibria in economies representing
these games. On the other hand we analyze when competitive equilibria
of economies and cooperative solutions applied to induced games yield the
same allocations.
The main chapters of this thesis, each of which self contained in nota-
tion, are based on four articles. Chapters 2 and 3 consider extensions of
the results of Shapley and Shubik (1975) and Qin (1993) to subsets of the
core respectively the inner core. Chapter 2 considers the case of TU market
games while in Chapter 3 the NTU case is analyzed. Chapter 4 investigates
the relation of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions with the inner core in
the context of bargaining games. We conclude that asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solutions are related to certain markets. The fifth Chapter considers
the relation of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive equi-
libria but now starting with economies and looking at induced bargaining
games.
Keywords
Market Games, Coalitional Market Games, Competitive Payoffs, Core, Inner
Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions.
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Cette the`se e´tudie plusieurs aspects des relations entre la the´orie de l’e´quilibre
ge´ne´ral et la the´orie des jeux coope´ratifs. Dans la suite, nous nous concen-
trons sur les relations entre les concepts de solution dans les diffe´rents do-
maines. Nous discutons les relations entre e´quilibre compe´titif d’une part et
les concepts de solution des jeux coope´ratifs d’autre part comme le coeur in-
terne ou les allocations de marchandage de Nash asyme´trique. Nous partons
des jeux et nous e´tudions quelles solutions correspondent a` des e´quilibres des
e´conomies qui repre´sentent ces jeux. Nous e´tudions e´galement quels couples
de solutions conduisent aux meˆmes niveaux d’utilite´.
Les principaux chapitres de cette the`se, chacun e´tant auto-suffisant pour
les notations, sont base´s sur quatre articles. Les chapitres 2 et 3 sont des
extensions des re´sultats Shapley and Shubik (1975) et Qin (1993) a` des sous-
ensembles du coeur ou du coeur interne. Le chapitre 2 est consacre´ aux jeux
de marche´ a` utilite´ transfe´rable alors que le chapitre 3 analyse les jeux a`
utilite´ non transfe´rable. Le chapitre 4 e´tudie les relations entre la solution
de marchandage de Nash asyme´trique avec le coeur interne dans le contexte
des jeux de marchandage. Nous pouvons en conclure que les solutions de
marchandage de Nash asyme´triques sont relie´es a` certains marche´s. Le cin-
quie`me chapitre conside`re les relations entre les solutions de marchandage de
Nash asyme´triques et les e´quilibres compe´titifs mais en partant maintenant
des e´conomies et en regardant les jeux induits.
Mots cle´s
Jeux de Marche´s, Jeux de Marche´s Coope´ratifs, Paiements Compe´titifs,
Coeur, Coeur Interne, Solutions de Ne´gociation Asyme´triques de Nash.
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